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Preface
Economic research for decades has relied on regarding decision makers as purely ra-
tional and selfish, sometimes having perfect knowledge of their environment. While
proponents of present-day behavioral economic research like to point out that already
Adam Smith’s less well known book “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” constitutes
a treatment of behavioral economics (Ashraf et al., 2005), it was only in the 1950s
that mainstream economics started to systematically question some of the assump-
tions made. Examples include Allais (1953) who famously demonstrated the inability
of many decision makers to behave consistently with the independence axiom, one of
the fundamentals of Expected Utility Theory. Similarly, Strotz (1955) formulated a
critique of exponential discounting, arguing that myopia could lead to time-inconsistent
behavior.
Following the work by psychologists who were crossing lines into economics, pri-
marily the group around Daniel Kahneman, behavioral economics slowly rose from
being a niche to becoming a respected field within mainstream economics. By the
1990s, behavioral economics received widespread attention following influential theo-
retical contributions in major general interest journals that offered explanations for
empirical observations standard economic theory could not account for. With the 2002
Nobel Prize in Economics being awarded to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith, and
the 2012 Nobel Prize to Al Roth, behavioral economics and also its sister field exper-
imental economics finally reached center stage of economics research. Thanks to its
prominence, many related disciplines and subfields of economics have picked modeling
approaches that take non-standard behavior into account. Fields such as behavioral
finance or behavioral public policy emerged, thanks to the possibility of considering
systematic decision biases and their interactions with market environments or political
interventions.
Behavioral finance can be considered a subset of traditional finance, in which as-
sumptions about perfect markets and rational agents are relaxed, allowing for cognitive
biases such as anchoring, mental accounting, overconfidence or probability weighting to
play a role. Contributions in this field for example have made us understand, that the
1
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tendency to chase trends inherent to decision patterns in many people can repeatedly
cause bubble-and-crash phenomena (Smith et al., 1988), and that this can be explained
by variations in cognitive skills (Bosch-Rosa et al., 2015). Other insights include the
tendency of people to perceive losses as more painful than the utility of gains of the
same size (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which in combination with myopia may
deliver an explanation for the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi et al., 1995).
Behavioral public policy instead has mainly focused on how behavioral idiosyn-
crasies contribute to outcomes of relevance for public economists (Chetty, 2015). For
example, Chetty et al. (2009) describe how inattention to sales taxes can distort peo-
ple’s shopping behavior, and Choi et al. (2011) show that many people are prone to
choosing dominated choices in their retirement plans. Recent contributions also make
a link to topics of political economy, for example Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) investi-
gate the relationship of movie violence and violent crimes, surprisingly finding that the
attendance of violent movies acts as a substitute for violent behavior, and Card and
Dahl (2011) find that domestic violence increases after the home team loses a football
match although being favored by the odds. The rise of behavioral public policy and
its success at debunking commonly held economic wisdoms has led to some countries
establishing behavioral task forces, such as the United Kingdom’s Behavioral Insights
Team or the United States’ Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, with the aim of
providing legislators help in creating policies that can accommodate behavioral biases
among their constituents.
This dissertation adds to both of these fields, behavioral finance and behavioral pub-
lic policy, by contributing five chapters containing empirical studies. The first three
chapters use laboratory experiments to identify behavioral anomalies and offer expla-
nations for previously observed non-standard economic behavior in the environment of
financial markets and risk-tasking behavior. The last two chapters are concerned with
the malleability of political preferences and the effectiveness of gun policy instruments.
They contain empirical studies in public policy using secondary data sets, both from
historic, as well as contemporary sources.
Chapter 1, which is joint work with Martin Kocher, Stefan Trautmann and Yi-
long Xu, discusses the importance of selection effects in laboratory studies on the
relationship of time pressure and risk-taking behavior. While earlier studies on risky
decision-making usually allow subjects to take as much time as they want, to facilitate
qualitatively good choices, this assumption rarely holds for many real-life decisions in-
volving risk. This is for example the case for stock market traders, who have to react
to incoming information within split-seconds and adjust their portfolio quickly. There-
fore, recent studies have started to analyze how time pressure affects choices when
subjects decide over risky prospects. Kocher et al. (2013) for example find strong shifts
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in behavior when subjects are exposed to time pressure. In the case of mixed gambles
they show that participants are more likely to be attracted by prominent gains and
shy away from prominent losses.
We build on the findings by Kocher et al., as we use mixed gambles and put subjects
under time pressure. In contrast to their paper however, we apply the time pressure
variation also within subjects instead of purely between subjects, allowing us to observe
behavior of every subject also in the absence of time pressure. Because time pressure
usually leads some subjects to violate the time constraint, the observed sample is po-
tentially selected. With the additional within subjects variation, we can particularly
investigate if those who violate the constraint behave differently in the absence of time
pressure. Additionally, we elicit two dimensions of cognitive skills, intellectual capac-
ity (IQ) and intellectual efficiency (IE). Intellectual capacity measures the cognitive
reasoning power, i.e. the extent to which complex information can be handled, while
intellectual efficiency measures the speed at which information is processed. Together
with several other background variables that we collect, such as the locus of control
questionnaire (Rotter, 1966), the self-efficacy scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995)
or a short version of the Big Five personality questionnaire (Gosling et al., 2003), we
then try to predict which traits are associated with the ability to effectively cope with
time pressure.
We find that subjects violating the time constraint indeed show fundamentally
different behavior in the absence of time pressure. Because they make their decisions
more carefully and spend more time on each gamble, they realize significantly higher
expected values. When facing time pressure however, this advantage vanishes. Because
of taking too much time initially, violators only have little time left for later decisions.
This can also be seen in the variance of time spent on any decision, which is much
higher for violators, than for non-violators. Although the choices that violators make
early on yield higher expected values, the choices that they make with only little time
left are so much worse, that when comparing all choices made between violators and
non-violators, there is no significant difference. The fact that they violate the time
constraint however makes them eventually worse off, as we designed the violation to
come with the lowest possible payoff from that decision.
With respect to predictability of violating behavior, our results are more mixed.
Our analysis does not find strong predictive power of either age, gender, IQ, locus
of control, or Big Five. Only IE and self-efficacy seem to somewhat differ between
violators and non-violators, a finding consistent with our expectations and other results
from the literature. When zooming in more closely, we see that while IE is predictive
of being a violator, it is not of decision quality, which is largely influenced by IQ. We
then estimate a simplified parametric decision model of Cumulative Prospect Theory
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for unconstrained choices and see how well this predicts constrained choices. This
prediction we then relate to our elicited background characteristics. We find that higher
measures of IE, self-efficacy, and less time-use in the absence of time pressure make the
fitted model predict behavior under time pressure reasonably well, lending credibility
to the idea that observables relate to decision styles that subjects implement. In
multivariate regression analyses, we then seek to identify which characteristic predicts
success in choices under time pressure best. While we again find some weak evidence
of IE, self-efficacy, and time-use in the absence of time pressure to be predictive, the
overall variation in our outcome variables that we can explain remains very low.
Our findings suggest that different decision styles are a ubiquitous feature of decision
making under risk. Subjects who can cope with time pressure clearly apply different
strategies than those who don’t, an important factor that future studies should take
into account. The fact that behavior is not well predicted by easily obtainable charac-
teristics such as questionnaire answers also matters for practitioners. If applicants for
certain types of jobs are to be filtered for their ability to cope with time pressure, mea-
sures as the ones employed in our study may lack the predictive power to successfully
do so.
In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Martin Kocher and Konstantin Lucks, we
turn from individual decisions to markets. The tendency of human subjects to create
bubble-and-burst phenomena in stylized experimental asset markets experiments has
been a long known fact (Smith et al., 1988). Guidebooks on the psychology of investing
and successful investors such as Warren Buffet have suggested that a lack of self-
control abilities can be damaging when making investment decisions. We test this claim
by implementing an experiment, in which we exogenously reduce some participants’
ability to exert self-control, based on the paradigm of ego depletion from psychology
(Baumeister et al., 1998). After this intervention, subjects both with and without a
reduction in self-control capabilities engage in trading of a virtual asset in a continuous
double auction with open order books, and each market consists of only participants
with either high or low self-control resources. In an additional experiment where we
seek to explore the mechanism through which lower self-control might affect trading
behavior, we reduce self-control capacities of traders differentially within markets and
elicit details about their emotional state.
We find that markets with traders low in self-control exhibit significantly more
overpricing. Markets with non-depleted traders show signs of excessively high prices
too, but to a lesser extent. Our treatment does not affect cognitive skills or risk
aversion, thus excluding them as a driver of the result. When populating markets with
an equal population of depleted and non-depleted traders, we observe the same extent of
overpricing as if all traders were depleted, suggesting that already a moderate share of
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traders low in self-control can substantially inflate prices. We discover no difference in
behavior among depleted and non-depleted traders after period one, but traders low in
self-control tend to bid lower and ask higher than non-depleted traders during the first
trading period. This suggests that traders low in self-control are primarily interested
in realizing profits from trading, thereby fueling the bubble. The fact that differences
disappear after period one could therefore be due to non-depleted participants following
the market behavior of depleted participants more strongly. Additionally we find that
profits do not differ due to the rapid convergence of behavior of our two groups of
traders. While being low in self-control therefore seems to be detrimental to markets,
it does not necessarily drive traders low in self-control out of the market, therefore
generating a persistent negative effect on prices.
Using additional questions regarding participants’ emotional state we can show
that depleted traders feel significantly more excitement, fear, and joy at the end of the
trading period. We also present suggestive evidence that their trading behavior might
be driven by emotions more strongly than they are aware of. While previous literature
has found that cognitive skills are strongly predictive of earnings in experimental asset
markets (Bosch-Rosa et al., 2015), we also find that our treatment sidelines this channel,
as cognitive skills have no beneficial impact on profits for depleted traders. We see
this as suggestive evidence that traders low in self-control rely more strongly on the
impulsive system 1, rather than reflective system 2 (Kahneman, 2011).
Implications from our findings are twofold. First, we present evidence that reduced
self-control abilities can contribute to overpricing, delivering an additional possible
explanation for why overpricing is sometimes observed in real markets. This seems
particularly important in countries where large parts of the population engage in asset
market speculation, such as in China, where other forms of gambling are illegal. Sec-
ond, our results offer advice to traders to be aware of potential self-control problems.
Cooling-off periods, or avoiding longer stretches of hunger or sleep deprivation might
be beneficial to pricing patterns in asset markets.
Chapter 3 analyzes institutional features common in today’s asset markets. With
the advent of high-speed internet connections and large cost decreases in computing
power, more and more trading has been shifted from human traders to computers.
Approximately three quarters of trading volume in the United States stem from com-
puterized trading and high frequency trading (HFT) generates trading profits of $ 3
billion annually. These traders often trade using limit order based strategies. At the
same time, market structures have largely converged to a pricing scheme called maker-
taker pricing, in which those that accept outstanding offers (market orders) are levied
a fee and those that create new offers to market participants (limit orders) are given a
rebate.
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Given that the pricing structure and the presence of HFTs have changed and now
often coexist, I answer the question of how this affects human traders. In an experiment,
I let human traders trade assets of a fictitious firm and vary whether they encounter
an HFT in addition to other human traders, whether they are subject to maker-taker
pricing, or both. The setup allows me to answer how traders adjust their behavior to
these additional institutional features, and how this in turn affects market outcomes.
Additionally, I elicit cognitive abilities, risk preferences and other demographics I can
use as controls.
I find that maker-taker pricing does not impact individual behavior much. The
evidence of how this pricing structure affects prices at which subjects trade is weak and
inconclusive. If anything, maker-taker pricing leads traders to spend more per asset,
but not significantly so in most specifications. Also, cognitive skills do not seem to
influence the choice of using limit versus market orders when this particular fee/rebate
structure is present. The results are stronger for the presence of HFTs. When HFTs are
present, traders make much more use of market orders relative to limit orders. They
also trade much more shares per period, but only if in addition to the HFT they also
face the maker-taker fee structure.
When analyzing profits it becomes apparent that traders learned to game the HFT.
In all treatments in which HFTs were present, average profits strongly increase over
the trading periods. There is substantial heterogeneity in profits, suggesting that
some subjects understand how to beat the algorithm, while others do not. Overall
prices, however, are not different across treatments suggesting that individual changes
in behavior did not necessarily translate to aggregate market efficiency.
My findings are important in two dimensions. First, they show that market prices
do not change much in reaction to individual adjustments to either HFTs or maker-
taker pricing, which is reassuring for market designers. Second, the fact that some
traders learn to game the algorithm suggests a possible explanation for market crashes
following a withdrawal of liquidity: HFTs usually involve algorithms that make them
withdraw from trading if they accumulate losses. This in turn will remove a substantial
amount of liquidity from the market after which trading could break down. The Wall
Street Journal (2010) argues that this contributed to and exacerbated the 2010 Flash
Crash.
In Chapter 4, which is joint work with Mark Westcott, we provide evidence on
how racial attitudes can persistently be altered. Following the work by Bisin and
Verdier (2001) that established a theoretical foundation for why certain types of pref-
erences may be transmitted across generations, several empirical papers have reported
persistence, for example of mistrust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), or antisemitism
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(Voigtländer and Voth, 2012). Psychologists in turn have long argued that prejudice to-
wards minorities can be effectively reduced by increasing interaction between majority
and minority, a framework called intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954).
We provide a test of the persistence of this intergroup contact on racial attitudes us-
ing archival data. During World War II, more than one million American soldiers were
transferred to the United Kingdom to help in the preparation of defeating Germany
and its allies. Approximately 10% of these soldiers were African Americans, serving
almost exclusively in segregated support units. Most British had not seen black people
before, as the United Kingdom had only a very small black pre-war population of 8,000
that lived mostly in London and the port cities. Since deployment of troops was done
according to military needs, we assume interaction with African American soldiers to
be exogenous to pre-existing racial attitudes. We exploit the variation in the deploy-
ment patterns to construct a measure that reflects the extent of contact between the
British population and African American soldiers. Using a non-representative inter-
net survey and a complete membership list of the British National Party (BNP), an
extremist party widely considered to be racist, we investigate the effects of historical
contact with African American soldiers on contemporary racial attitudes.
We find that areas in which the likelihood of contact with black G.I.s during World
War II was higher, see a significantly lower rate of BNP membership in 2007. Adding
fixed effects and several control variables does not change this effect. Varying the
clustering level, using different treatment indicator definitions, splitting the sample
and using different specifications also provide stable and significant estimates. We then
construct a radius around each geographic unit in which we observe racial attitudes
and count the black troops located within this radius as an alternative treatment
measure. Expanding the radius makes the effect fall almost linearly, as the likelihood
of interaction between population and troops is decreasing in distance. Data from
an internet survey confirms our initial findings, as respondents from areas with more
exposure to African American soldiers state to have “warmer feelings towards black
people”.
To our knowledge, the findings in this chapter are the first that confirm a persistent
positive effect of intergroup contact on stated and revealed racial attitudes. Especially
in the light of the current Syrian refugee crisis in Europe, and the revitalized nation-
alistic movements in many developed countries, these insights carry important policy
relevance. If prejudice between any minority and majority groups exists, bringing these
groups together can offer an effective remedy. Integration policy should therefore also
focus on contact-enhancing actions.
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Chapter 5 is joint work with Christoph Koenig and investigates the relationship of
gun ownership and crime rates founded on behavioral arguments. The debate about
tougher gun legislation is fiercely fought in the political discourse of the United States,
as access to firearms is a constitutional right for every citizen. Proponents of the right
to bear arms usually argue that armed citizens can provide a credible deterrent to crim-
inals, such that crime rates actually decrease. Gun control advocates however reason
that the high rates of gun violence that the United States experience is largely due
to the easy access to firearms. While some prior studies have tackled the relationship
of gun prevalence and crime in predominantly correlational studies, the results are
mixed.
We provide a novel approach in that we look at the gun demand shock that followed
the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut in December
2012. Fearing tougher gun legislation and perceiving a higher need for self-defense ca-
pabilities, millions of citizens across all US states were interested in acquiring firearms.
Some states however had implemented waiting periods or installed other bureaucratic
hurdles that prevented purchasers of firearms to receive their guns instantly, which
we hypothesize eventually discouraged some citizens to buy any firearms at all. We
therefore investigate the effect of gun purchase delay legislation on gun purchases and
then use the results to estimate an impact on crime rates.
Gun purchases increase significantly stronger after the shooting at Sandy Hook in
states in which no purchase delay legislation was in place. The effect is not driven by
violations of the parallel trends assumption, as we include state-specific time trends
and conduct a synthetic control exercise (Abadie et al., 2012). Most importantly,
using Google search data we show that the ex ante interest in acquiring a firearm
was not significantly different across the states, and that only the eventual buying
decision differed. This is consistent with present-biased consumers postponing their
purchase, but not with arguments from standard economic theory such as transaction
costs alone. We can also rule out that demand moved from primary markets (gun
stores) to secondary markets (gun shows), as both supply and demand for gun shows
were unaffected.
We then investigate the effect on crime rates. All crime rates seem unaffected by the
differential firearm purchasing rates, except for murder. Murder rates increase signifi-
cantly in states that don’t have purchasing delays in place. Our estimates suggest that
approximately 98 lives could have been saved in each month of 2013 alone. The effects
are again significant to numerous robustness checks. Including the 2012 Presidential
election in the analysis shows that the effect is similar, suggesting that there was no
direct effect of the mass shooting on crime rates. Using additional data, we are then
able to show that all of those additional murders were committed with firearms and
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that a disproportionate share of victims were women, that were predominantly killed
by men.
While our results should not be understood as an argument towards abolishing gun
ownership rights, they should rather be seen as insights into how impulsive acts of
violence can be prevented. Being able to save almost 1200 lives per year, of which
a substantial fraction are women, seems substantial compared to a total of about
30,000 lives that are being lost in the United States each year in firearm-related deaths.
Additionally, the robust relationship of gun ownership and murder rates suggests that
there is scope for improving filter mechanisms to determine who should own a gun and
who should not.
All five chapters of this dissertation are self-contained, they have their own intro-
ductions and can be read independently. Each chapter has its own appendix, and all
appendices are added after Chapter 5. The bibliography containing all references can
be found at the end of this document.
Chapter 1
Risk, Time Pressure & Selection
Effects*
1.1 Introduction
Managerial decision making is often made under adverse conditions, including expo-
sure to stress and time pressure (e.g. Claessens et al., 2007; Maruping et al., 2015, and
references therein). In contrast, experimental studies of managerial decision problems
(e.g., risk taking, or bargaining) typically provide decision makers with ample time to
make their choices. They possibly allow the decision makers to revise and correct their
choices, and sometimes provide learning opportunities in the form of repeated trials.
A decision maker should find herself in an optimal setting to make good decisions.
Because of the often unfavorable conditions in the field, researchers interested in the
descriptive aspects of managerial decision-making have started to study decisions in
controlled experimental settings that try to mimic aspects of these unfavorable decision
environments. An important aspect of decisions in the field that has been transferred
to controlled laboratory settings is the presence of time pressure in decision making
(Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2015). Allocating people randomly into time-constrained
and time-unconstrained decision environments, researchers have identified the causal
effects of time pressure on various types of decisions (e.g., Sutter et al. (2003), on
bargaining; Kocher and Sutter (2006), on beauty contests; Baillon et al. (2013), on de-
cisions under ambiguity; Kirchler et al. (2014), on risky decisions; Buckert et al. (2015),
on imitation in strategic games; El Haji et al. (2016), on bidding in auctions).
Observing decisions in adverse, but controlled environments is important, because it
provides insights into decision processes that help to develop externally valid, descrip-
*This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Kocher, Stefan Trautmann and Yilong Xu.
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tive models of decision making. However, the existing approach, with an exogenous
variation of the aspect that affects the decision environment, has two potentially se-
rious problems relating to issues of self-selection. First, and specifically for the case
of time-constraints, if time pressure is supposed to be substantial and relevant, some
people may violate the time constraint. The sample of decisions observed in the data
set is self-selected.1 Failure to take these selection effects into account may therefore
result in a false interpretation of the observed behavior in terms of population averages.
For example, Tinghög et al. (2013) argue that failures to replicate time pressure effects
on cooperation in public goods games may be due to the original studies excluding
about half of the participants because of failure to meet the time constraint (Casari
et al. (2007), make a similar observation in the context of auction bidding). The second
problem applies more broadly to any aspect of adverse environments implemented in
randomized experiments. Outside the laboratory, people self-select into occupations
and thus into job-related decision making environments.2 In contrast, participants in
experiments are exogenously assigned to a treatment condition that may not fit well
with their tastes and skills (Al-Ubaydli and List, 2015). External validity of the ob-
served experimental behavior for similar decision environments outside the laboratory
thus cannot be taken for granted. Despite similarity of the experimental and the nat-
ural decision environments, the decision makers may systematically differ across the
two settings in a self-selected way. Importantly, while external validity is an issue in
any empirical study, it is a more central aspect in experiments that explicitly aim to
mimic natural decision environments.
Observing that selection issues are at the heart of behavioral experiments with
time pressure and other adverse conditions, we are the first to study (1) the empirical
relevance of selection effects and (2) whether there are individual-level correlates based
on observable background variables that can be used as predictors of the ability of a
decision maker to cope with time pressure. We use the term time-pressure resistance
for such ability. It relates to differences in the decision process, including the decision
maker’s time management. Our study aims to provide insights into these processes,
and how they differ between decision makers. To this end, we collect data on risky
decisions under time pressure, augmenting a design used in Kocher et al. (2013) to
allow for both between-subject and within-subject analyses of behavior across time-
constraint conditions. Thus, we observe each decision maker’s risky choice behavior
both in the presence and in the absence of time pressure for a similar set of risky
alternatives.
1A similar problem obtains in studies on the effect of stress on decision making, where analy-
ses of data are typically restricted to those participants who show a cortisol reaction under stress
(Trautmann, 2014).
2External validity may be less of a problem in the context of time-limited offers for consumers,
where self-selection seems less likely (e.g. Sugden et al., 2015).
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We assess participants’ scores on a measure of cognitive ability, on a score of cog-
nitive efficiency, and a set of personality traits. We test whether these individual
differences predict decision quality (measured in terms of expected payoffs in risky de-
cision making, discussed in detail below) under time pressure and in the absence of
time pressure. Importantly, while performance under time pressure can be measured
in many ways, a risky decision task requires complex reasoning and has no obvious
solution from the perspective of the decision maker (because optimal choices depend
on preferences). Consequently, the decision maker has to choose a decision strategy,
and this strategy may be affected by time pressure. Our performance measure aims to
detect such shifts in strategy. Alternatively, we interpret a fitted decision model as a
proxy for the person’s decision strategy, and observe how the model performs across
different time-pressure conditions. The details of the experimental design, including
our measures of cognitive ability and efficiency are described in much detail in the next
section.
Employing this design, we provide the following results. First, we find clear dif-
ferences in decision styles across people that can be observed in the absence of time
pressure and which affect the success in mastering the time constraint when it is present.
That is, selection is very relevant. Second, while various observable characteristics cor-
relate with success in decision making and with the decision maker’s ability to maintain
her decision style in the presence of time pressure, there is still an important role for
unobserved factors. In other words, it difficult to predict who is time-pressure resistant
and who is not, leading to modest predictive power of our models.
1.2 Studying self-selection in an adverse environment: Ex-
perimental design
We implement an experimental structure that allows us to observe both between- and
within-subject differences in risky decision-making behavior in an adverse and a regular
decision environment. This is how we can causally identify the effects of time pressure
on risky decision making at the individual level. As decision makers are likely to
show different reactions to adverse decision environments, we also measure potentially
selection-relevant individual characteristics that may explain the different reactions.
More specifically, for each participant we observe (i) risky choices in the absence of
time pressure; (ii) risky choices in the presence of time pressure; (iii) a measure of
cognitive ability (“IQ”); and (iv) a measure of intellectual efficiency (“IE”). We discuss
the different tasks in detail below. The general structure of the experiment carefully
counterbalances the order of the different parts as shown in Table 1.1, in order to avoid
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Table 1.1: Treatment Design
Treatment Part 1: Indiv. Part 2: Risky Part 3: Risky Part 4: Indiv.
(#obs) Differences Choices Set 1 Choices Set 2a Differences
1 (93) IQ Time pressure No time pressure IE
2 (94) IQ No time pressure Time pressure IE
3 (96) IE Time pressure No time pressure IQ
4 (96) IE No time pressure Time pressure IQ
Notes: IQ: measurement of cognitive ability; IE: measurement of intellectual efficiency; a: a set of pure gain choices was added
after Set 2 to give subjects the possibility to earn back potential losses in sets 1 and 2 (see section 1.2.2). Note that the IQ and IE
tasks allowed subjects to move back and forth across items while this was not possible in the risky choice tasks.
unobservable order effects in our design. Our setup allows us to predict behavior under
the adverse influence of time pressure by behavior in the absence of time pressure,
controlling other relevant observable characteristics.
Each set of risky choices (Set 1 and Set 2) consists of 24 binary choices (see Table
A.1 in the appendix for a full description). Time pressure was imposed by setting
time limits for each of two 12-item subsets of choices within each of these two sets of
risky choices. In particular, each set consists of (i) one subset of 12 binary choices that
compare pure loss lotteries with mixed lotteries of lower expected value (“prominent
gain”); and (ii) one subset of 12 binary choices that compare pure gain lotteries with
mixed lotteries of higher expected value (“prominent loss”). A detailed description and
motivation of these choice tasks is given in Section 1.2.2.3 An important feature of the
time-pressure implementation is that the time limit is imposed on the subset level, not
on each choice item. That is, participants could go through the items in each subset
at their own pace and therefore had to organize the allocation of time to the different
choices efficiently. However, subjects were not allowed to go back and reconsider earlier
choices. This setup requires subjects to manage their time use efficiently over a set
of decisions, creating a trade-off between making more careful/thoughtful decisions on
some items, and a higher chance to be able to complete all problems.
To make time pressure and no time pressure conditions as similar as possible in
the presentation of the instructions and the task design, the unconstrained task also
involved a time limit. However, this limit was selected such that it would not provide
an actually binding constraint for subjects, namely at 420 seconds in all subsets. The
extent of the time constraint in the time pressure conditions was calibrated in pre-
test sessions such that there would be significant time pressure, while not making it
impossible for the subjects to perform the decision task. In particular, under time
pressure, the time limits were set at 120 seconds for the set with the prominent gains
and at 80 seconds for the set with the prominent losses. In both cases, this value
3Because losses were possible in the lottery choices, we included a set of lottery choices after the
main task (Set 2 / Part 3) that gave subjects the possibility to earn back any losses from sets 1 or 2.
See section 1.2.2 for details.
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implied a 20% reduction of the median decision times in the absence of constraints
that we observed in six pilot sessions (details about the pre-test sessions are given in
the online supplement).
1.2.1 Cognitive ability, intellectual efficiency, and personality mea-
sures
We employed the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) test (Raven and
Court, 1998) to measure cognitive ability (“IQ”) and intellectual efficiency (“IE”).
Cognitive ability assesses a subject’s cognitive reasoning power, i.e. the extent to
which complex information can be processed. Intellectual efficiency measures cognitive
reasoning speed, i.e. how fast incoming information can be processed. It gives us a
measure for the ability of a decision maker to cope with time pressure.
Raven’s progressive matrices are often used as a nonverbal assessment of cognitive
reasoning power or general intelligence; its advanced version is aimed at subjects in
the high cognitive ability ranges such as university students. In each item, subjects
are presented with a 3-by-3 matrix of abstract symbols, with the symbol in the lower
right corner missing. They are asked to choose, among eight possible alternatives, the
one that completes the pattern in the matrix. We communicated to subjects that the
items in the task were arranged in ascending order of difficulty and that they could go
back and forth within the time limit to revise their answers. An example can be seen
in Figure 1.1, where the correct answer is option 3.
Instead of running the full 48-item test, a short-form4 containing 12 selected items
from the APM test was administered to obtain a measure of IQ, as it has been argued
that conducting the full APM does not add much predictive power (the correlation
between the two formats is ρ = 0.88, see Bors and Stokes (1998)). As we are interested
in the cognitive capacities of subjects, we allowed subjects to answer all twelve items at
their own pace. To keep instructions as close as possible to our measure of intellectual
efficiency (details below), we implemented a non-binding time constraint of 25 minutes,
which was again calibrated in pre-tests.
We use the remaining 34 items5 from the APM to construct a measure of cognitive
efficiency, i.e. the speed of cognitive reasoning (Raven and Court, 1998). By imposing
4The short form of the APM test we used here was introduced by Bors and Stokes (1998), consisting
of items 3, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 28, 30, 31, and 34 of the APM (Set II). It is more difficult, and
therefore suits university students better, than the other short version proposed earlier by Arthur and
Day (1994).
5 We use the first two items in Set I of the APM test as instructional items, leaving 34 items for
our intellectual efficiency measure.
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Figure 1.1: A Sample Screen from Raven’s APM
a severe time limit on subjects (13 minutes to solve all 34 items), we measure how
fast and how efficiently they can process information. They could again reconsider
earlier choices at any time. The timing constraint proved to be binding in pre-tests:
no participant was able to finish all questions within the time limit.
Based on the tasks, we define our measures IQ and IE as the number of correct
items in the cognitive ability and the intellectual efficiency tasks, respectively. There
is no additional reduction of the score for wrong answers or missing items. Note that,
as shown in Table 1.1, the IQ and IE tasks were counterbalanced separately for each
ordering of the time pressure tasks. The IQ and IE tasks were incentivized such that
(1) a higher score yields a higher chance to win a monetary prize, and (2) subjects
could never identify their number of correct answers exactly. We provide more details
on and the procedure in Appendix A.3.
At the end of the experiment, we elicited several personality measures that have
often been linked to managerial decision making (e.g. Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010),
and are potentially relevant to the ability of coping with time pressure. The Gener-
alized Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995) is a ten-item questionnaire
predicting subjects’ perceived ability to cope with daily hassles and adaptation after
stressful events. Time pressure is thus a natural environment in which self-efficacy
may have an effect on decision-making quality. In particular, in line with previous
research showing a positive correlation between measures of self-efficacy and good fi-
nancial planning behavior (Kuhnen and Melzer, 2014), we hypothesized that higher
level of self-efficacy may be associated with better decision quality under time pres-
sure. Rotter’s Locus of Control questionnaire (Rotter, 1966) is a 28-item survey that
assesses the extent to which individuals believe that they have control over events that
affect them in their lives. These beliefs may become especially important when control
is exogenously manipulated, as was the case under time pressure in our experiment.
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A Big Five Ten Item (TIPI) questionnaire (Gosling et al., 2003), which measures the
Big Five personality characteristics using only ten questions was also administered.
Here we predicted that traits such as conscientiousness could become a burden under
time pressure, as subjects would not be able to implement the degree of diligence they
would typically prefer. Finally, we elicited some general demographics and background
data.
1.2.2 Risk preference measures
Our main task involves binary risky choices. We build on the design in Kocher et al.
(2013), who analyzed risky decisions under time pressure. That study found strong
time pressure effects for lottery choices involving mixed gambles, i.e., including both
gains and losses. In particular, under time pressure, decision makers seem to be prone
to prefer mixed gambles over pure loss gambles with higher expected value (thus being
drawn by the prominent gain in the mixed gambles); similarly, decision makers seem to
prefer pure gain gambles over mixed gambles with a higher expected value (thus being
repelled by the prominent loss in the mixed gamble). Conte et al. (2016) find similar
prominence effects under time pressure. Because we want to study the role of selection
effects under time pressure, we deliberately employ this particular structure of lottery
choices, expecting to induce robust time pressure effects with the design. As described
before, we present subjects with two sets of choices, one set being time-constrained,
and the other de facto unconstrained. Each set consisted of a subset of 12 choices of the
prominent-gain format, and 12 choices of the prominent-loss format. The two subsets
were separately time-constrained as described above. Within each subset, subjects had
to proceed through the choice problems in a given order (fixed over all subjects and
conditions) and could not go back to revise previous choices. A list of all choices is
given in Appendix A.1. A screenshot of the presentation of the choices is given in
Appendix A.2.
Subjects made as many choices as possible within the time constraint. At the
end of the experiment, one choice was selected randomly from all the potential choice
problems in Set 1 and Set 2, and payoffs depended on the decision made, i.e. the lottery
chosen, in this choice problem (this procedure prevents wealth or house money effects,
which we considered relevant in the context of risky choice). If a subject violated the
time constraint and thus failed to answer some of the questions, she would receive
the lowest possible outcome (i.e., the highest possible loss) if one of the unanswered
decision problems was selected for payment. For example, if the selected choice problem
involved a choice between the lottery (15%: e -15, 85%: e -11) and (15%: e 12, 85%:
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e -17) (see S1 / G11 in Table A.1), the earnings for a person who did not submit a
decision was e -17.
Because the risky choices of sets 1 and 2 involve potential losses, we needed to
endow the participants with sufficient funds to cover any losses they might incur in
parts 2 and 3 of the experiment. Therefore, an additional task was added after Set
2 that involved six risky choices between lotteries in which the lowest possible gain
amounted to e 20. By adding the endowment task after all Part 2 and Part 3 choices
had been made, and by endowing with the help of risky choices, we hoped to prevent
subjects from integrating the endowment easily with the loss outcomes in the choices in
earlier parts. This method was adapted from Kocher et al. (2013). We did not impose
a time limit on the endowment task; at the end of the experiment, one of the six
choices was randomly selected for payment, and earnings were added to earnings from
the lottery selected from sets 1 and 2. When working on Set 1 and Set 2, subjects were
not aware how the subsequent task would look like; they only knew that other parts
were to follow and that they would not incur overall net losses from the experiment.
In the analyses below, we always report performance based on behavior in sets 1 and
2, thus not incorporating the endowment task.
1.2.3 Laboratory details
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was
done with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We conducted 16 experimental sessions
at the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich in July and September 2014.
In total, 379 subjects took part in the experiment, up to 24 in each session. They
were mostly undergraduate and graduate students from a diverse set of programs that
the university offers. Payoffs were determined by randomly selecting Part 1, Part
4 or Part 2/3 for payment, with payment details then depending on the procedures
described in the previous subsections. A typical session lasted for about 75 minutes,
and subjects earned on average about e 16.63 (approximately $21.32 at that time). In
addition, we ran several pilot studies in Munich and Tilburg to calibrate the appropriate
timing constraints. Information on the pilots is given in the supplementary material.6
Experimental instructions can also be found in the supplement.
6See https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/11242744/KSTX_webappendix_sep2016.pdf.
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1.3 Time pressure and risky decisions: Manipulation check
We first consider whether the time pressure manipulation for the risky decisions was
effective in terms of time-use, in terms of the number of participants violating the time
constraint, and in terms of the number of unanswered decision items. Table 1.2 shows
the results. Clearly, subjects made substantially faster decisions under time pressure
(Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01), were more likely to violate the time constraint (Mann-
Whitney test, p < 0.01), and had more missing items (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01).
The manipulation of time pressure was successful in providing a highly adverse decision
environment.
Table 1.2: Time Pressure Manipulation for Risky Decisions
Treatment Actual time used # of subjects violating # of missing
(average, in sec.) the time constraint items per person
Time pressure (N=189) 164 58 0.87
No time pressure (N=190) 279 2 0.01
Notes: Decision times reported show the sum of time used for the two subsets. Total time constraint was 200 seconds under time
pressure, and 840 seconds in the absence of time pressure.
Table 1.3: Time Pressure Effects on Risky Choices
Treatment Expected value Expected value Percent of Percent of
(choices made; (all decision choices avoiding choices seeking
e )a,b problems; e )a,c prominent loss prominent gain
Time pressure -1.31 -1.61 59.85% 62.50%
(N=189)
No time pressure -1.14*** -1.15*** 50.83%*** 55.66%**
(N=190)
Notes: a: averages reported; b: numbers reflect the expected value implied by choices actually made; c: numbers reflect the
expected value implied by all choice problems, including missing items; *,**,*** indicates significance of difference from time
pressure condition at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests.
We next consider the effect of time pressure on risky decisions. Table 1.3 shows,
for time-constrained and for unconstrained choices, the average expected payoff that
is implied by the choices the subject actually made, the average expected payoff that
is implied by all choice problems including missing items (which count as the highest
loss)7, the percentage of choices that avoid a prominent loss, and the percentage of
choices that seek a prominent gain. The latter two percentages are conditional on the
items that a person has answered. We observe that time pressure significantly reduces
decision quality. The expected value (EV) implied by choices actually made is lower
under time pressure. Clearly, missing items lead to additional losses and further reduce
payoffs under time pressure. Under time pressure, participants make significantly more
7As a benchmark for the subsequent analyses we observe that the highest realizable expected value
was e -0.39, and the lowest was e -2.28 if all choices were actually answered. Not answering any item
would yield an expected payoff of e -11.23.
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choices that avoid a prominent loss or seek a prominent gain, at a loss of expected
value, than in the absence of time pressure. That is, choices are more heuristic under
time pressure, being affected by salient attractive aspects of the lottery and sacrificing
expected payoff. We observe that, despite differences in the implementation of the time
constraint and in the design of the lottery choices, these comparative findings exactly
replicate those reported in Kocher et al. (2013). Note however, that the share of choices
for the lower-EV option (loss avoiding or gain seeking, respectively), is higher in the
current experiment than in Kocher et al. (2013).
We observe that participants realize a lower expected value under time pressure.
In the subsequent analyses, we consider expected value as a core measure of decision
quality. This interpretation is supported by the direct (inverse) link of expected value
to heuristic choices (loss avoiding and gain seeking). Expected payoff is also a criterion
that is applied in many professional settings outside the laboratory to assess decision
success. However, participants may not necessarily aim to maximize expected value in
the experiment. In the supplementary material, we thus present the main results also
under the alternative assumption that participants’ decisions may reflect cumulative
prospect theory preferences.
1.4 Results: Identifying selection
We first approach the question whether selection is relevant under time pressure. To
this end, we compare those decision makers who violate the time constraint under time
pressure (N = 90) to those who do not (N = 289). A violator is defined as a decisions
maker who ran out of time before making all 12 choices, in at least one of the two
subsets of risky decisions in her time-constrained part. Clearly, these two groups will
thus differ under time pressure. However, the within-person design also allows us to
study whether these groups differ when they are not time-constrained.
Table 1.4 shows results of the comparison between the two groups for various be-
havioral and performance measures. The left panel shows behavior in the absence of
time pressure. Subjects who violate the time constraint differ substantially from those
who do not violate the constraint in the way they approach the risky decision task. In
terms of decision processes, violators use more time and distribute their time less evenly
across choices. Moreover, violators are less affected by salient loss or gain features of
the lotteries. They consequently perform significantly better on average in terms of the
implied expected value of their choices than non-violators, when not exposed to time
pressure. In the right panel of Table 1.4 we compare the two groups in the presence of
time pressure. Also under a time constraint, violators use more time and have a higher
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variance of time used across choice problems. They perform significantly worse on the
full set of choices. This effect is driven by the relatively strong punishment for not
answering a choice problem, which they seem not to take sufficiently into consideration
in their strategy. Moreover, under time pressure, violators do not anymore perform
better than non-violators on the choices they actually made. However, violators do not
perform significantly worse than non-violators on these items either.
Table 1.4: Differences between Time-constraint Violators and Non-violators
Performance measure
No time pressure Time pressure
Violators Non-violators Violators Non-violators
(N=90) (N=289) (N=90) (N=289)
Actual time 323.79 221.13*** 188.87 148.72***
used (in sec.)
Variance of time 77.75 37.29*** 30.82 10.30***
used per item
Expected value -1.06 -1.21*** -1.29 -1.22
(choices made; e )
Expected value (all -1.08 -1.21*** -2.29 -1.22***
decision problems; e )
Expected value (items -3.69 -3.90*** -3.72 -3.90***
w/o violations; e )a
Percent of choices 49.63% 54.79%* 52.72% 55.45
avoiding prominent loss
Percent of choices 46.96% 60.67%*** 47.95% 60.84%***
seeking prominent gain
Notes: Violator status for each subject is assigned if at least one item in at least one time-constrained subset was not answered;
*,**,*** at the entries for non-violators indicate that these values differ from those for violators, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance
level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. a: expected value calculated on the basis of those items in the prominent gain and prominent
loss subsets that all subjects were able to answer under time pressure.
Table 1.4 also shows the expected value over the set of choices for which no subject
violated the time constraint (row five).8 This includes the first seven choices in the
prominent gain sets and the first three choices in the prominent loss sets. Apparently,
on this subset of early choices, the violators perform much better than the non-violators
do, and this holds true in both the time pressure and the no-time pressure condition.
Moreover, comparing this performance measure across time-pressure conditions, we
observe that the expected payoffs do not differ for either group of decision makers (for
both groups, p > 0.7, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Thus, under time pressure, initially
the violators can fully implement the same decision strategy as in the absence of time
pressure. However, as they move on and run out of time, they lose out, harming their
overall performance for the choices they actually make (shown in row three in Table
8For this row, we removed one subject, a violator, from the analysis in this table, as she is the only
participant violating the time constraint already at the fourth item for the subset of prominent gain
lotteries, while others violate only after the seventh item. The results remain the same if we include
all subjects but we lose a substantial amount of information for the subset of prominent gain lotteries.
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1.4) and even more significantly for the full set of choices (shown in row four in Table
1.4).
Table 1.5: Differences between Time-constraint Violators and Non-violators across
Choice Items under Time Pressure (Expected Value of Choices Made)
Choice Violators Non-Violators Choice Violators Non-Violators
(pr gain) (pr loss)
1 -9.89 (N=90) -10.08 (N=289) 13 8.56 (N=90) 8.55 (N=289)
2 -5.09 (N=90) -5.14 14 8.93 (N=90) 8.59*
3 -12.37 (N=90) -12.56* 15 4.61 (N=90) 4.49
4 -5.57 (N=89) -5.75** 16 8.33 (N=89) 8.30
5 -14.17 (N=89) -14.56*** 17 6.12 (N=89) 6.15
6 -8.94 (N=89) -9.11** 18 9.42 (N=88) 9.39
7 -3.22 (N=89) -3.44*** 19 11.74 (N=87) 11.57
8 -11.71 (N=87) -11.85** 20 5.61 (N=84) 5.68
9 -9.42 (N=83) -9.70** 21 7.50 (N=77) 7.54
10 -13.11 (N=77) -13.24 22 4.31 (N=66) 4.22
11 -12.28 N=(63) -12.34 23 4.25 (N=47) 4.41
12 -8.37 (N=45) -8.38 24 8.02 (N=19) 8.03
Notes: Entries are expected values (e ) of choices made; averages over participants in the subgroup; *,**,*** at the entries for
Non-violators indicate that these values differ from those for Violators, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance level, Mann-Whitney
test. Number of observations in parentheses (constant for Non-violators).
This dynamic pattern of performance is shown in more detail in Table 1.5. The
table shows for each item, in the order of appearance, the implied expected value
of the choices made by violators and non-violators under time pressure. In the set of
prominent gains (items 1-12), violators perform better early on. In the set of prominent
losses (item 13-24), the effect is less pronounced, but points in the same direction. As
they move on with the task and time runs out, violators do not make better decisions
than the non-violators anymore. This is especially true in the set with prominent gains.
Additionally, violators at some point violate the time constraint (shown by the decrease
in sample sizes indicated for each choice item), leading to significant losses in expected
value over all decision problems. We also observe that violation of the time constraint
for prominent-loss choices leads to an additional loss of expected payoffs for the set
of choices made. This is caused by the fact that lotteries in this subset had positive
expected payoffs, and thus a participant’s average expected payoff over choices made is
harmed by simply reducing the number of prominent-loss choices that are completed.
This effect leads to the negative effect on expected value for choices actually made
under time pressure, shown in row three of Table 1.4.
Figure 1.2 provides further illustration of the time-use strategies of violators and
non-violators. The figure plots for each item the average decision time for violators
and for non-violators. In the absence of time pressure (upper panel), violators spend
more time on each item than non-violators, and use a substantial amount of time for
certain, apparently difficult items, leading to higher variance in terms of the average
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time-used per item. Under time pressure (lower panel in Figure 1.2), violators initially
use too much time and then almost monotonically reduce their time used per item as
they progress through the task.9 Compared to the non-violators who remain relatively
stable in their time used per item as they proceed through the task, violators thus
initially use more time and later have even less time than the (on average) much faster
non-violators take for the last few items. That is, given the significant punishment for
violation of the time constraint, violators exhibit poor time management.
Figure 1.2: Time Use of Violators and Non-violators
An important question regarding the external validity of experimental observa-
tions of choice behavior concerns the within-person correlation of behavior in time-
9All items that a person cannot answer because time ran out are counted as zero time used. This
is consistent with the person having indeed used zero seconds to make the decision. Note that the
non-zero time use for later items in each subset by each group of violators is caused by the definition
of violator based on a violation in at least one of the two subsets. Thus, not all violators run out of
time in the prominent gain subset (prominent loss subset).
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constrained and unconstrained decision environments at the individual level. Tables
1.4 and 1.5 showed that violators cannot implement their decisions as successfully under
time pressure as in its absence. Table 1.6 displays the correlation of various behavioral
measures across time pressure conditions; correlations are given separately for violators
and non-violators. We observe that behavior and outcomes are positively correlated
across environments, though correlations are larger for non-violators than for violators.
While non-violators seem to be able to implement similar decision strategies both in
the absence and in the presence of time pressure, violators are less able to sustain the
same strategy in the different decision environments, especially for the last few items
when they run out of time.
Table 1.6: Correlations of Behavior across Time Pressure Conditions
Performance measure Spearman rank Correlation Spearman rank Correlation
(only violators, N=90) (only non-violators, N=289)
Actual time used 0.42*** 0.63***
(in sec.)
Variance of time 0.47*** 0.51***
used per item
Skewness of time 0.03 0.09
used per item
Expected value 0.37*** 0.86***
(choices made; e )
Percent of choices avoiding 0.69*** 0.81***
prominent loss
Percent of choices seeking 0.68*** 0.82***
prominent gain
Notes: *,**,*** indicate that the correlation of behavior with time pressure and without time pressure is different from zero at the
10%, 5% , and 1% significance level, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients.
To sum up, we document significant selection effects under time pressure: those
participants who cannot cope with the time constraint have very different time-use
and decision strategies in the absence of time pressure. They make better decisions
when sufficient time is available (i.e., under no-time pressure conditions) than those
subjects who are not violating time-constraints under time pressure. However, under
time pressure they are not able to sustain these strategies anymore and therefore lose
out against the non-violators in terms of performance.
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1.5 Results: Predicting who can better cope with time
pressure
1.5.1 The effect of observable traits: Non-parametric analyses
Having observed that there are systematic differences in behavior between those who
can and those who cannot cope with time pressure well, we now investigate whether
there are observable traits or characteristics that allow predicting time-pressure re-
sistance to in decision making. Table 1.7 shows that there are some differences in
intellectual efficiency and self-efficacy between violators and non-violators. While not
significant on conventional levels, differences in gender look suggestive. Moreover, we
have already shown the pronounced differences in time use strategies between violators
and non-violators, which are also observable in simple measurement tasks.
Table 1.7: Characteristics between Time-constraint Violators and Non-violators (Indi-
vidual Differences)
Individual background variable Violators (N=58) Non-violators (N=131)
IQ 9.38 9.47
IE 22.47 23.27**
Big-Five dimensions
Openness 5.64 5.53
Conscientiousness 5.56 5.68
Extraversion 4.62 4.78
Agreeableness 5.23 5.19
Neuroticism 4.82 4.95
Locus of control 12.64 12.27
Self-efficacy 28.36 29.80**
Gender (% male) 29.31 % 40.46 %
Age 23.93 23.75
Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for Non-violators indicate that these values differ from those for Violators, at the 10%, 5% , and 1%
significance level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests.
In the following we therefore study the differences between low and high IQ, low
and high IE, low and high self-efficacy, small and large amounts of time used / variance
of time used (in the absence of time pressure), and between males and females. Im-
portantly, these differences are observed for all subjects, irrespective of whether they
violate the deadline under time pressure or not. That is, we can also make use of
variation in performance within the groups of violators and non-violators. Below we
will use these measures also jointly in a multivariate analysis as predictors of decision
performance under time pressure.
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Effects of cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency. We consider the effects of IQ
and IE on risky behavior, in time-constrained and unconstrained settings. Despite
being positively correlated (ρ = 0.5760, p < 0.01, Spearman rank correlation), the
correlation between IQ and IE is far from perfect, suggesting that the two measures
capture separate traits. Since we are interested in outcomes and in selection effects, we
report effects on the implied expected value from the choices made and from all choice
problems, the percentage of time-constraint violators, the number of missing items per
subject, and the incidence of avoiding prominent losses and seeking prominent gains.
To allow for direct group comparisons, we split the sample at the median values of IQ
and IE.10 Table 1.8 reports the results for IQ, and Table 1.9 reports the results for
IE.
As shown in the tables, in the absence of time pressure, low IQ and low IE subjects
perform worse in terms of expected payoffs, and they are affected more strongly by
salient features of the lottery than high IQ and IE groups. These results are consistent
with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Dohmen et al. (2010)). The table also
suggests that the amount of time used by high IQ/IE subjects and relatively low IQ/IE
subjects are similar, in both conditions. In fact, there is no significant correlation
between actual time used and IQ or IE.11 Interestingly, the right panels of tables 1.8
and 1.9 show that IQ is correlated with decision quality under time pressure, while IE is
not. This is counter to our prediction that IE measures the exact skill to make difficult
decisions under a severe deadline. The fact that IQ effects remain significant under
time pressure suggests that the absence of an effect for IE is not simply due to a larger
noise under time pressure. Note that we consider univariate correlations, and IE and
IQ may be differently affected by other variables that are related with behavior under
time pressure (e.g., gender), which will be controlled for in the multivariate analyses
below.
Effects of self-efficacy. Table 1.10 shows results for self-efficacy. Although self-efficacy
directly measures individuals’ ability to cope with hassles environment, similar to IE,
there is no raw correlation with behavior and performance under time pressure and
without time pressure.
Effects of gender. Table 1.11 shows pronounced gender differences both in the absence
and in the presence of time pressure. Males take more time for decisions, are less
10The median IQ is 10. We split the sample such that IQ < 10 defines the “low” group. The median
for IE is 23. We split the sample such that IE < 23 defines “low” group.
11A potential explanation for such weak correlation might be that high cognitive ability participants
more carefully consider the decision problem, while low cognitive ability participants need more time
to understand the problem.
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Table 1.8: Effects of IQ
Performance measure
No time pressure Time pressure
(840 sec = 420+420) (200 sec = 120 +80)
IQHigh IQLow IQHigh IQLow
Actual time used (in sec.) 257.72 228.62 159.29 156.82
Expected value (choices made; e ) -1.10 -1.27*** -1.14 -1.37***
Expected value (all decision problems; e ) -1.11 -1.27*** -1.41 -1.56**
Percent time-constraint violators 1.36% 0 24.09% 23.27%
Number of missing items per person 0.01 0 0.70 0.68
Percent of choices avoiding prominent loss 49.17% 59.64%*** 50.33% 61.00%***
Percent of choices seeking prominent gain 52.17% 64.68%*** 54.56% 62.24%***
Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for IQLow indicate that these values differ from those for IQHigh, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance
level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The median IQ score is 10. Total time was 840 in no-time pressure and 200 in time pressure
conditions.
Table 1.9: Effects of IE
Performance measure
No time pressure Time pressure
(840 sec = 420+420) (200 sec = 120 +80)
IEHigh IELow IEHigh IELow
Actual time used (in sec.) 250.96 237.38 157.44 159.48
Expected value (choices made; e ) -1.13 -1.24*** -1.19 -1.30
Expected value (all decision problems; e ) -1.13 -1.24*** -1.42 -1.54
Percent time-constraint violators 1.32% 0 22.47% 25.66%
Number of missing items per person 0.01 0 0.63 0.78
Percent of choices avoiding prominent loss 49.71% 59.32%*** 51.92% 59.11%**
Percent of choices seeking prominent gain 54.56% 61.68%** 57.57% 58.09%
Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for IELow indicate that these values differ from those for IEHigh, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance
level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The median Intellectual Efficiency score is 23. Total time was 840 in no-time pressure and
200 in time pressure conditions.
affected by salient losses, and realize higher expected payoffs. Males seem to aim at
maximizing expected payoffs, explicitly taking the time to calculate expected values.
This is in line with self-reports of risk aversion, which are lower for males than for
females (average degree of risk aversion equals 3.33 for males and 3.78 on a Likert
scale ranging from minimum 1 to maximum 5, p < 0.01, two-sided Mann-Whitney
test). Under time pressure, males are no more likely than females to violate the time
constraint, despite their apparent maximization strategy. Males make worse decision
under time pressure than in its absence (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.088for
choices made; p < 0.01 for all choices). However, the data suggests that they are on
average still better able to cope with time pressure than females, despite their more
time-consuming decision strategy.
Effects of time-use strategies. As seen before, time-use strategies differ strongly
across subjects and correlate with violator status. Measuring the total time used and
the variance across choice items in the conditions with no time pressure for all subjects,
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Table 1.10: Effects of Self-Efficacy (SE)
Performance measure
No time pressure Time pressure
(840 sec = 420+420) (200 sec = 120 +80)
SEHigh SELow SEHigh SELow
Actual time used (in sec.) 357.02 230.75 158.38 158.10
Expected value (choices made; e ) -1.17 -1.18 -1.28 -1.18
Expected value (all decision problems; e ) -1.17 -1.18 -1.47 -1.48
Percent time-constraint violators 0.47% 1.20% 20.66% 27.71%
Number of missing items per person 0.005 0.012 0.62 0.78
Percent of choices avoiding prominent loss 52.82% 54.52% 54.58% 55.08%
Percent of choices seeking prominent gain 57.52% 57.28% 57.99% 57.50%
Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for SELow indicate that these values differ from those for SEHigh, at the 10%, 5% , and 1%
significance level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The median Self-Efficacy score is 29. We split the sample such that SE < 29
defines the low group. Total time was 840 in no-time pressure and 200 in time pressure conditions.
Table 1.11: Effects of Gender
Performance measure
No time pressure Time pressure
(840 sec = 420+420) (200 sec = 120 +80)
Female Male Female Male
Actual time used (in sec.) 224.57 277.13** 156.68 160.63
Expected value (choices made; e ) -1.23 -1.09*** -1.27 -1.18**
Expected value (all decision problems; e ) -1.23 -1.10*** -1.53 -1.38***
Percent time-constraint violators 0% 1.99%** 36.32% 19.87%
Number of missing items per person 0 0.02** 0.75 0.60
Percent of choices avoiding prominent loss 59.14% 45.14%*** 60.33% 46.45%***
Percent of choices seeking prominent gain 59.28% 54.59% 58.60% 56.54%
Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for Male indicate that these values differ from those for Female, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance
level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. Total time was 840 in no-time pressure and 200 in time pressure conditions.
we confirm the importance of the measures. Table 1.12 shows strong effects on viola-
tor status and missing items: those who make more careful decisions (higher time use
and variance) are more likely to violate the time constraint and miss out an answering
items. However, these careful decision makers do not perform worse on average than
the less careful ones. If they manage to meet the time constraint, they realize a higher
performance. Moreover, more careful decision makers are less prone to salience effects
and obtain higher expected payoffs on the choices they make.
1.5.2 Parametric Decision Model
Tables 1.7 to 1.12 demonstrate that observable characteristics are strongly associated
with risky behavior in the presence and absence of time pressure. Moreover, we found
that these behaviors are correlated between the two environments, implying that sub-
jects try to adhere to similar decision processes in both situations (Table 1.6). A natural
question is whether we can link observable traits to a person’s ability to maintain her
Chapter 1. Risk, Time Pressure & Selection Effects 28
Table 1.12: Effects of Variance of Time Used Per Item and Total Time Used (in the
Absence of Time Pressure) on Outcomes under Time Pressure
Performance measure VARHigh VARLow TimeHigh TimeLow(N=189) (N=190) (N=191) (N=188)
Actual time used 172.55 144.04*** 176.46 139.77***
(in sec.)
Expected value (choices -1.15 -1.32*** -1.15 -1.32***
made; e )
Expected value (all decision -1.53 -1.42 -1.57 -1.37
problems; e )
Percent time-constraint 34.39% 13.16%*** 36.65% 10.64%***
violators
Number of missing items 1.06 0.33*** 1.19 0.19***
per person
Percent of choices avoiding 50.80% 58.79%** 49.57% 60.12%***
prominent loss
Percent of choices seeking 49.73% 65.78%*** 48.74% 66.97%***
prominent gain
Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for VARLow and TimeLow indicate that these values differ from those for VARHigh and TimeHigh,
at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The median variance of time used per item under no
time constraint is 12.74. We split the sample such that VAR < 12.74 is the low variance group; and Time < 201 seconds is the low
time (faster) group. Total time was 200 (in time pressure conditions).
decision processes under a tight time constraint. To answer this question, we estimate
a simplified cumulative prospect theory model (CPT, (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992))
for each participant on the basis of her 24 time-unconstrained choices, and assess how
well the fitted model predicts her behavior under time-pressure. Predictive success is
then related to observable characteristics.
Our CPTmodel assumes linear utility and identical probability weighting parameter
for gains and losses. Thus, we estimate two parameters, loss aversion and curvature of
the weighting function (estimation code provided in the web supplement).12 Because
some individuals failed to submit all decisions under time pressure, we report both
predictive success over choices made (missing items ignored), and predictive success
over all decision problems (missing items counted as a failure to implement the decision
model). The fitted CPT model has good predictive power. The average success rate
of predicting choices under time pressure using time-unconstrained fitted parameters
equals 67.71% for behavior over choices made and 65.71% over all decision problems,
respectively. Both predictions are significantly better than the random prediction (both
p < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests).
The relation of observable characteristics with our measures of predictive success is
shown in Table 1.13. We find strong links between observables and predictive success,
12We imposed constraints λ > 0 for loss aversion and γ > 0 for the weighting functions. We lose
37 observations because we could not recover reasonable parameter values for these participants from
the estimation.
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with virtually identical results for both prediction measures (i.e. for actual choices made
and for all choices). For decision makers with higher measures of IE, higher measures
of self-efficacy, and less time-use in the absence of time pressure, the fitted model
predicts behavior under time pressure more successfully than for those in the relevant
comparison categories. For IQ and variance in decision times, we find insignificant
results. Moreover, males are better able to maintain their decision strategy, as are those
who did not violate the time constraint. There is clear evidence that observables are
related to a person’s time pressure resistance. Importantly, in contrast to an evaluation
based on expected payoffs, the current approach presumes no normative measure of
success; each person is evaluated on the basis of her own choice behavior in the absence
of time pressure, possibly showing loss aversion or probability weighting.
Table 1.13: Correct Predictions of the Individual Decision Model under Time Pressure
Choice made All choices
High Low High Low
IQ 68.33% 66.27% 66.12% 64.75%
IE 70.17% 65.42%** 68.14% 63.43%**
Self-efficacy 69.50% 66.04%* 67.50% 64.03%*
Total time used under NTP 66.07% 72.98%*** 63.50% 72.80%***
Variance of time used under NTP 68.19% 66.87% 65.37% 66.30%
Gender Female Male Female Male65.87% 70.60%*** 63.81% 68.68%**
Violator Yes No Yes No63.70% 69.08%*** 55.83% 69.08%***
Notes: Entries are percentages of correct predictions by the individual-specific CPT models (as estimated under no-time pressure)
for choices under time pressure. *,**,*** at the entries for Low column indicate that these values differ from those for High column,
at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests.
1.5.3 Multivariate analyses
We finally provide multivariate analyses for our main dependent variables of interest.
We study the partial effects of IE, IQ, self-efficacy, gender, as well as our two time-use
measures on expected payoffs for the choices made (columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.14)
and on expected value over all choices (columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.14), under time
pressure. That is, we aim to identify whether using a set of observables allows us
to predict outcomes under time pressure. In addition, we also conduct multivariate
analyses for predictive success of the fitted CPT model under time pressure, both for
choices made (column 5 in Table 1.14) and for all decision problems (column 6 in Table
1.14).
The results confirm our earlier findings, but show overall modest explanatory power
of background variables for variations in expected payoff and predictive power of indi-
vidual decision models under time pressure. IQ and IE, which are positively correlated,
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are significant predictors of expected value and predictive success. As expected, IE
seems more relevant for all choices (including missed items), while IQ is more relevant
for choices made. F-tests suggest that IE and IQ jointly determine the decision quality,
with higher ability participants making better choices (EV) and more consistent choice
across time pressure settings. Total time used under no time pressure predicts better
decisions over choices made, but lower predictive success over all choices. We find
no significant effect of gender. Self-Efficacy has a significant effect only for predictive
success over all choices made.
Table 1.14: Multivariate Analysis of Performance Measures
Covariates
Expected Expected Expected Expected Predictive Predictive
value value value (all value (all success success (all
(choices (choices decision decision (choices decision
made; e ) made; e ) problems; e ) problems; e ) made; %) problems; %)
IE 0.0140 0.0178 0.0348 0.0333 0.0046 0.0062
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0164)** (0.0164)** (0.0032) (0.0033)*
IQ 0.0399 0.0321 0.0019 0.0048 0.0008 -0.0007
(0.0169)** (0.0175)* (0.0228) (0.0224) (0.0050) (0.0052)
F-test F=7.18*** F=5.73*** F=3.76** F=3.60** F=1.82 F=2.56*
IE = IQ = 0
Self-Efficacy -0.0085 -0.0097 0.0036 0.0040 0.0027 0.0035
(0.0074) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0017) (0.0018)*
Female -0.0414 0.0276 -0.0779 -0.1067 -0.0273 -0.0333
(0.0696) (0.0740) (0.0863) (0.0875) (0.0199) (0.0208)
Variance of -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
time used per (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001)
item when no
time-constraint
Total time 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002
used when no (0.0003)*** (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)*
time-constraint
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
# obs 379 379 379 379 342 342
R2 3.61% 11.05% 2.60% 3.10% 8.60% 10.25%
Notes: Results show coefficients from OLS regressions using robust standard errors, reported in parentheses. Controls include
swiftness on the computer (Cappelen et al., 2015) and math score. All regressions control for treatment (Table 1.1); *,** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
Overall, we can explain only a small amount of the variance in expected value
and in predictive success of the fitted CPT model. Although IE, IQ and time used
strategy under unconstrained conditions are helpful in predicting decision, our results
still emphasize the necessity of finding better instruments to predict the ability to
perform under time pressure.
1.6 Discussion and conclusion
We set out to study the potential role of selection in adverse decision environments,
and how it is linked to observable characteristics of the decision maker, including those
characteristics that can be made observable using survey and experimental techniques.
Clearly, different decision styles play an important role. Those who can and those who
cannot easily cope with the time constraint in risky decisions differ along various di-
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mensions. Those who violate time constraints, i.e. those who have lower time pressure
resistance, make more careful (more variance, more time used), and consequently more
successful decisions (higher EV, less affected by salient outcomes) when unconstrained.
They also initially perform better under time pressure. However, as they run out of
time, they cannot implement their strategy anymore, leading to considerable losses.
Consequently, their performance and behavior are also much less correlated between
the time pressure and the no-pressure conditions than it is the case for non-violators.
A fitted decision model of their behavior in the absence of time pressure is less pre-
dictive of their decisions under time pressure. Violators try to make good decisions,
sacrificing time, and violating the time constraint despite severe punishment (payment
of maximum loss in the current design): they have a poor time management.
Our experiment aimed at making time-pressure relevant differences in decision style
observable by considering measures of ability, personality and decision strategy. We
find that various measures correlate with outcomes under time pressure and with the
proneness to being attracted by salient features of prospects. Including these variables
in a multivariate analysis, we identify IQ, IE and time-use in the absence of time
pressure as moderate predictors of success under time pressure. Corroborating previous
results by Kuhnen and Melzer (2014), self-efficacy is the only personality trait that has a
weak systematic influence on decision-making. Overall, predictive power of observables
is low, suggesting that we miss out important unobservable aspects of the decision
strategies. This seems particularly important for practical applications, as identifying
people based on tests for cognitive abilities and standard questionnaires seems to be of
limited use when selecting agents that should perform well under time pressure.
We obtain results regarding the determinants of risky decision strategies. The find-
ing that cognitive ability relates to higher realized expected payoffs is consistent with
the extant literature. In a representative sample of the German population, Dohmen
et al. (2010) find that subjects with higher cognitive skills are willing to take more risks.
Similarly, Benjamin et al. (2013) report for Chilean high school students a significant
correlation of risk aversion and cognitive capacities. With the average participant being
risk averse, these directional effects are consistent with higher expected payoffs in our
setting. However, other researchers have questioned the evidence on cognitive ability
and risk taking. Andersson et al. (2014) provide evidence that these correlations may
be spurious. They assert that, in fact, cognitive capacities are related to making errors
and that the specific design of choice lists triggers the interpretation of differential risk
attitudes. Our design does not involve choice lists, suggesting the cognitive ability
effects are not merely driven by these design issues. However, our results suggest that
the link between cognitive ability and risk behavior may be more moderate compared
to the effects reported by Dohmen et al. (2010).
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In conclusion, we find that selection is a very important factor in adverse decision
environments. The relevance of selection effects has implications for the interpretation
of the average laboratory behavior in terms of population parameters, and for the in-
terpretation in terms of external validity. We try to predict who makes good decisions
under time pressure. We find that cognitive ability measures, self-efficacy and observ-
able time use measures correlate with performance under time pressure. However, more
work is needed to make aspects of decision style and the use of heuristics predictable. If
behavioral measures are shown to be of limited explanatory power, neurological mark-
ers may provide an interesting alternative (e.g., Buckert et al. (2014); Kandasamy et al.
(2014)). Identifying people’s ability to cope with time pressure is not a straightforward
task. Tests for cognitive ability or efficiency and standard questionnaires need to be
accompanied by additional measures.
Chapter 2
Unleashing Animal Spirits –
Self-Control and Overpricing in
Experimental Asset Markets*
2.1 Introduction
“Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability
due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our pos-
itive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical
expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of
our decisions to do something positive (...) can only be taken as the result
of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and
not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied
by quantitative probabilities.”1
John Maynard Keynes
Keynes famously saw “animal spirits” at the root of many (financial) decisions,
potentially causing price exaggerations on the aggregate market level. As often in
Keynes’ work, the term “animal spirits” is not well-delineated. It alludes to optimism,
instincts, urges, emotions, and similar concepts. In this chapter we assess the notion
that a lack of self-control abilities may lead to price exaggerations on asset markets,
and we analyze how the lack of self-control abilities is associated to emotions and
trading behavior. In psychology, self-control abilities and willpower are defined as the
capacities to override or inhibit undesired behavioral tendencies such as impulses and
*This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Kocher and Konstantin Lucks.
1Source: Keynes (1936), p. 136.
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to refrain from acting on them (Tangney et al., 2004). Self-control is necessary to
guard oneself against undue optimism, actions motivated by emotional responses, and
impulsive decisions. Furthermore, self-control is required in order to stick to plans
made in the past.
That self-control is considered relevant for investor success is also evident from
statements of investors and from popular guidebooks on the psychology of investing.
For instance, Warren Buffet emphasizes that “success in investing doesn’t correlate
with I.Q. once you’re above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what
you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in
investing.”2 Similarly, anecdotal evidence from rogue traders show that they completely
lost their self-control abilities at some stage. In a study by Lo et al. (2005) involving
day traders from an online training program participants stated attributes related
to self-control as the most important determinants of trading success.3 In a similar
spirit, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011) report distinct differences in emotion regulation
strategies among traders of different experience and performance levels from qualitative
interviews with professional traders. Therefore, correlational evidence suggests that
self-control matters for trading success on an individual level.
This contribution is the first to provide empirical evidence on the causal effect
of a variation in self-control abilities on trading outcomes.4 The major challenge to
overcome is to exogenously vary self-control abilities in order to obtain causal inference
on the impact of self-control abilities on behavior and market outcomes. A first step is
to use the experimental laboratory and affect state self-control levels of traders. Most
of the available techniques draw on the concept of self-control depletion or exhaustion.
Our experimental identification rests on the assumption that self-control is a limited
resource and that it is variable over time on the individual level. Evidence for these
two characteristics is abundant (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998; Gailliot et al., 2012),
although it has also been questioned lately (Carter and McCullough (2013)). While
validated survey measures for trait self-control exist, they can only provide correlational
inference.
In the spirit of Keynes we concentrate on aggregate market outcomes in a first
experiment and extend our analysis to individual behavior and performance in a second
experiment. We use a well-established financial market setup in the experimental
laboratory (Smith et al., 1988; Kirchler et al., 2012; Noussair and Tucker, 2013; Palan,
2013; Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015) to investigate whether an exogenous variation in
2http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_27/b3636006.htm
3They quote attributes such as persistence, tenacity, perseverance, patience, discipline, planning,
controlling emotions, and (lack of) impulsivity as crucial (Lo et al., 2005, table 3).
4However, there is a quickly growing empirical literature on the effects of self-control abilities on
decision making in other domains relevant to economists (see, for instance, Beshears et al. (2015).)
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self-control abilities of traders leads to overpricing. This experimental asset market is
known for its basic tendency to exhibit overpricing; it features a dividend-bearing asset
with decreasing fundamental value.
In order to deplete self-control abilities before the start of the market, we employ the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), which is one of the most commonly used tasks in psychology
experiments for modulating self-control (Hagger et al., 2010). It is easy to administer,
it can be implemented in an exhausting/depleting version and in an easy version (i.e. a
placebo version), and it allows for additional controls. The majority of studies that use
both survey measures and behavioral measures of self-control conclude that the effects
of state self-control interventions are qualitatively similar to those of trait self-control
levels (e.g. Schmeichel and Zell, 2007). Hence, even if our experiment is confined to
the laboratory setting and to a variation in state self-control, it is likely that it extends
to situations outside the laboratory in which also trait self-control matters.
A drop in self-control abilities can increase the extent of overpricing on a market
through different channels. One psychological transmission mechanism runs through
an increased influence of the impulsive decision making system. A consequence could
be that traders’ behaviors become more easily swayed by observing others’ behaviors on
the market (for instance, a more pronounced tendency to momentum trading). Another
behavioral mechanism relates to an heightened influence of emotions (for instance, the
excitement after seeing the prospect of making more money, or a stronger psycholog-
ical reward of interim gains). Yet another option, potentially related to impulsivity,
would be a stronger role of biases in decision making such as myopia, limiting the
ability to correctly foresee the declining fundamental value and thus creating histories
of overpricing on the market.
Our main finding is a significantly higher level of overpricing in markets where
traders’ self-control abilities have been depleted, compared to markets with traders
whose self-control abilities have not been depleted. If markets are populated by both
depleted and non-depleted traders the effect is similar in size and also highly significant.
Obviously, having some self-control depleted traders on a market suffices to create the
additional over-pricing effect.
Behavior in markets is path-dependent, choices are endogenous to other choices,
and traders imitate each other. Nonetheless, we are able to provide robust evidence
from control variables, from trading and from survey questions that can explain the
additional overpricing with depleted self-control abilities. First, there is no direct effect
of self-control depletion on risk attitudes or cognitive abilities of traders, which could
explain our findings. Second, self-control depleted traders do not trade significantly
less than non-depleted traders, ruling out a simple exhaustion effect. Third, several
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indicators show that self-control depleted traders trade more aggressively early in the
market. In other words, they contribute more to the creation of overpricing histories,
and non-depleted traders jump on this bandwaggon. Fourth, stronger emotional arousal
of individuals on the market is related to being self-control depleted. In short, traders
become more impulsive and potentially rely less on cognitive skills, when they cannot
resort to their full self-control resources.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the
related literature, and in section 2.3, we explain and motivate our experimental design.
Consequently, section 2.4 presents the results from our main experiment, and section
2.5 reports on an additional experiment that allows us both to test the robustness of
our initial results and to better understand how self-control depletion translates into
overpricing and how traders’ behavior and decision processes might be affected by the
treatment. We discuss potential channels explaining our findings in section 2.6. Section
2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Related Literature
Our literature overview focuses on the two aspects in the economics and psychology
literature that are most relevant for our study: self-control and experimental asset
markets. As already said, self-control abilities and willpower are defined as the ca-
pacities to override or inhibit undesired behavioral tendencies such as impulses and to
refrain from acting on them. There are different theoretical approaches in psychology
and in economics that take self-control abilities and potential self-control problems into
account.
First, self-control can straightforwardly be related to dual-systems perspectives of
decision making. As outlined by Kahneman (2011), these perspectives share the general
assumption that structurally different systems of information processing underlie the
production of impulsive, largely automatic forms of behavior, on the one hand (system
1), and deliberate, largely controlled forms of behavior, on the other hand (system 2).
System 2 is effortful and requires self-control resources.5 Thus, if resources are low,
reflective operations may be impaired, leading to a dominance of impulsive reactions
that could be in conflict with objective reasoning. From this perspective, reducing
self-control abilities can be interpreted as increasing the role of the (impulsive) system
1 in decision making (Hofmann et al., 2009).
5Note that the division of system 1 as automatic and system 2 as controlled describes a tendency;
there are both automatic and conscious processes involved in exerting self-control and giving in to
temptation, respectively (cf. Kotabe and Hofmann, 2015).
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Second, and very much related to dual-system perspectives, economists have used
dual-self models of impulse control (see, for instance, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and
Fudenberg and Levine (2006)) in order to describe self-control problems. These models
study the interaction of two selves, a rational (long-term) and an impulsive (short-
term) self. Such models can account for time inconsistent behavior (for instance,
in connection with quasi-hyperbolic discounting) and for the fact that cognitive load
makes temptations harder to resist. Third, willpower as a depletable resource has
been modeled directly in economics. Ozdenoren et al. (2012) look at a consumption
smoothing model that views willpower as a depletable resource, and Masatlioglu et al.
(2011) consider lottery choices.
Is there empirical evidence for self-control abilities or willpower to be indeed limited
or depletable resources? Many researchers in psychology have shown that exerting
self-control consumes energy and consequently diminishes the available resources for
other acts that require self-control.6 Self-control can involve either cognitive control, or
affective control, or both (Hagger et al., 2010). Self-control abilities regenerate through
rest, can be trained, and differ between people (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al.,
1999; Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Tangney et al., 2004; Muraven, 2010).
Our experimental identification relies on self-control depletion. We reduce self-
control abilities by exposing experimental participants to a self-control demanding task
before the main task (known as the dual task paradigm). Such setups have been used in
other domains in economics, mainly in the context of individual decision making. For
example, the consequences of self-control variations in decision making under risk have
been studied. Several papers report increased risk aversion following self-control deple-
tion (Unger and Stahlberg, 2011; Kostek and Ashrafioun, 2014). However, a number of
studies also reveal an increase in risk taking following similar manipulations (Bruyneel
et al., 2009; Freeman and Muraven, 2010; Friehe and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2014). Both
Stojić et al. (2013) and Gerhardt et al. (2015) find no significant effect of self-control
manipulations on risk preferences elicited from choice lists. Bucciol et al. (2011, 2013)
show in field experiments with children and adults that self-control depletion leads to
reduced productivity in subsequent tasks. De Haan and Van Veldhuizen (2015) find
no effect of a repeated Stroop task on the performance in an array of tasks in which
framing effects – such as anchoring effects and the attraction effect – are typically
observed.
Recently, experiments have looked at the effects of self-control variations on other-
regarding preferences. Achtziger et al. (2016) report a strong but heterogeneous impact
of reduced self-control on offers and accepting behavior in ultimatum games, presum-
6For recent overviews about the ongoing discussion in psychology and models of the underlying
processes involved in self-control see Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) and Kotabe and Hofmann (2015).
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ably depending on what an individual’s more automatic reactions are. In a similar vein,
Achtziger et al. (2015) provide evidence for reduced dictator giving after a reduction
in self-control abilities.7
Existing studies also suggest a relationship between self-control abilities and fi-
nancial decision making. However, we are not aware of experimental studies in this
context. Using survey evidence, Ameriks et al. (2003, 2007) consider the connection
between wealth accumulation and trait self-control in a sample of highly educated US
households. Ameriks et al. (2003) attribute differences in savings among households to
differing “propensities to plan” – i.e. different individual costs of exerting self-control.
Ameriks et al. (2007) use the difference between planned behavior and expected be-
havior in a hypothetical scenario as a measure for self-control problems. They find a
positive correlation between better self-control abilities and wealth accumulation, in
particular for liquid assets. Gathergood (2012) conducts a similar study in the UK
with a representative sample. He reports a positive association between lower levels of
self-control and consumer over-indebtedness.
Our asset market is based on the seminal paper by Smith et al. (1988), who were the
first to observe significant overpricing in an experimental double auction market. Many
studies have followed up on these early findings.8 Trader inexperience and confusion
have been considered as one of the aggravating factors of overpricing (Dufwenberg
et al., 2005; Kirchler et al., 2012), and Bosch-Rosa et al. (2015) for example show that
grouping traders by cognitive skills leads to increased overpricing for groups with low
cognitive sophistication. Nadler et al. (2015) provide evidence that giving testosterone
to a group of male participants significantly increases prices, and Petersen et al. (2015)
find that inducing stress decreases overpricing.
Since emotion regulation is correlated with self-control abilities (Tice and Brat-
slavsky, 2000), the influence of emotions on prices in asset markets is also relevant
to our research question: Andrade et al. (2016) find that inducing excitement before
trading triggers overpricing in asset markets stronger in magnitude and higher in ampli-
tude than other emotions and a neutral condition. In a similar study, Lahav and Meer
(2012) show that inducing positive mood leads to higher deviations from fundamental
values and thus more overpricing. The role of emotions in experimental asset markets
has also been evaluated using self-reported emotions on Likert scales (Hargreaves Heap
and Zizzo, 2011) and face reading software (Breaban and Noussair, 2013), instead of
inducing specific emotions exogenously. Results from these experiments indicate that
7Martinsson et al. (2014) analyze the relationship between self-control and pro-sociality in an
indirect way, but their findings are also in line with the idea that pro-social behavior requires self-
control. A similar result is provided by Kocher et al. (2016).
8Recent surveys can be found in Noussair and Tucker (2013) and Palan (2013).
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Figure 2.1: Treatment Differences in the Stroop Task
excitement and a positive emotional state before market opening are correlated with
increased prices relative to fundamental values. Moreover, fear at the opening of the
market is correlated with lower price levels.
2.3 Experimental Design
This chapter reports the results from two experiments. The design of Experiment I is
described in this section. Experiment II is a natural extension of Experiment I and
described in greater detail in section 2.5. Experiment I consists of four independent
parts: (i) instructions and dry runs of the asset market without monetary consequences
and without the possibility to build reputation for the parts to come; (ii) the main
treatment variation in self control, the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) in two treatment
versions; (iii) elicitation of risk attitudes and cognitive abilities, both incentivized; and
(iv) a fully incentivized experimental asset market.
Our identification of the effects induced by a variation in self-control abilities in
market prices relies on the comparison of behavior in markets following two different
versions of the Stroop task. A tough version lowers self-control abilities, whereas a
placebo version should leave self-control abilities largely unaffected. We implement
a condition in which all market participants are subjected to the tough version of
the Stroop task (henceforth LOWSC for low self-control) and a condition in which
all participants were subjected to the placebo version (henceforth HIGHSC for high
self-control). Except for this treatment variation in part (ii), the two experimental
conditions are identical in all other parts.
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The Stroop task follows a simple protocol: participants are instructed to solve
correctly as many problems as possible within five minutes. An example of such a
problem is displayed on the left-hand side of Figure 2.1. The task is to select the color
of the font the word is printed in. A selection of six color buttons – always the same
and in the same order – is given on the bottom right of the screen, and subjects are
instructed to click on the correct one. As soon as they make a selection, the next
word-color combination appears. Consecutive word-color combinations always differ
from each other. The difficulty of this task is that the words always describe one of the
six colors; the incongruence between the color of the word and the word itself causes a
cognitive conflict, since reading the word is the dominant cue. Common explanations
for the conflict are automaticity of reading the word or relatively faster processing of
reading than color perception (MacLeod, 1991). The conflict has to be resolved, and
resolution requires self-control effort. Applying this effort depletes self-control resources
and leaves participants with lower levels of willpower and/or self-control resources after
the five minutes.
The Stroop task is one of the most commonly applied methods to deplete self-control
resources (Hagger et al., 2010). It can be easily implemented in a computer laboratory,
is straightforward to explain, requires only basic literacy skills, and generates addi-
tional data on the number of correctly solved problems and the number of mistakes.
The difference between the Stroop task in LOWSC and HIGHSC is the frequency
with which a conflicting word-color combination occurrs.9 All screens in LOWSC ex-
hibit such a conflict, while in HIGHSC only every 70th screen does. Experimental
participants do not receive any information on the frequency of such a conflict, and
the instructions for the two versions of the task are identical. By having an occasional
word-color incongruence in HIGHSC we are able to ensure that subjects take the task
seriously. If anything, our setup reduces the potential treatment difference, because in
HIGHSC some self-control depletion might still take place, making the potential result
of a significant difference between the two conditions more difficult to obtain.
We decided to provide participants with a flat payment of e 3 for the Stroop task
in order to signal that we were interested in their performance. We do not use a piece-
rate or any other competitive payment scheme because it might create different wealth
levels after the treatment variation, and wealth differences might be correlated with the
treatment. Hence, treatment differences might potentially be confounded with wealth
effects.10 Upon completion of the five minutes, we ask experimental participants how
hard they perceived the task on a six-point Likert scale.
9The right-hand side of Figure 2.1 shows an example of congruence between font color and word,
as we use it in the placebo Stroop task in HIGHSC.
10Achtziger et al. (2015) find no differences in depletion effects between flat payments and incen-
tivized versions of a related self-control manipulation. We are confident that subjects took the task
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Self-control resource depletion can influence several relevant variables for the sub-
sequent experimental asset market. We control for two mechanisms directly: cognitive
ability and risk attitudes.11 Eliciting control variables takes place after the self-control
manipulation but before the experimental asset market for two reasons: Firstly, if these
measures were to follow the asset market, there might be spillover effects due to expe-
riences during the asset market and secondly the effect of our self-control manipulation
might wear off since the asset market part of the experiment lasts a considerable amount
of time during which self-control could start to regenerate (Muraven and Baumeister,
2000). In order to avoid that the self-control variation wears off before the asset mar-
ket interaction starts, it is a requirement that measuring the control variables does
not take much time. Two tasks that fit this requirement are the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT) for measuring individual cognitive abilities (Frederick, 2005) and a simple
multiple price list lottery design for eliciting individual risk attitudes (Dohmen et al.,
2011).
First, our subjects answer the three questions of the standard CRT. It is well-known
that CRT responses are correlated with more time-consuming measures of cognitive
ability, risk and time preferences (Frederick, 2005), as well as with decisions in a wide
array of experimental tasks such as entries in p-beauty-contest games (Brañas-Garza
et al., 2012) and performance in heuristics-and-biases tasks (Toplak et al., 2011). Fur-
thermore, Corgnet et al. (2014) and Noussair et al. (2014) find that the CRT is a good
predictor of individual trader’s profits in asset market experiments.12 Subjects are paid
e 0.5 for every correct answer but do not learn their CRT results and thus earnings
until the end of the experiment.
Second, we elicit individual certainty equivalents (CE) for a lottery using a multiple
price list as a measure for individual risk attitudes. Differences in risk attitudes can be
a rational reason for trade (Smith et al., 1988) and might explain initial underpricing
of assets on the market, thus sparking off later price increases and overpricing (Porter
and Smith, 1995; Miller, 2002). Furthermore, Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) find that
more risk averse individuals trade less frequently. On a single computer screen, our
experimental participants have to choose ten times between a lottery that pays either e
.20 or e 4.20 with equal probability and increasing certain amounts of money that are
equally spaced between the two outcomes of the lottery. Subjects are allowed to switch
seriously; only two participants in Experiment I tried less than 114 screens and one answered less than
110 items correctly. Most of our subjects answered many more – see appendix B.3 for details.
11For evidence of potential effects of self-control depletion on complex thinking see Schmeichel
et al. (2003). As mentioned in the previous section, evidence on the relationship between self-control
abilities and risk attitudes is rather inconclusive. Emotions as a potential transmission mechanism
will be assessed in Experiment II.
12The CRT is regarded as a measure of cognitive ability and thinking disposition (Toplak et al.,
2011). We will discuss the CRT results and their implications in more detail when we discuss our
results in section 2.6.
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at most once from the lottery to the certain amounts. At the end of the experiment, the
computer randomly picks one of the ten decisions of each individual as payoff-relevant
and implements the preferred option, potentially simulating the lottery outcome.
Immediately after risk elicitation the main part of the experiment, the asset market,
opens. The asset market featurs a dividend-bearing asset with decreasing fundamental
value over ten trading periods (lasting 120 seconds each) in a continuous double-auction
market design with ten traders and with open order books, following Kirchler et al.
(2012).13 This is a simplified version of the markets in Smith et al. (1988). Before the
first trading period, five subjects in a given market receive 1000 experimental points in
cash and 60 assets, and the other five receive 3000 points in cash and 20 assets as their
initial endowment. Assignment to the two initial asset allocations is random.
During each trading period, traders can post bids and asks as well as accept open
bids and asks. Partially executed bids and asks continue to be listed with their residual
quantities and inactive orders remain in the books until the end of the current period.
At the end of every period, the asset pays a dividend of either ten or zero experimental
points with equal probability. The dividend payment is added to each trader’s cash
holdings. Assets have no remaining value after the last dividend payment, i.e. they
display a declining (expected) fundamental value. This design feature is explicitly
stated and highlighted in the instructions. To make things clear, the instructions
provide a detailed table with the sum of remaining expected dividend payments per
unit of the asset at any point in time. Assets and cash are carried from period to
period. Short selling and borrowing experimental points are not allowed. After every
period, the average trading price as well as the realizations of the current and all past
dividends are displayed on a separate feedback screen. At the end of the ten periods,
experimental points are converted into euros, using an initially announced exchange
rate of 500 points = e 1 .
At the end of the experiment, subjects learn about their payoffs from all parts of
the experiment. We ask them to fill in a short questionnaire concerning demographics
and background data. We also ask participants how tired they feel after the experiment
and how hard they have perceived decisions over the course of the entire experiment
on a 6-point Likert scale. Then, all earnings are paid out in private, and the subjects
are dismissed from the laboratory.
Experiment I was conducted in October 2013. 160 participants took part in ten
experimental sessions – four with one markets and six with two markets. Hence, we
obtained 16 independent observations, eight for each of our treatment conditions. The
13Appendix B.7 provides the experimental instructions, including a screen shot and a description
of the trading screen.
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experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and recruitment was
done with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Experimental sessions lasted for about
90 minutes, and participants earned e 18.18, on average. We only invited students
who had never participated in an asset market experiment before. We also excluded
students potentially familiar with the CRT or the Stroop task.14 Prior to the start of the
experiment, subjects received written instructions for all parts of the experiment. These
were read aloud to ensure common knowledge. Remaining questions were answered in
private.
2.4 Experimental Results
2.4.1 Manipulation Check
The data suggest that our treatment manipulation was successful: First of all, during
the Stroop task participants attempted fewer problems, achieved fewer correctly solved
problems and made more mistakes in the LOWSC condition than in the HIGHSC
condition (all Mann-Whitney tests p < 0.01).15 Participants perceived the Stroop
task as significantly more demanding in the LOWSC condition than in the HIGHSC
condition (Mann-Whitney test p < 0.01). Finally, we do not find any differences in
background characteristics such as field (p = 0.416) and year of study (p = 0.9162),
age (p = 0.1709) and gender (p = 0.9558) between our two treatments (Mann-Whitney
tests and Pearson’s χ2 test for field of study), suggesting that random assignment to
treatments was successful.
2.4.2 Definitions and Measures
In order to calculate mean prices one can use either an adjustment that takes trading
volumes into account (henceforth: volume-adjusted prices) or an adjustment that takes
the number of trades into account (henceforth: trade-adjusted prices). The former is
an average price per asset, whereas the latter is an average price per trade. Our results
remain unaffected by the choice of adjustment; in line with the literature, we mainly
display results based on volume-adjusted prices in the following.
14Of our 160 subjects, one suffered from some form of dyschromatopsia, i.e. a color vision impair-
ment. We asked for it in the post-experimental questionnaire in order to make sure that it is not a
common phenomenon.
15Detailed distributions on these variables can be found in section B.3 of the appendix. All tests
reported in this chapter are two-sided unless stated otherwise.
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In order to quantify the tendency of markets to exhibit irrational exuberance we
compare trading prices with the fundamental value of the asset. In the following we
adopt the approach of Stöckl et al. (2010) and assess the market price developments
using Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) (in equation 2.1) and Relative Deviation (RD)
(in equation 2.2) as measures for general mispricing and overpricing, respectively.
RAD = 1
T
T∑
t=1
|Pt − FVt|
F¯ V
(2.1)
RD = 1
T
T∑
t=1
Pt − FVt
F¯ V
(2.2)
Pt is the volume-adjusted mean price in period t, FVt is the fundamental value of
the asset in period t, and F¯ V denotes the average fundamental value of the asset over
all periods.
RAD is constructed as the ratio of the average absolute difference of mean market
price and fundamental value, relative to the average fundamental value of the asset.
RD is the ratio of the average difference between mean market price and fundamental
value, relative to the average fundamental value. The difference between the two
measures is how the difference between mean market price and fundamental value enters
the calculation: For RAD the difference enters in absolute terms, thus all deviations
from the fundamental value – overpricing and underpricing – increase RAD, making
RAD a measure of average mispricing. For RD the wedge between market price and
fundamental value retains its sign, thus periods with overpricing and underpricing
can cancel each other out. Hence, RD provides the dominant direction of mispricing,
making it, in effect, a measure of average overpricing.
Both measures are straightforward to interpret: A RAD of .1 means that prices are
on average 10% off the fundamental value, while a RD of .1 indicates that prices are
on average 10% above the fundamental value. Both measures are independent of the
number of periods and the fundamental value.
2.4.3 Aggregate Price Development
Figure 2.2 shows how average market prices in LOWSC and HIGHSC evolve over the
ten trading periods. In both conditions, average market prices start out at a similar
level, displaying a moderate level of underpricing. However, from the third period
onwards, average prices in both conditions exceed the fundamental value. Eventually,
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Figure 2.2: Mean (Volume-adjusted) Trading Prices in the Two Treatments
average market prices drop sharply, but do not drop below the fundamental value
again.
The most conservative comparisons between the two treatments are based on market
averages over all traders and over all ten periods. This is the approach we apply
for all non-parametric tests regarding aggregate market outcomes. These averages
are statistically independent in the strict sense, and test statistics are based on eight
observations for each treatment. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test confirms the impression
from eyeballing, i.e. that market prices in both conditions are significantly different
from the fundamental value (HIGHSC : p = 0.0929, LOWSC : p = 0.0173). Figure
2.2 suggests more pronounced overpricing in the LOWSC condition than in HIGHSC,
which is confirmed by a Mann-Whitney test (HIGHSC : R¯D = 0.1885, LOWSC : R¯D =
0.4990; p = 0.0742)16. A comparison of RD tells us that while in HIGHSC overpricing
is on average 19%, in LOWSC prices exceed the fundamental value by almost 50%.
Thus, trade among individuals with low self-control leads to overpricing which is more
than twice as high as in the baseline HIGHSC.
Furthermore markets in the LOWSC condition exhibit higher levels of mispric-
ing (HIGHSC : ¯RAD = 0.3253, LOWSC : ¯RAD = 0.5890; Mann-Whitney test: p =
0.0460). According to RAD, prices in the HIGHSC condition deviate by about 33%
from the fundamental value, whereas they deviate by about 59% from the fundamental
value in the LOWSC condition.
16Both measures are significantly different from zero for both conditions.
Chapter 2. Unleashing Animal Spirits – Self-Control and Overpricing 46
Figure 2.3 displays the price evolution of single markets in the two conditions. There
is a high degree of path-dependence and endogeneity in price evolution in the markets
and a lot of heterogeneity among markets in the same condition. Therefore, finding a
significant difference between the two conditions for the most conservative test in terms
of statistical independence is the more striking. The left panel represents the markets
from the HIGHSC condition, while the right panel shows the LOWSC markets. Price
paths in HIGHSC markets often follow a rather flat or declining development, while
in LOWSC a number of markets display a hump-shaped price evolution that initially
increases and peaks in later trading periods. The emergence of overpricing oftentimes
can be attributed to constant prices despite decreasing fundamental values (Huber and
Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler et al., 2012) – a description that fits price paths in our HIGHSC
markets better than those in LOWSC markets.17
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of Individual Market Prices in HIGHSC and LOWSC
17Section B.1 in the appendix shows a comparison of overpricing measures across treatments for each
period separately. Overpricing in LOWSC significantly exceeds overpricing in HIGHSC in periods
6-9.
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2.4.4 Potential Transmission Mechanisms of the Treatment Effect
Having established a significant treatment effect, the next step is to look at potential
channels via which self-control variations could have had an effect on market outcomes.
Detailed descriptive results on the variables considered in this section can be found in
sections B.4ff. of the appendix.
Cognitive Abilities and Risk Attitude
Self-control depleted participants might not be willing to think as hard and thus provide
the (wrong) intuitive answers in the CRT. The average number of correct answers in the
CRT was 1.05 in HIGHSC and 1.14 in LOWSC. The difference in CRT score between
the two conditions is not significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.7223).
We conclude that the Stroop task did not have an impact on our incentivized version
of the CRT.18 Risk attitudes might be affected by self-control depletion. The average
certainty equivalent we elicited is close to the lottery’s expected value: 2.2 in HIGHSC
and 2.15 in LOWSC. Like the literature exploring the effect of reduced self-control on
risk attitude that has come to inconclusive results (e.g. Bruyneel et al., 2009; Unger
and Stahlberg, 2011; Gerhardt et al., 2015), we also find no significant effect (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.4083) of our treatment variation on risk attitudes as measured by
the multiple price list certainty equivalent elicitation.19
Trading Activity
An additional channel through which our results could be explained is changes in
trading activity, i.e. the number of traded shares per trading period. People low
in self-control have been reported to become more passive (Baumeister et al., 1998,
Experiment 4). Increased passivity and thus a thinner market in LOWSC, where few
trades could drive overpricing, could be responsible for our results. Thus we compare
the number of shares traded in the two conditions. Figure 2.4 illustrates the evolution
of average shares traded per period. Traders in HIGHSC traded slightly more overall:
while the average trader traded 13.02 shares per period in HIGHSC, only 11.39 shares
changed hands on average per trader in each period in LOWSC. However, according
to a Mann-Whitney test, there is no significant difference between amounts traded
between the two conditions (p = 0.3446).20 When analyzing the results of Experiment
18If we include the observations from our second experiment, the CRT scores of the two groups
become 1.0875 and 1.1375 respectively with p = 0.7442 from a Mann-Whitney test.
19Including observations from Experiment II does not provide significant differences between the
two groups.
20An additional regression analysis in Table B.2 in appendix B.2 reinforces this conclusion.
Chapter 2. Unleashing Animal Spirits – Self-Control and Overpricing 48
II, we shall take a closer look at trading strategies of self-control depleted traders versus
non-depleted traders.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of Average Shares Traded per Trader by Condition
Regressions Controlling for Potential Channels
Although our control variables seem unaffected by our treatment, they could still pos-
sess explanatory power for the difference in overpricing that we observe. We therefore
run regressions, including controls as indepedent variables. To avoid endogeneity prob-
lems across trading periods and between subjects, respectively, we aggregate overpricing
measures over all ten periods on the individual level and use robust standard errors
clustered at the market level. We do this separately for sales and purchases, since selling
above fundamental value results in an expected profit, while buying above fundamen-
tal value results in an expected loss. We define measures for individual overpricing
for purchases and sales, which we call IndRDpurchases and IndRDsales, respectively.
Similar to the measure RD they are defined as the percentage of buying (selling) prices
exceeding the asset’s fundamental value pooled over all periods, but for each subject’s
buying (selling) activity separately instead of on the market level as before. We report
results on IndRDpurchases as the dependent variable in the regressions in Table 2.1 In
appendix B.2, we provide robustness checks for our chosen approach for sales and both
aggregated sales and purchases.
In all four models we are interested in the effect of the explanatory variables on
IndRDpurchases, our measure of an individual’s overpricing tendency. Throughout all
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Table 2.1: Determinants of Individual RD Based on Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndRDpurchases
LOWSC 0.400** 0.390** 0.816*** 0.843***
(0.140) (0.134) (0.131) (0.125)
CRT -0.0708* -0.0952 -0.0912
(0.0392) (0.0558) (0.0547)
CE -0.0188 0.0684 0.0719
(0.0459) (0.0441) (0.0455)
CRT × LOWSC 0.0612 0.0628
(0.0821) (0.0831)
CE × LOWSC -0.224*** -0.237***
(0.0712) (0.0709)
Female 0.0666
(0.0690)
Constant 0.0933 0.194 0.0255 -0.0353
(0.0971) (0.120) (0.0597) (0.0682)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.275 0.307 0.364 0.370
OLS regression, dependent variable is Individual Relative Devi-
ation (IndRD) for purchases, an individual equivalent to mar-
ket level Relative Deviation (RD) restricted to purchases only.
LOWSC is a dummy where 1 stands for LOWSC and 0 for
HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent. CRT denotes
the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects who indicated
they knew one or more of the CRT questions before were excluded.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at market level
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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specifications, we observe a significant treatment effect: Being in LOWSC increases an
individual’s propensity to buy at excessive prices. In specification (2), our measure of
risk attitude is not significant, but if we also include interactions with our treatments
in specifications (3) and (4), relative risk seeking is correlated with lower individual
overpricing when self-control capabilities are reduced. Performance on the CRT has the
expected effect of reducing the tendency of buying at prices above fundamental value in
all specifications where it is included, and its effect does not significantly differ between
participants in LOWSC and HIGHSC markets.21 Hence, introducing measures for risk
aversion and cognitive skills and their interactions with our treatments do not reduce
the size or significance of the treatment coefficient. We conclude that neither changes
in cognitive skills nor in risk preferences after self-control depletion can explain our
main result of excess overpricing after self-control depletion.
2.5 Experiment II: Mixed Markets
2.5.1 Motivation and Design
The results reported in section 2.4 referred to markets, in which either all market par-
ticipants underwent the tough Stroop task or none of them, i.e. either everyone’s self-
control resources had been reduced or no one’s. In this section we report results from
markets, in which only half of the participants’ self-control resources were depleted.
Each market consisted of five participants randomly assigned to the easy (placebo)
Stroop version from the HIGHSC condition and five participants randomly assigned
to the tough Stroop version from the LOWSC condition. We call this new condition
MIXED and for simplicity refer to traders facing the tough version of the Stroop task
as MIXLO traders and to those facing the easy version of the Stroop task as MIXHI
traders. The motivation for this additional experiment is twofold. First, asset market
experiments are zero sum games and behavior is highly path-dependent and endoge-
nous to market prices, which makes it technically impossible to analyze differences in
behavior resulting from reduced self-control in our homogeneous markets. Therefore,
we wanted a condition in which traders under both conditions are active at the same
time. It allows us to assess differences in trading behavior and performance between
MIXLO traders and MIXHI traders. Second, since in real-world settings – either due
to dispositional differences or due to differential previous demands on self-control re-
sources – it is likely that individuals high and low in self-control interact, we want
21Note that we exclude subjects who were familiar with the CRT from these analyses, since such
knowledge might have inflated correct CRT responses and thus obfuscate any effects of CRT scores.
The regression results are qualitatively very similar when including these subjects.
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so see whether the effect of reduced self-control observed in LOWSC markets can be
replicated with a smaller share of depleted traders in MIXED markets.
We conducted eight additional sessions with 16 markets in April 2014 and Novem-
ber 2015. In the last four sessions we added several questions to the experimental
questionnaires dealing with participants’ emotions. We were interested whether our
variation of self-control had taken effect via changes in emotional states. In order to
reduce experimenter demand effects and as is common in experiments analyzing emo-
tions, we confronted subjects with several emotions of which some were not relevant
at all to our question of interest. Apart from the assignment to the respective version
of the Stroop task within a market and the additional questions in the questionnaires
of the last four sessions, the experimental protocol remained exactly the same as in
Experiment I. Experimental participants were not aware of the different versions of the
Stroop task, i.e. they were unaware of the fact that half of the traders performed the
tough version and half of the traders the easy version.
2.5.2 Aggregate Price Evolution
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Figure 2.5: Trading Price Evolution Including MIXED
Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of average trading prices in all three treatments
of Experiment I and II. Interestingly, the effect of reduced self-control on mispricing
and overpricing does not seem to be changed if only part of the trader population is
self-control depleted. Both LOWSC and MIXED on average display more overpricing
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than HIGHSC. For MIXED we observe an average RAD of 0.551 and an average
RD of 0.430. A Mann-Whitney test confirms that the mispricing measure RAD in
MIXED is significantly different from HIGHSC (p = 0.0500) but cannot be statistically
distinguished from LOWSC (p = 0.8065). This result also holds for our overpricing
measure: RD in MIXED differs significantly from HIGHSC (p = 0.0864), but not from
LOWSC (p = 0.5006).22
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Figure 2.6: Price Evolution in Individual Markets in MIXED
Figure 2.6 illustrates the evolution of mean trading prices for the 16 individual
markets in the MIXED condition. Qualitatively, we get similar results as in LOWSC.
That is, in some of these markets prices exhibit a hump-shaped development, ini-
tially increasing and peaking in some intermediate period. Thus already the presence
of a moderate share of traders with depleted self-control abilities is sufficient to re-
produce the excess overpricing we observed when all traders’ self-control levels were
depleted.
2.5.3 Differences in Trading Behavior and Outcomes
Trading Behavior
Differences in market outcomes in theMIXED condition compared to HIGHSC markets
must result from different actions of MIXLO traders. However, when analyzing trading
22The results of these comparisons also hold when looking at quantity- or trade-adjusted mean
prices.
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behavior, distinguishing cause and effect is particularly difficult, as already mentioned
earlier. A particular deviation in behavior by some traders in the early phases of a
market might shift behavior of other (non-depleted) traders. We therefore start by
focusing on the very first trading period, where dependencies are less relevant than in
later periods. Table 2.2 compares several variables concerning trading activity between
MIXLO and MIXHI traders. Remember that we conduct all statistical tests based
on the most conservative definition of independence (the market level), and hence
significant effects are usually associated with large absolute differences.
Table 2.2: First Period Differences in Trading Behavior
Group Mean
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
pbid 36.377 28.487 0.035**
pask 49.931 54.478 0.196
qbid 16.109 17.788 0.660
qask 14.389 15.202 0.796
timebid 60.425 47.000 0.017**
timeask 50.230 50.383 0.796
firsttimebid 51.517 39.846 0.048**
firsttimeask 34.635 34.435 0.959
Variables starting with a p denote prices, q quantities
and time variables refer to the time passed in the cur-
rent period, thus lower values indicate behavior earlier
on. bid and ask refer to posted bids and asks, p-values
from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with data collapsed on
market and treatment level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
According to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests MIXLO traders make significantly lower
bids initially (p = 0.035) and post these bids earlier than their non-depleted peers
(p = 0.017). They are also quicker in posting their first bid at the beginning of the
period (p = 0.048). While not significant, there also seems to be the tendency that
MIXLO traders (while bidding low) ask for a higher price than the MIXHI traders
(p = 0.196). After period one, these differences vanish, suggesting that non-depleted
traders start imitating the behavior of self-control depleted traders.23 The averages
in Table 2.2 suggest an initially more aggressive trading pattern of MIXLO traders,
trying to buy lower and sell higher than MIXHI traders. From trading period two on,
however, their behavior has incited non-depleted traders to behave similarly and hence
set many markets on an entirely different trajectory.
23Results for period two are reported in table B.8 of the appendix indicating that these initial trading
differences disappear, while MIXLO traders display significantly higher asking prices in period 2.
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Table 2.3: Rank Correlations of First Period Behavior with Overpricing
ρ p-value
pbid 0.436 0.104
pask 0.488 0.055*
qbid 0.486 0.066*
qask -0.229 0.393
timebid -0.607 0.016**
timeask 0.262 0.327
firsttimebid -0.421 0.118
firsttimeask 0.079 0.770
Rank correlations of average first-period
behavior over all market participants
with average relative deviation over pe-
riods 2-10 for MIXED markets, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3 presents evidence that the observed differences in first period behavior
between our treated and non-treated traders are also those behaviors that are correlated
with later overpricing. While Table 2.2 has shown that low-self control traders bid
earlier in period one and also post their first bid significantly earlier, Table 2.3 shows
that markets in which bidding occurs early in period one, are those that exhibit more
overpricing over the course of the experiment.
Profits
On average, MIXLO traders earned e 8.16, and MIXHI traders earned e 7.84 in the
experimental asset market – a difference that is not significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.9794). We consider this as evidence that inhibited self-control abilities
affect overpricing, but that depleted traders are not necessarily driven out of the mar-
ket. Instead, as shown previously, they might goad non-depleted traders into more
aggressive trading behavior, making everyone end up with similar profits. While this
suggests that a lack of self-control abilities is not necessarily detrimental to trading
performance, it shows how negative the effect can be for markets on which traders
potentially imitate each other’s behavior.
2.5.4 Increased Emotional Reactivity
In the experimental sessions that we conducted in November 2015, we asked partic-
ipants a number of questions relating to their emotional experience during the asset
market. In particular, we asked participants to rate how strongly they felt a number of
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emotions at the beginning of the first period and at the end of the last period, respec-
tively. We asked participants at the end of the experiment, requiring them to recollect
their emotions.24
Table 2.4 reports the results for those emotions that have previously been connected
to overpricing in experimental asset markets (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2011; An-
drade et al., 2016; Lahav and Meer, 2012; Breaban and Noussair, 2013). Note that we
collapsed all the emotional measures on the treatment group level within each mar-
ket and test for differences with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Strikingly, the intensity
of every single measure of experienced emotions is higher in the MIXLO than in the
MIXHI group, with many measures being statistically significant. At the beginning
of period 1, MIXLO participants report to feel borderline significantly more surprise
(p = 0.103) and significantly more joy (p = 0.058). Remember that Lahav and Meer
(2012) found that inducing positive mood before trading leads to higher deviations
from fundamental values and thus larger levels of overpricing and that correlational
studies also suggest such a relationship (Breaban and Noussair, 2013; Hargreaves Heap
and Zizzo, 2011). Furthermore, at the end of the final trading period, MIXLO traders
report significantly higher levels of excitement, fear and surprise than MIXHI partici-
pants (all p < 0.05).
We also asked participants in the post-experimental questionnaire explicitly about
how strongly they felt their behavior was driven by emotions and how much they had
tried to suppress the influence of emotions on their trading behavior (see final panel of
2.4). Even though the difference in averages goes in the expected direction, given the
responses to the questions on experienced emotions, they fail to reach significance on
conventional levels. The results indicate that the behavior of the traders with depleted
self-control abilities might have been driven by emotional factors to a larger degree
than they were aware of themselves.
2.5.5 Reduced Cognitive Control
Experiment I did not show a direct effect of the Stroop task on incentivized CRT
performance. Condition MIXED gives us the possibility to look at the issue again, in
particular at the association between CRT, the treatment (MIXLO and MIXHI ), and
performance in terms of profits.
24We also provided participants with a questionnaire regarding their trading behavior which we do
not report here. The average responses to all the emotion-related questions and the test statistics can
be found in Table B.4 of the appendix. Average values for changes in emotions over time can be found
in Table B.5.
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Table 2.4: Ex-post Reported Emotions of Traders in MIXED
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
Beginning of the First Period
Excitement 4.200 4.500 0.400
Fear 2.100 2.175 0.395
Surprise 3.600 4.050 0.103
Joy 3.625 4.375 0.058*
End of the Last Period
Excitement 3.425 4.200 0.042**
Fear 1.900 2.575 0.014**
Surprise 2.450 3.400 0.030**
Joy 3.375 4.125 0.207
Self-Evaluation of Emotional Reactivity
Emotion driven 2.475 2.725 0.362
Suppressed emotions 5.300 4.950 0.205
Data collapsed on the treatment level per market; responses were
on 7 point Likert scales; test results from Wilcoxon Signed Rank
tests; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Previous research has shown that CRT scores correlate positively with individual
participants’ profits in similar experiments (Corgnet et al., 2014; Noussair et al., 2014).
Toplak et al. (2011) find that CRT scores are correlated with measures of cognitive
ability, thinking disposition and executive functioning. Thus, we can interpret the
CRT score as a measure of cognitive control. In order to check whether the effect of
CRT performance on profits is similar here, we ran additional regressions which we
report in table 2.5. Note that we excluded participants who had indicated that they
knew at least one of the CRT questions at the end of the experiment. The knowledge
of CRT questions before the experiment might have inflated correct CRT responses
and thus obfuscate any interaction effects between treatment and CRT scores.25
In specification (1) we reproduce the finding that there is no statistically signif-
icant difference between the profits of traders in MIXLO and MIXHI. Specification
(2) confirms findings from earlier studies that higher CRT scores are positively related
to higher overall profits for both MIXLO and MIXHI. However, when we separate
this effect by treatment by including an interaction of the MIXLO dummy with the
CRT score, we obtain a larger effect of the CRT score on profits for MIXHI traders,
while for MIXLO traders the effect of CRT scores on profits is significantly smaller
2572 subjects in MIXED markets reported to know at least one of the CRT questions. Including
these subjects makes the coefficient of the interaction term CRT ×MIXLO insignificant with p = 0.110
and p = 0.197 respectively in the specifications parallel to (3) and (4) as these subjects water down
the effect.
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(p < 0.05) and in fact cannot be distinguished from zero overall (post-estimation Wald
test, p = 0.43).
Thus, MIXLO subjects’ trading seems to be relying less on their underlying ability
for cognitive control. Together with the results indicating higher emotional valence and
reactivity, this suggests an interpretation of trading behavior of MIXLO participants
as relatively more relying on impulsive system 1 processes than on reflective system 2
processes (Kahneman, 2011).26
Table 2.5: Determinants of Profits in MIXED
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profit
MIXLO 1.036 1.040 4.342* 4.301*
(0.770) (0.795) (2.222) (2.215)
CRT 1.084** 1.882*** 1.757**
(0.497) (0.621) (0.691)
CE 0.473 0.867 0.685
(0.550) (0.768) (0.753)
CRT × MIXLO -1.660** -1.547**
(0.642) (0.690)
CE × MIXLO -1.031 -1.051
(1.125) (1.098)
Female -1.381
(0.888)
Constant 7.035*** 5.302*** 3.936*** 5.326***
(0.441) (1.097) (1.323) (1.638)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R2 0.016 0.079 0.120 0.145
Participants who indicated to know at least one of the CRT
questions excluded; robust standard errors clustered on the
market level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.6 Discussion
We observe a large main effect of self-control depletion on overpricing in both experi-
ments. The difference in overpricing cannot be explained by a change in risk attitudes
26Hefti et al. (2016) argue that good performance in an asset market requires two dimensions of
cognitive capabilities, mentalizing and cognitive abilities. Self-control depletion could in principle
affect both dimensions and lead subjects to become more impulsive. We deem this an interesting
question for future research.
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or a simple change in cognitive abilities. Experiment II gives us additional power to as-
sess potential explanations for the excess overpricing after self-control depletion.
First, there are differences in trading behavior. Self-control depleted traders trade
slightly less on average, and their initial trading behavior seems more aggressive. For
instance, the fact that self-control depleted traders post bids significantly earlier sup-
ports the notion that their behavior is driven by a higher degree of impulsivity than
the behavior of non-depleted traders. In an environment in which early aggressive
activity is potentially imitated by others on the market, not much is needed to set
a market on an overpricing trajectory. Notably, trading behavior is strongly path-
dependent in experimental asset markets, and the evolution of prices follow different
forms and different timings on different markets. We could have presented additional
empirical evidence for effects of self-control depletion on trading behavior and trad-
ing strategies, but such evidence requires assumptions that are somewhat arbitrary.
Hence, we decided to present fewer analyses and only those in whose robustness we are
confident.
Second, there are differences in the reported intensity of emotions and relevance of
emotions. Due to existing findings, initial differences before the opening of the asset
market (and after the Stroop task) are one channel via which depleted self-control
could have affected overpricing. Apart from the pre-market emotional state, differential
emotional reactions during the market could be driving our results. Emotion regulation
has been shown to draw on self-control resources (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al.,
2010). We have evidence that participants displayed more intense emotional states, in
particular at the end of the asset market. We interpret our treatment effect as the
result of an increased sensitivity towards emotions triggered by self-control depletion.
Our effect is in line with the literature on self-control depletion. For example, Bruyneel
et al. (2006) have shown that people whose self-control has been reduced rely more on
affective and less on cognitive features in product choice. Similarly, in our setting
traders with low self-control levels could rely more heavily on affective features of the
asset, e.g. the thrill from its recent price increase or from speculation, than on cognitive
features, e.g. the knowledge that the fundamental value of the stock is decreasing.
Thus emotional responses could be responsible for more myopic decision making, a
higher level of overconfidence/overoptimism (Michailova and Schmidt, 2016), and more
speculative trading.
Third, cognitive abilities could be different after the two versions of the Stroop
task. However, the issue is not as straightforward as we expected. For our sample, we
cannot provide evidence on a direct impact of the treatment on CRT performance. This
might be because the monetary incentives to do well in the CRT are relatively high,
and it is well-known that people can temporarily overcome self-control problems if the
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motivation is sufficient (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003; Vohs et al., 2012). However,
there is evidence in our data for an indirect effect of self-control depletion on cognitive
abilities. We find that the CRT carries predictive power for traders’ profits, but only
if their self-control has not been depleted previously.
There are additional explanations that we cannot pin down fully and have to leave
for verification in future research. Self-control depleted traders, for instance, report
significantly higher levels of surprise after the last period of the market. This could be
an indication for a reinforcement of myopic behavior when being self-control depleted.
Another candidate explanation for our treatment effect is a problem to stop, i.e. to
sell early enough and not to stick too long to the expectation of a future price rise.
Self-control depletion could lead to a reluctance to sell an asset whose price is rising.
Similarly, it could lead to undue overoptimism.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide causal empirical evidence for the notion that a lack of self-
control can fuel overpricing on asset markets. We consider experimental continuous
double auction markets for which Smith et al. (1988) first reported a tendency for
overpricing. We exogenously reduce market participants’ ability to exert self-control
using a tough version of the Stroop task, which has previously been shown to deplete
people’s ability to exert self-control in subsequent tasks (Baumeister et al., 1998).
Comparing two market settings in which either everyone’s or no one’s self-control was
reduced, we observe significantly more mispricing and overpricing as the result of a
reduction in self-control abilities than without this reduction.
Self-control depletion affects trading behavior and the perception of the trades
and market outcomes. We provide evidence that in markets populated by self-control
depleted and non-depleted traders initial trading strategies of the former are more
aggressive than of the latter. However, the evidence is not entirely conclusive. Trading
is path-dependent on experimental asset markets, and it is difficult to pin down the
exact reasons for overpricing to emerge without making arbitrary assumptions. We
do not observe a performance difference between traders with depleted self-control and
traders with full self-control abilities, suggesting that low self-control traders might not
be driven out of the market, but rather incite other traders to engage in more aggressive
trading. In addition, we have evidence for an emotional channel that explains our
main result. Self-control depleted traders show stronger emotions, in general, but in
particular stronger emotions that have been linked to overpricing in previous studies
that induce emotions or that measure emotions while trading. Finally, we find that
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our measure for cognitive skills loses predictive power for the profits of low self-control
traders. This might indicate that even though cognitive skills seem unaffected by
self-control depletion (as are risk attitudes), different cognitive processes play a role
in traders with low self-control levels. These results are in line with a dual systems
perspective of self-control: self-control depleted participants seem to have acted more
on the basis of emotions and less on the basis of cognition, thus driving up prices.
Our findings have relevant implications: First, with differences in self-control levels,
we add a potentially important explanation to the existing explanations for overpricing
on asset markets. We have shown that already a moderate number of participants with
low self-control levels are sufficient to more than double the extent of overpricing in
terms of relative deviation from fundamental value. Second, our results can be regarded
as indicative of the role of self-control in markets outside the laboratory – there, both
temporary reductions in self-control as well as the personality trait self-control might
play an important role in determining trading behavior and perception. Self-control
might also be an important attribute on which individuals self-select into trading.
However, low self-control traders might not be as easily exploitable by high self-control
traders as one would think. In our case, they would not have been driven out of the
market quickly. Several practical implications of our results for investing and trading
activities come to mind. Given our findings, investment decisions should not be taken
under limited self-control or willpower conditions. For instance, cognitive load, food
or sleep deprivation, and self-control effort in unrelated domains have been shown
to be correlated with limited self-control abilities. If such conditions are unavoidable,
decision aides to sustain self-control such as commitment devices should prove useful to
circumvent the potentially negative consequences. This might be particularly relevant
in fast-paced markets.
Our experiment opens up interesting paths for future research: It would be inter-
esting to see to what extent our results are robust to changes in alternative market
mechanisms such as call markets and to changes in the fundamental value process such
as a constant fundamental value process, which has been shown to reduce overpricing
(Kirchler et al., 2012). Finally, the role of self-control for traders in markets outside
the laboratory remains largely unexplored. One can imagine field experiments or using
quasi-experimental variations of self-control abilities to study decisions of traders on
real markets.
Chapter 3
High-Frequency Trading, Maker-Taker
Pricing and Behavioral Adjustments:
An Experimental Study of Pricing
Structures in Fast-Paced Markets
3.1 Introduction
Financial markets have transformed drastically in the past two decades. While the
image of human traders making orders by phone or in face-to-face interactions on the
trading floor has become the stereotype of stock market trading, more and more trading
has been transferred into dedicated data centers where orders are being executed by
computers, sometimes in milli-, micro- or nanoseconds. Hendershott et al. (2011)
report that in 2009, already 73% of US trading volume was conducted by computers,
a share that has presumably been rising since. The advent of low-latency connections
between trading venues and affordable high-power computers enabled the rise of the
so-called high frequency traders (HFTs). HFTs are programmed to realize gains across
platforms by eliminating arbitrage opportunities, within platforms by using statistical
relationships in co-movement of stocks, or by interpreting imbalances in order books
as demand and supply shifts that translate into future price changes, usually using
limit order based strategies (O’Hara, 2015; Xu, 2015). Brogaard (2010) reports that
HFTs made $ 3 billion annual gross trading profits on US equity markets alone in the
years 2008 and 2009 and most studies estimate their market share to be within 1/3 and
2/3 of overall trading volume (Biais and Foucault, 2014). These trading profits result
primarily from large turnovers, Baron et al. (2012) estimate that the average profit per
contract for HFTs is only around $.70.
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Using limit order based strategies has traditionally been regarded as having positive
impacts on markets, as they act as liquidity suppliers (Foucault et al., 2005; Handa
and Schwartz, 1996). For this reason, many markets have adopted maker-taker pricing
(MTP), a pricing structure in which limit orders receive rebates on the trading price,
and market orders are levied a fee, the spread between the two generating revenue
for the trading venue. Maker-taker pricing has become the dominant pricing scheme
in the largest equities exchanges (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2015).
There has been some concern that HFTs do not make good liquidity providers, as they
may cease to submit limit orders anytime, thereby inducing and perpetuating market
instability (Madhavan, 2012). With HFTs dominating limit order based trading, the
corresponding favorable pricing scheme and their ability to close arbitrage opportuni-
ties faster than any human trader could, human investors need to presumably adjust
their trading behavior and react to the shifts in trading strategies and speeds that
HFTs induce. The field of behavioral finance has in the past however established that
humans in general suffer from several cognitive limitations that might thwart such
adjustment processes, such as limited attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) or over-
and underreaction to signals (Palfrey and Wang, 2012) that might prevent incoming
information from being processed correctly.
This chapter investigates how human traders react when high frequency traders
enter their market environment, and what role the pricing structure plays in this ad-
justment process, as it heavily favors HFTs. Since the presence of HFTs and the pricing
structure cannot be easily manipulated in real markets, I rely on a laboratory experi-
ment. The stylized environment in a laboratory experiment is highly adequate for this
study, as the purpose is to observe general tendencies in human behavior that become
apparent whenever the mechanism in question is present. Using an experiment, I can
cleanly vary the pricing structure and enable or disable HFTs. In four treatments, I
manipulate whether traders face an HFT in their market, whether limit (market) order
traders are given a rebate (levied a fee), or both. I then compare these conditions by
looking at prices and trading strategies to detect behavioral changes.
My results show that neither maker-taker pricing nor the presence of HFTs signif-
icantly influence price paths. Across all treatments trading prices react sluggishly to
changes in asset valuation, but there is neither much under- nor overpricing. HFTs
substantially shift behavior from limit to market orders, but maker-taker pricing has
no such effect. Overall, maker-taker pricing does not impact trading at all, other than
that it increases the average number of trades in markets with HFTs. When HFTs
are present, I observe that human traders learn to game the algorithm and realize
substantially higher profits.
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Several papers relate to the present study. One strand of literature deals with the
presence of computerized traders. Akiyama et al. (2013) use automated traders in call
auctions to investigate the effects of strategic uncertainty. They find that replacing
human subjects by computer traders makes price forecasts more accurate, but not per-
fectly so. Grossklags and Schmidt (2006) and Farjam and Kirchkamp (2016) investigate
the role of beliefs about the presence of computerized traders. The former paper uses a
market order based trading mechanism for the computer, while the algorithm used by
the latter paper is unknown. Both papers report reduced overpricing when automated
traders are present. Finally, De Luca and Cliff (2011) and Das et al. (2001) compare
different trading strategies using limit orders in markets with automatic execution to
see which strategy outperforms humans best. It is important to note, that none of
these contributions was particularly interested in the changes in trading behavior due
to computerized traders making fast limit order based trades without automatic ex-
ecution. The only experimental contribution in the area of pricing structures that
explicitly models maker-taker pricing is Bourke and Porter (2015), although some em-
pirical studies with less experimental control but a more natural setting exist (Malinova
and Park, 2015; Cardella et al., 2015). Bourke and Porter investigate the impact of
the pricing on several variables, but only find book depth to increase.
My results add insights on the psychology of traders that are so desperately needed
to explain the deviations from rational behavior that lead to stock market crashes
and recessions. The finding that price paths are neither influenced by HFTs nor fee
structure is reassuring for the design of actual equity markets. More concerning however
is the fact that HFTs realize losses. This can be seen as a precursor of market crashes
due to a lack of liquidity, as many HFTs would exit the market if they consistently
realized losses, which is exactly what happened during the 2010 Flash Crash (Wall
Street Journal, 2010). In markets with many uninformed traders that do not close the
wedge between prices and values, this problem will likely be exacerbated.
This chapter proceeds as follows, section 3.2 explains the experimental design and
sets up testable hypotheses, section 3.3 presents the findings and section 3.4 discusses
the implications and concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design & Hypotheses
3.2.1 Setting & Treatments
In the experiment, subjects acted in an asset market where they could trade shares of a
single fictitious company over the course of 10 periods. In 4 different between-subjects
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treatments, implemented using a 2× 2 design, I varied whether computer traders were
present (HFT ), whether a pricing structure rewarding market making was implemented
(MTP), or both (HFT-MTP). Table 3.1 lists all treatments.
Table 3.1: Overview of Treatments
Computerized Traders
Yes No
Maker-Taker Yes HFT-MTP MTP
Pricing No HFT CONTROL
Each treatment began with a 2 period dry-run of the asset market after subjects
had correctly answered several control questions to test their proper understanding
of the market structure. After completion of the dry-run, the actual asset market
commenced for a total of 10 periods. Finally, two additional parts elicited subjects’
risk preferences using a choice list and measured their cognitive skills. Before receiving
their pay, subjects filled in a standard questionnaire on background demographics and
answered several questions regarding their trading behavior.
3.2.2 Detailed Description: Asset Market
The experimental asset market used in my experiment closely resembles SSW-style
asset markets that have been heavily used in the literature to study overpricing phe-
nomena (Smith et al., 1988; Kirchler et al., 2012; Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015; Kocher
et al., 2016), but also borrows important features from markets concerned with opti-
mal belief updating (Palfrey and Wang, 2012; Bonn et al., 2016; Lindner and Schindler,
2016). More specifically, subjects were initially endowed with assets and cash, and they
could act as buyers and sellers for these assets in a ten period double auction market
populated with 6 traders, where each period lasted exactly 120 seconds. To encourage
trading, the ex ante expected value of each subject’s portfolio was held constant, but
every trader was endowed with a different percentage of wealth in assets, either 20
assets and 3,000 in cash, or 60 assets and 1,000 in cash. Because the initial asset value
was fixed at 50, every trader started the experiment with a wealth of 4,000. In order
to trade their assets, subjects could submit bids and asks to a public order book or
accept any standing bid or ask for one asset at a time. Additionally, they could remove
their own standing offers from the order book at any time during the trading period.
Traders also saw a price chart of the price evolution in each period, the current market
price and a list of their own past transactions to guide their decisions.
In contrast to many asset market experiments (for a survey see Palan (2013); Nous-
sair and Tucker (2013)), I did not implement dividend payments with increasing cash-
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to-asset ratio and decreasing fundamental value. Instead, the asset was repurchased at
the end of the market (similar to (Kirchler et al., 2015)), but to a randomly determined
value. While the asset value before trading began was exactly 50, after each period,
the asset value decreased or increased by exactly 20 points with equal probability, but
never exceeding 100 and never going lower than 0. Subjects were fully aware of this
adjustment process and its limits, and the actual asset value would be publicly an-
nounced at the end of each period. The choice for this deviation from the literature
was driven by the desire to observe a market that does not create overpricing simply
due to subject confusion or inattention. I rather wanted to observe subjects’ behav-
ioral adjustments to the presence of a pricing structure and a high speed computerized
trader, if they fully understand the setting.
A computerized trader was present in two of the treatments (see above) and auto-
matically traded at very high speeds, significantly faster than subjects. The computer
was programmed to post 3 bids slightly below the current market price, and 3 asks
slightly above the current market price at any time during a period.1 At any action
of any subject (such as posting a bid or ask, accepting any bid or ask, or deleting a
current bid or ask) the computer would reevaluate his position, delete bids above the
current market price from the order book, delete asks below the current market price
from the order book and post new bids and asks (up to 3 each). The computer would
never accept open bids or asks from the order book. Subjects were fully aware of the
presence of the computer and the instructions explained the trading behavior of the
computer in detail. Furthermore, the computer trader was able to access unlimited
cash and assets for trading purposes, a feature that human traders could not make
use of, as short-selling and borrowing for participants were ruled out by design. The
programming of the computer in many ways resembles high frequency traders in that
a) trading happens at faster speed than any other market participant is capable of
trading at, b) trading strategies are limit order based, and c) computer traders actions
are strategy-based (O’Hara, 2015).
Two of the treatments contained a fee structure (see above) that levied a fee on any
trader that accepted an open bid or ask from the order book, and gave a rebate to any
trader that had submitted the corresponding limit order in that trade.2 The fee and
rebate were set at 1 point per trade, such that they were revenue-neutral and would
allow comparison of my treatments without the fee structure. This pricing structure is
called maker-taker pricing, because the liquidity providing party (the market maker) is
receiving a rebate, while the liquidity removing party (the market taker) is levied the
1How far away from current market price bids and asks were was determined by drawing of several
random numbers, that were added or subtracted from the current market price.
2In this setting, a market order denotes any transaction where an open bid or ask is accepted from
the order book. A limit order in turn means submitting a new bid or ask to the order book.
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fee. The fee or rebate were not included in any trading prices and automatically applied
upon execution of a trade. For both treatment variations, all subjects received instruc-
tions explaining computerized traders and the fee structure, and only later revealed if
their session would contain one, any or both of those variations. This particular design
was chosen, such that treatment differences due to differently complex instructions
could not arise.
After each period, subjects had to answer four questions intended to elicit their
beliefs. Specifically, I asked them to indicate 1) the probability of the asset’s value
increasing in the next period, 2) the average answer from all traders in their market
to question 1), 3) the asset’s value at the end of the experiment, and 4) the average
estimated asset’s value among all other traders in their market. While question 1)
served as a test whether subjects could successfully remember or understand that
the probability of a value increase was always 50%, question 2) elicited the extent to
which subjects believed other traders would remember or understand this, serving as
a measure for rational expectations. Question 3) tested for particularly negative or
positive expectations of asset valuation developments for the trader, while question
4) assessed the trader’s expectations about other traders’ expectations. All questions
were incentivized using a quadratic scoring rule, which exhibits some theoretically
undesirable features Manski (2004), but doesn’t perform worse in practice compared
to other elicitation methods (Trautmann and Kuilen, 2015).
At the end of the asset market, the final asset value was announced, all assets were
repurchased and the revenue added to cash holdings, which were then converted into
Euros using an ex ante announced exchange rate.
3.2.3 Detailed Description: Additional Tasks
After completion of the asset market, I elicited subjects’ risk attitude using a multiple
choice list with 20 items comparing a lottery and an increasing fixed amount (Dohmen
et al., 2011). Subjects were only allowed to switch once from the lottery to the fixed
amount, and I treat the switching point as their individual certainty equivalent, al-
lowing to categorize subjects into risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk loving. After they
indicated their preferred choice for each of the 20 items, one item was randomly picked
by the computer and the preferred choice was implemented (either the lottery or the
fixed amount).
Subjects then took on the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) test.
For the duration of 5 minutes, they were given a number of 3× 3 matrices of symbols,
where the symbol in the lower right hand corner was missing. They then had to select
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from 8 options the only symbol that would meaningfully complement the matrix. This
test has been used to measure cognitive abilities, as completing the matrices requires
logical thinking. Subjects received a positive payment for each correct answer, and a
negative payment of the same amount for each incorrect answer. After answering one
matrix, the next matrix immediately appeared, until the entire 5 minutes had passed,
upon which the task ended immediately.
3.2.4 Procedures
In April 2016, I conducted the experiment with 4 treatments and 3 sessions per treat-
ment to a total of 12 sessions. 264 subjects participated in sessions of 24 subjects
each at the computerized laboratory MELESSA of the University of Munich. Sessions
lasted approximately one hour and subjects received an average payoff of e 14.46. Be-
fore each part, subjects received written instructions that were read aloud to ensure
common knowledge.3 Remaining questions were answered in private and subjects re-
ceived additional support if they encountered difficulties with the practice questions.
All payments were privately made in cash before subjects were dismissed from the
laboratory.
3.2.5 Hypotheses
If all traders were perfectly rational and had identical risk preferences, there should not
be any trade, as all traders carry the same asset valuation, even if the latter changes
after each trading period. Allowing for varying degrees of risk aversion among traders
however will also generate differences in valuation, as future price paths of the asset
become uncertain. Such a setting requires the most risk loving trader to hold all assets
as his willingness to pay for any asset is higher than that of any other trader in the
market. Importantly, the presence of computerized traders should have no impact of
trading behavior in such a setting. The computer generates offers above and below
market price, but in a setting with perfectly rational traders, the market price will
exactly be the difference between the risk premia of the two most risk loving traders –
a number potentially decreasing in the number of traders in a market. A fee structure
in turn would have an impact on rational traders to the extent, that it constitutes a
shift in prices. Traders executing market orders would trade at prices that reflect their
valuation minus the fee, while limit order traders execute trades at prices reflecting
their valuation plus the rebate.
3English translations of the instructions can be found in the appendix.
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The experimental data allows me to test a number of hypotheses—about the impact
of maker-taker fees, the presence of high-speed computerized traders, and the joint
influence of the two. Since fees and rebates are revenue-neutral, they constitute simply
a shift of the price from the market order trader to the limit order trader. Given
the complexity of the trading environment (Huber and Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler et al.,
2012), we might expect that not all traders are fully aware of the fees at all time due
to limited attention and might trade at higher (or lower) prices than they would in
the absence of fees. If limited attention is a feature of cognitive abilities as I measure
them, I should also expect a differential effect for different levels of cognitive skills.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Market order traders will trade at higher prices in the presence of a
fee structure, while limit order traders will trade at lower prices. The effect is more
pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.
Alternatively, traders with limited cognitive skills might out of fear of being involved
in disadvantageous trades instead rely more strongly on limit orders instead of market
orders, in order to avoid incorporating the fee structure in their trading decisions.
Hypothesis 2 Traders with lower cognitive abilities use more limit orders in the pres-
ence of a fee structure.
The presence of high-speed computerized traders in turn will automatically allow
subjects to make more use of market orders, as the computer mechanically provides
6 limit orders at all times (3 bids and 3 asks). This can also facilitate trading speed,
as open bids and asks can be accepted continuously, without waiting for other human
traders to generate acceptable offers.
Hypothesis 3 In the presence of high-speed computerized traders, human traders will
rely more strongly on market orders than limit orders. They will also engage in more
trades per period than in the absence of automated traders.
Given that computerized traders strategically maximize trading profits by posting
offers around the market price to eliminate arbitrage opportunities, they should have
a stabilizing effect on prices and generate smaller profits for human traders. Such a
stabilizing effect should also be expected to be present in the within-period variance
of market prices.
Hypothesis 4 Profits are smaller in the presence of computerized traders and the vari-
ance of market prices within a period is smaller.
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When both a fee structure and computerized traders are implemented, the predic-
tions become less clear. While the fee structure could drive subjects towards using
more limit orders, automated traders could induce the opposite effect. Due to the
comparatively small fee, I hypothesize that the latter effect is stronger.
Hypothesis 5 When both high-speed computerized trader and a fee structure are imple-
mented, subjects rely on market orders more strongly, but to a smaller extent than they
do in the absence of fees.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Prices
Before I look at the detailed behavioral adjustments that traders make before they
are faced with the respective market structure change, I investigate the price paths
observed in the different treatments. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of prices in all
four treatments, compared to the actual fundamental value (FV). Remember, while the
initial value of the asset is 50 points, the fundamental value of the asset adjusts by plus
or minus 20 points after each period and therefore varies over the course of 10 periods.
The first striking result that can be seen is that prices evolve more or less constantly,
reacting somewhat to the changes in fundamental value, but clearly to a lesser extent
than the fluctuations in value. The price adjustment in my experiment therefore seems
similar to the way beliefs are updated in Bonn et al. (2016); Palfrey and Wang (2012).
To quantitatively test whether this observed difference is statistically significant, I
calculate for each period the increase in fundamental value over the previous period, and
the increase in prices over the previous period, and compare the two.4 Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests confirm that price adjustments are indeed smaller than the adjustment of
fundamental value in all four treatments (p = .0745 in CONTROL, p = .0033 in MTP,
p = .0044 in HFT, and p = .0029 in HFT-MTP).
Due to prices being almost constant while the fundamental value varies, the question
arises if the resulting prices constitute over- or underpricing. Figure 3.1 at least suggests
that prices stay above and below fundamental value for at least some time. I therefore
test whether prices and fundamental coincide in each of the four treatments using
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. While prices are on average statistically indistinguishable
from the fundamental value in treatments CONTROL (p = .1688), MTP (p = .7221),
and HFT (p = .1307), they significantly lie below the fundamental value in HFT-
4All non-parametric tests in the results section are two-sided and conducted after collapsing the
variables to the market level to obtain conservative estimates, unless otherwise noted.
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Figure 3.1: Price development across treatments
MTP (p = .0712). This significant difference is presumably mainly due to the strong
increase of the fundamental value in the last period, while prices slightly drop. In all
other periods, prices in the different treatments seem to be pretty close together. A
Kruskal-Wallis test indeed confirms that no price path is significantly different from
the others (p = .6224).
Overall, the price evolutions suggest that neither the presence of high-speed com-
puterized traders, nor a fee structure has much of an impact of prices in this setting.
Subjects trade at almost constant prices and react very little to changes in fundamental
value. This means that behavioral changes on the individual level that I will look at
more closely below, do not translate into aggregate price changes. This is reassuring, as
it means that aggregate market outcomes may not necessarily depend on these features
of the market structure.
Chapter 3. High-Frequency Trading and Pricing Structures 71
3.3.2 The Effects of Fees
To study the effects of a fee structure with maker-taker pricing, I first investigate if
traders who use more market orders exhibit substantially different prices. I therefore
build the average price at which each trader traded and relate it to the average number
of those transactions that are market orders. A Spearman correlation on the subject
level then detects a directionally negative correlation, that is however not statistically
significant (ρ = −.1055, p = .4107). It therefore does not seem that traders take the
fee structure into account, although the very small fee of one point makes detecting
treatment differences unlikely to begin with.
To further test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I turn to regression analysis. Table 3.2 reports
results from an OLS regression at the individual level with heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, only using data from my CONTROL and MTP treatments. Column
1 regresses the average trading price of a trader on a treatment dummy, where 1
denotesMTP. Maker-taker pricing seems to increase trading prices in this specification,
a finding that did not show up in the non-parametric comparisons, presumably due to
more conservative testing. Adding the share of market orders in column 2 does not
alter the results by much, and confirming my non-parametric finding from above, there
does not seem to be a relation between the share of market orders and prices.5 Column
3 adds the interaction of the share of market orders and the MTP dummy. This
coefficient particularly answers how prices were influenced by subjects that used more
market orders in MTP. The coefficient is negative but not yet significant (p = .107),
delivering at most weak evidence that traders using more market orders in MTP might
actually trade at lower prices in line with hypothesis 1. Column 4 adds gender, which
has been predictive of trading behavior (Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015). While gender itself
has no predictive power, it drives the coefficient of the interaction term further away
from significance. Finally, column 5 adds cognitive skills as the overall performance in
the Raven task. This reduces the p-value of the interaction term further, while itself
cognitive skills do not seem to matter for prices.6
While there is no significant evidence that traders using more market orders also
trade at higher prices, there is weak evidence that adding a fee structure has the
hypothesized effect of driving traders in this direction. The results are however not
significant at conventional levels, which could be due to the rather small fee levied
on the transaction, and will therefore be treated as non-results. Cognitive skills do
not seem to possess much explanatory power itself. I therefore turn to Hypothesis
5Note that the number of observations drops in column 2 as not all traders submitted market
orders.
6Including a third level of interactions using the results from the Raven task does not deliver
additional insights. Results available from the author upon request.
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Table 3.2: Regressions of trading prices on fee structures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Trading Price
Fees 3.913∗∗ 3.503∗ 125.663∗ 125.052 114.587
(1.704) (1.772) (74.740) (75.863) (79.009)
Market Orders -17.881 112.752 108.489 101.829
(82.672) (125.583) (129.253) (137.680)
Fees × Market Orders -244.290 -243.186 -221.710
(149.290) (151.527) (157.750)
Male .571 .446
(1.954) (1.939)
Cog. Skills -.900
(1.104)
Constant 35.550∗∗∗ 44.956 -16.940 -15.150 -9.840
(2.624) (41.629) (62.956) (64.654) (68.374)
Observations 126 121 121 121 121
R-squared .040 .032 .041 .042 .048
Coefficients from a OLS regression of individual trading prices using the data from treatments CONTROL and
MTP. Fees denotes treatment MTP, Market Orders is the share of trades conducted as a market order, Male
is a gender dummy, and Cog. Skills is the performance in the Raven task. Robust standard errors reported in
parentheses, and ∗ = p < .10, ∗∗ = p < .05 and ∗∗∗ = p < .01.
2 by regressing the share of individual market orders on my measure of cognitive
skills, as well as other covariates. Column 1 shows the baseline, in which only a
dummy indicating whether treatment is CONTROL orMTP. By construction, subjects
use a market order share of close to 50 % in both treatments.7 Adding cognitive
skills in column 2 and the interaction in column 3 does not add much power and
hardly influences the results, indicating that cognitive skills play no role on the decision
whether to rely on market or limit orders. Adding additional controls in columns 4
and 5 does not change this finding.
While my previous results at least allowed to speak of suggestive evidence because
some tests only marginally missed conventional significance levels, the results in this
table are more clear. It does not seem that traders low in cognitive skills evade the
incorporation of a fee structure by switching from market to limit orders. Overall, and
in line with the findings in Bourke and Porter (2015), a fee structure does not seem
to change much of traders’ behavior, apart from weak evidence that it entices them to
trade at higher prices.
3.3.3 The Effects of High-Speed Traders
The presence of high-speed computerized traders opens the possibility for subjects to
switch from market making to market taking, as the computerized trader will pro-
vide sufficient liquidity through its limit orders. Figure 3.2 compares the share of
transactions being market orders across all four treatments. While our treatments
7In the absence of HFTs, each human market order must correspond to a human limit order.
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Table 3.3: Regressions of market orders on cognitive skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Share of Market Orders
Fees -.001 -.001 -.006 -.006∗ -.006
(.001) (.001) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Cog. Skills .000 .001 -.001 -.001
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Fees × Cog. Skills .002 .002 .002
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Male .002 .002
(.001) (.001)
Age .000
(.000)
Constant .502∗∗∗ .501∗∗∗ .502∗∗∗ .501∗∗∗ .498∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.008)
Observations 121 121 121 121 121
R-squared .007 .008 .020 .034 .039
Coefficients from a OLS regression of the share of market orders using the data from treatments CONTROL and
MTP. Fees denotes treatment MTP, Age denotes the trader’s age in years, Male is a gender dummy, and Cog.
Skills is the performance in the Raven task. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, and ∗ = p < .10,
∗∗ = p < .05 and ∗∗∗ = p < .01.
where computerized traders are absent show a share of market orders of 50%, this
share strongly increases to about 60% in all treatments where an automated trader
is present. When comparing the share of market orders between treatments CON-
TROL and HFT, this difference is statistically highly significant (Mann-Whitney test,
p = .0001), and so is the difference between CONTROL and HFT-MTP (Mann-
Whitney test, p = .0001).
These results are clearly support for the hypothesized shift of trading behavior
from limit orders to market orders when the computer is supplying sufficient liquidity
through active orders in Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, there is still a substantial extent
(approximately 40%) of trading being conducted using limit orders. To test the sec-
ond part of this hypothesis, I will compare the number of trades per period across all
treatments. Figure 3.3 shows exactly this comparison for all four treatments. There is
a clearly visible difference in the Figure, but the claim that this difference is driven by
adding computerized traders cannot be confirmed (comparing the average number of
trades in CONTROL and HFT does not deliver significant estimates, Mann-Whitney
test, p = .3600, nor does the comparison between MTP and HFT, p = .2244). Strik-
ingly, the entire increase in trades seems to stem from the combination of maker-taker
fees and having computerized traders, as Mann-Whitney tests show highly significant
differences: p = .0138 when testing against HFT, p = .0006 when testing against MTP,
and p = .0010 when testing against CONTROL. This suggests that both features are
necessary to induce subjects to trade more volume, but interestingly, the increased
trading activity does not lead to significantly higher prices.
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Figure 3.2: Share of market orders across treatments
The findings with respect to Hypothesis 3 are therefore straightforward. High-speed
computerized traders indeed push human traders to make increasing use of market or-
ders. They are however not sufficient to increase trading volume, which also needs
maker-taker pricing to lead to significant differences. I now test whether these differ-
ences in trading behavior can also influence traders’ profits and the variance of market
prices.
Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of profits in all four treatments. Because of the asset
market being a zero-sum game in the absence of computers, average profits always equal
e 4 in treatments CONTROL and MTP. In both treatments where computer traders
are present, however, subjects make substantially higher profits that accumulate over
time. Apparently, some subjects strategically used a weakness of the computer algo-
rithm. Because all offers were relative to the current market price, subjects executed
market orders at low prices initially and purchased large quantities of assets from the
computer. In later periods (and even later within periods), they traded at higher prices
to make the computer create offers at high prices, in which they sold all their previ-
ously cheaply bought assets back to the computer. The fact that the computer had no
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Figure 3.3: Number of trades across treatments
participation constraint, but supplied assets and cash constantly, could thus be used to
realize substantial profits. This offers insights into how bubble-and-crash phenomena
in such a setting could occur: An actual high frequency trader would react similarly,
but would usually possess a routine that makes him exit the market, whenever he con-
sistently realizes losses. This could lead to a sudden drop in liquidity provision that
makes the market collapse.
Since developing a strategy to game the algorithm and then colluding to adjust
market prices requires substantial cognitive effort, I test the relationship of cognitive
skills and profits. A Spearman rank correlation shows that higher scores on the Raven
task tend to be correlated with higher profits in the asset market but not significantly
so: ρ = .3468, p = .1050. I find a similar picture when comparing the share of market
orders with profits from the Raven task. While the correlation is positive and barely
misses conventional significance levels in treatments in which computerized traders are
present: ρ = .3473 and p = .1045, there is no such relationship in treatments where
computer traders are absent (ρ = −.2471 and p = .2802). While some traders therefore
strategically exploited the computer, others did presumably not realize the arbitrage
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Figure 3.4: Profits across treatments
opportunities created by the wedge between prices and value. This phenomenon would
be a particular problem in markets in which many traders are uninformed about un-
derlying values of assets, such as in China, where large parts of the population engage
in asset trading as a substitute for gambling, which is illegal.
It is also not the case that high-speed computer traders have a mitigating impact
on price fluctuations. I compute the within-period variance of market prices for each
treatment as a measure of price volatility. A Kruskal-Wallis test however does not find
one condition to be significantly different (p = .5553). Given the increasing profits
for traders in the settings with computerized traders, there could be counteracting
effects. While computerized traders stabilize the price around the current market price
by offering bids and asks close to the current prize, they also destabilize the price when
human traders try to exploit them.
Summarizing, while I find support for behavioral shifts towards more market orders,
computer traders alone neither contribute to increased trading activity, nor do they
stabilize the prices. Owing to some subjects colluding and exploiting the computerized
trader, the algorithm actually suffers from severe losses.
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3.3.4 Effects in HFT-MTP
Since I have previously established that the share of market orders does not change
following the introduction of maker-taker pricing, and that market orders suddenly
increase when computerized traders are present, there should not be much of a miti-
gation of that effect in a setting, where both treatment variations are present. Figure
3.4 has already shown that there is a difference between HFT-MTP and CONTROL,
as well as HFT and CONTROL. As expected from visual inspection, there is indeed
no significant difference between the share of market orders in HFT-MTP and HFT
(Mann-Whitney test, p = .9020), but the tendency is consistent with hypothesis 5, as
the share of market orders is slightly lower in HFT-MTP.
Apart from the not significant difference in market order utilization, treatment
HFT-MTP only differs from the others by a much steeper slope of profits over time
(see Figure 3.4) and by significantly more trades (see Figure 3.3).
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the effects of high-frequency traders (HFT), maker-taker
pricing and the joint effect of the two on behavioral adjustments by human traders. The
topic is of particular importance, given that asset markets have undergone major change
in the past decades. While more computerized trading is often argued to have made
markets more stable and removed arbitrage opportunities, due to the boundedness of
rationality in human traders, there could be unintended consequences.
My experiment therefore consists of four treatments, where I vary whether HFTs
are present, whether maker-taker pricing is implemented or if both are present at the
same time. Laboratory subjects engage in trading of one fictitious asset in each of
the treatment conditions. HFTs are programmed to constantly create limit orders for
purchases and sales slightly above and below the market price, thereby smoothing price
paths. Maker-taker pricing takes the form of a fee to be levied on market orders, while
the corresponding limit orders receive a rebate of the same amount.
I find that prices do not differ across the four treatments, suggesting that all treat-
ments contribute to market efficiency equally. Maker-taker pricing does not appear
to have much of an influence on any variables, as I do not observe changes in trading
behavior. HFTs instead encourage human traders to engage much more strongly in
market orders. Because subjects learn to game the algorithm, they end up with sub-
stantially higher profits. This is made possible, because other market participants fail
to exploit the arbitrage possibilities due to the wedge between value and prices.
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My findings provide important insights. First, it seems that human traders are not
more prone to engage in speculative behavior depending on the presence of HFTs and
the fee structure. This should be reassuring to market designers. Second, the fact that
collusion can lead to strong losses for the algorithm, reemphasizes the need to ensure
liquidity provision to markets. When algorithms face consistent losses, they usually
withdraw from the market, as can be seen with the role of spoofing in the 2010 Flash
Crash.
This study also has some limitations, that should be addressed. First, the fact that
the pricing structure has no visible impact on trading behavior might be due to the
fee being relatively small compared to market prices (and the variance thereof). This
might have led subjects to just ignore the fee, and focus on realizing trading profits
from other traders that do not value the asset correctly. Future experiments should
therefore analyze this relationship in a setting where the trading fee is much more
substantial. Second, the fact that HFTs can be exploited without exiting the markets
upon realization of substantial losses suggests that crashes due to lack of liquidity might
have been prevent. To also judge the influence HFTs have on human decision making
when markets break down, future studies should design an HFT such that it exits the
market when needed to cut losses. I leave these questions for future research.
Chapter 4
Shocking Racial Attitudes: The
Cultural Legacy of Black G.I.s in
Europe*
4.1 Introduction
The death of Martin Brown in Ferguson, Missouri and anti-migration marches in Ger-
many have reawakened debates about racial prejudice in both the US and Europe.
Whilst racism persists, minorities’ welfare suffers through labour market discrimina-
tion, reduced access to public goods and hate crime. How can such prejudices be
reduced? Allport (1954) suggested that contact with minorities could be enough to
soften attitudes towards them, and this has been an important subject of study for
social psychologists ever since (see Pettigrew 1998 for a review).
This chapter exploits a natural experiment to test Allport’s theory of intergroup
contact. During the course of World War II, around 150,000 African American GIs
(troops) served in Europe. Like white soldiers, most arrived via ports in the west
of England and spent time at one or more locations in England and Wales before
the invasion of German-occupied France in June 1944. Whilst stationed in the UK,
both black and white GIs came into frequent contact with the local population: “Got
any gum chum?” became a popular refrain amongst British children and troops were
frequently to be found in local pubs and dance halls. In areas where black troops were
posted, many locals saw black people for the first time.
We create a measure of potential contact with black GIs during World War II using
detailed information on military units and their locations at various points in time.
*This chapter is based on joint work with Mark Westcott.
79
Chapter 4. Shocking Racial Attitudes 80
We combine this with data on membership of the British National Party (the BNP,
a far-right party) from Biggs and Knauss (2011) and with data collected by Project
Implicit, a large online experiment (Xu et al., 2014), to demonstrate the effect of contact
on contemporary racial attitudes. Individuals living in areas where significant numbers
of black troops were located are less likely to join the BNP and report warmer feelings
towards black people. Using data on those who have migrated to ‘treated’ areas,
we show that persistence is primarily driven by ‘horizontal’ socialisation rather than
intergenerational transmission. However, we find no persistent effect on contemporary
implicit attitudes.
Our study adds to the literature on intergroup contact in two main ways. Firstly,
our identification strategy provides quasi-experimental variation in potential contact
throughout an extensive geographical area. In many papers, data on the ethnic com-
position of neighbourhoods has simply been combined with individual-level attitudinal
data to show that those living in more diverse areas report less prejudiced attitudes
(see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). However, since migrants might avoid moving to areas
with hostile populations, these studies suffer from potential selection bias (Dustmann
and Preston, 2001). In our setting, decisions on the assignment of troops were made ac-
cording to military needs without consideration of local racial attitudes. Black soldiers
served almost exclusively in segregated black-only units, providing support services
such as logistics, transport and food preparation. By necessity, these units (around
10% of the total) were stationed alongside white-only combat units. This led to a
similar pattern of deployment between white and black troops but variation in the
number of black units at any base, which our identification strategy can exploit. In
addition, we add to the contact hypothesis literature by showing that a short period
of intergroup contact can have persistent effects on attitudes decades later.
We also contribute to the literature on the persistence of cultural norms, within
which individual preferences are seen as endogenous to social and family environments.
A general model of preference formation is provided by Bisin and Verdier (2001). In
this model, parents take costly investments in their children’s preferences, resulting in
‘vertical’ transmission of values, but children are also socialised by the wider society
in which they grow up, resulting in ‘horizontal’ transmission. Bisin and Verdier show
the conditions under which heterogeneous cultural values can endure in the presence of
these potentially opposing forces, and several recent empirical papers have now docu-
mented very long-run persistence in cultural values. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) show
that anti-semitic attitudes in German towns and cities persisted over a time span of
almost 600 years; individuals in locations which saw persecution of Jews during the
middle ages were more likely to engage in anti-semitic behaviour immediately prior to
and during World War II. They attribute the persistence to vertical inter-generational
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transmission. Using data from the ‘Afrobarometer’ project, Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) also show persistence of cultural traits across several centuries. They demon-
strate systematically lower levels of trust in ethnic groups which were more heavily
affected by the trans-Atlantic slave trade. They find evidence for both horizontal and
vertical transmission of trust, but attribute a substantially larger effect to the vertical
transmission mechanism. In contrast to both these papers, our results indicate that
persistence in racial attitudes is primarily driven by horizontal transmission through
the neighbourhood.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to look at the persistence of cultural
norms not only at the explicit, but also at the implicit level. The distinction between
explicit and implicit attitudes goes back to Greenwald and Banaji (1995), who define
implicit attitudes as “traces of past experience [that] affect some performance, even
though the influential earlier experience is not remembered in the usual sense—that is,
it is unavailable to self-report or introspection” (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995, p. 4f.).
Implicit attitudes, as measured by a computerised test (‘IAT test’), have been shown to
be predictive for outcomes in a variety of domains (for an overview see Uhlmann et al.,
2009). Agerström and Rooth (2011) find that hiring managers’ discrimination against
obese job applicants is predicted by a ‘weight’ IAT that measures implicit attitudes
towards the overweight. In an incentivised experiment, Stanley et al. (2011) show that
white subjects’ implicit attitudes predict their judgement about the trustworthiness of
randomly matched black partners, even conditional on their reported racial attitudes.
Our analysis shows that contact between black GIs and local populations has had no
persistent effect on contemporary ‘implicit’ racial attitudes. So whilst our analysis
finds evidence for the ‘contact hypothesis’ in two independent measures of explicit
attitudes, implicit attitudes were either unaffected or have not been subject to the
same transmission mechanisms.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the historical background
and data, Section 4.3 describes some necessary preliminaries for the data analysis. Sec-
tion 4.4 documents the effect of historical intergroup contact on contemporary support
for the British National Party. Section 4.5 uses data from Project Implicit to explore
channels of persistence and to test whether the historical episode affected implicit at-
titudes. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Historical Background and Data
4.2.1 Historical Background
The United States entered World War II on December in 1941 following a declaration
of war from Germany and its immediate reciprocation by the US Congress. A head-
quarters for the US military’s European operation were established in London the next
month. The first combat troops arrived via ports in Northern Ireland and VIII Bomber
Command, later redesignated as the Eighth Airforce, was incorporated and dispatched
to Britain to join the Royal Air Force in the aerial bombardment of Germany. It flew
its first missions in June from bases in the east of the country, designated the Eastern
Base Section. This was one of four base sections (areas) that had been created (East,
West, South and Northern Ireland) in order to decentralize operations (See Waddell,
2010, p. 142 and Figure 4.1 for a map).
The UK also functioned as a staging post for the ground troops who would later
liberate France and eventually Germany. These troops began arriving in the UK in May
1942 in preparation for a mid-1943 land offensive, but this operation was postponed
and troop numbers declined from a peak of 230,000 to around 100,000 as troops were
reallocated to North Africa or the Pacific (for figures on monthly troop strength see
Ruppenthal 1978 and Figure 4.2). The ‘friendly invasion’ (Buckton, 2006) of Britain
began in earnest in May 1943 once plans for a 1944 offensive were settled. By November,
around 160,000 troops were arriving per month. Troop numbers reached their peak in
June 1944 with one and a half million GIs stationed in the UK, with newly arrived
troops concentrated particularly in the Southern and Western Base Sections.
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Figure 4.1: Base Sections in the UK, figure taken from (Ruppenthal, 1978, p. 85).
A map of the UK base sections showing the boundaries for the western, southern and eastern
sections.
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Figure 4.2: Build up of US Army strength in the UK
Figure shows US troop numbers in the UK from 01/1942 to 11/1945 and, where available a breakdown according to type. Data for 06/1944 is unavailable.
Sources: Reynolds (1995, p. 410), Ruppenthal (1978, p. 232) and Pogue (1954, p. 541)
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Around ten percent of GIs who served in the UK were black. African American
soldiers had fought for the US Army and its predecessors since the American War of
Independence. Over nine hundred thousand would serve during World War II, more
than half of them overseas (Moore, 2013). As in previous wars, black soldiers served
in racially segregated units, normally under command of white officers. Results from
a pseudo-scientific aptitude test1 were used to justify limiting these black units to
non-combat ‘labour’ roles, most often supply, transport, food preparation and sanita-
tion.
The British government had at first tried to discourage the US military from sending
black troops to Britain. Ostensibly this was to avoid conflict between white GIs and
British citizens, who might show “more effusiveness to the coloured people than the
Americans would readily understand”2, but concerns about sexual activity no doubt
also played a role (Reynolds, 2006). The matter was taken up by Anthony Eden,
the Foreign Secretary, and likely also by Churchill (Reynolds, 2006). Nonetheless,
the government’s request was refused, primarily because the need for labour units in
Britain meant the use of black troops was a military necessity, but also out of domestic
political concern. Suggestions were then made to limit black troops to port areas,
where the UK’s existent black population of around 8,000 people was concentrated,
but these were also rejected. The policy instead was to “place them [black troops]
where needed” (Rash, 1942).3
In practice, this meant black troops would serve throughout the country, in rural and
urban areas alike. The influx of troops into a small country put huge strain on available
accommodation; troops were stationed wherever space could be found4. Because of the
support services they provided, black units had to be stationed in close proximity to
combat (i.e. white) units to be useful. Nonetheless, the colour bar was maintained.
Interaction between black and white soldiers was minimised: accommodation, dining
and training facilities were all segregated. A ‘pass system’ was introduced in order
to keep black and white troops apart during their leisure time, with black and white
1The Army General Classification Test, which tested for acquired skills and knowledge, and in
which black soldiers scored on average substantially worse than their white peers, was often seen as
proof of the innate incapacity of black soldiers to perform combat roles (Reynolds, 1995).
2E. Bridges to J. Martin, 21 July 1942, in Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York,
USA, Harry Hopkins papers, box 136.
3Units arriving in Britain were first assigned to one of several armies by the Headquarters of the
European Theater. They would then be assigned to a base by their army’s headquarters. Troops
arriving in early shipment phases were mainly accommodated in newly constructed camps or ex-
RAF or British Army quarters. Soldiers were also accommodated in private homes once the required
accommodation started to outstrip supply. At first, this happened on a voluntary basis, but starting
in late 1943 rooms in private homes were requisitioned. No more than ten percent of troops were
billeted in private homes, and to the best of our knowledge black troops were never accommodated
this way.
4Although Scotland was deemed unsuitable for military facilities and only small numbers of troops
were ever stationed there (Lee, 1966, p. 623).
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units allowed off base on different days of the week or assigned different venues to
visit. It was during this leisure time that most contact between soldiers and local
populations took place: GIs were frequently to be found in local bars, restaurants
and dancehalls. GIs were often invited into locals’ homes, and there are also frequent
reports of younger women visiting troops on base, sometimes resulting in prosecutions
for trespass. Officially black and white units had the same quota for leisure time,
although some black soldiers complained about white southern officers restricting their
passes (Smith, 1987, p. 134). The UK government was at pains to take no overt actions
to enforce segregation, refusing for example to instruct police officers to recommend
segregation to local bar and restaurant owners. There are however isolated examples
of local authorities attempting to limit contact between black GIs and British women
(Reynolds, 2006, p. 123).
In most areas where black GIs were stationed locals saw and interacted with black
people for the first time.5 Although some racial prejudice no doubt existed, the British
on the whole warmly welcomed black GIs, whilst attitudes towards white soldiers were
more mixed. Writing in Tribune, George Orwell remarked that “the general consensus
of opinion seems to be that the only American soldiers with decent manners are the
Negroes” and one countryman famously quipped, “I don’t mind the Yanks, but I don’t
care much for the white fellows they’ve brought with them” (Olson, 2010, p. 287).
A quarter of those providing information to ‘Mass Observation’, a social research or-
ganisation, said that they had become ‘more pro-colour’ as a result of their wartime
experience (Smith, 1987, p. 123). According to a survey carried in November 1943,
80% of black troops had a ‘favourable’ opinion of the English, compared to 68% of
whites, many of whom were unhappy that black GIs had been so warmly received by
the local population (Smith, 1987, p. 134).
Most American ground troops left England in the course of Operation Overlord,
the invasion of occupied Europe beginning on June 6th 1944. On the first day of the
operation 150,000 troops landed in Northern France. By the time the operation ended
in August 1944, 700,000 GIs were left in Britain, down from the June peak of one and
a half million. Units continued to cross to Europe, but troop numbers in the UK did
not decrease much further until the end of the war: the UK continued to serve as the
headquarters of operations in Europe, as a base for Army Air Force units, as the point
of entry for American troops bound for continental Europe and as the main location of
5General Eisenhower wrote to General Lee: “There is practically no coloured pop-
ulation in the British Isles. Undoubtedly a considerable association of colored troops
with British white population, both men and women, will take place on a basis mutu-
ally acceptable to the individuals concerned.” (September 5 1942, ETOUSA AG 291.2-
B, available at https://archive.org/stream/IndoctrinationOfPersonnelArrivingInTheUK/
IndoctrinationOfPersonnelArrivingInTheUK_djvu.txt)
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military hospitals in Europe. However, by November 1945, almost all American units
had left the United Kingdom.
4.2.2 Troop data
Data on the location of US Army units in England and Wales is sourced from monthly
station lists produced by the US Army’s Adjutant General’s office, initially the “MRU
United Kingdom Station Lists” (1942-1944) and subsequently the “MRU United King-
dom and Continental Station Lists” (1944 onwards). Each list provides an overview of
all US Army units in the United Kingdom and (later) the wider European Theater at
a given point in time.
The lists were created using data collected by the Army’s Machine Records Units
(MRUs), designated mobile units for collecting and processing personnel and troop in-
formation. Every day, large numbers of these mobile data-entry units punched ‘morning
reports‘ from each unit onto IBM punch cards, which were then transported to a central
unit at the Adjutant General’s office and formed the basis for the station lists. Around
one hundred and fifty copies of the lists were distributed by the Adjutant General
to various military commanders each month, listing all units stationed in the United
Kingdom and their location at a snapshot in time, typically a few days before the
production of the station list. Each entry in a station lists represents a unit. Units are
identified with an abbreviation of their name (e.g. 1944 QM TRK CO for the 1944th
Quartermaster Truck Company), and listed along with their current map coordinates6,
the nearest town (e.g. Watford), and a symbol to indicate if the unit contained black
soldiers.
Most station lists for the period 1942-1953 survive and are housed at the US Na-
tional Archives7. Sixteen station lists covering the United Kingdom have been digitised
and shared with us by Captain Philip Grinton. The station lists cover sixteen months
from June 1943 to December 19458 with a concentration in 1944, where troop numbers
were highest.
6Map coordinates are provided in a coordinate system defined on the Cassini projection, for example
WL5715 for Watford. The first two digits of the coordinate indicate an 100 by 100km square, the
subsequent digits provide the northing and easting from the bottom left of that square, to an accuracy
of 1 kilometer. We reproject coordinates to the British National Grid using a Cassini projection with
false easting 500000, false northing 100000, central meridian -1.19276, scale factor 1.0 and latitude of
origin 50.617708.
7Record Group 407, HMS Entry Number NM 3 377 A. Catalog entry at http://research.
archives.gov/description/6883370.
8June 1943, August 1943, September 1943, November 1943, December 1943, February 1944, March
1944, April 1944, May 1944, June 1944, August 1944, October 1944, November 1944, December 1944,
May 1945, December 1945.
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Using these digitised station lists, we create a dataset of all 1,576 military bases/-
camps (unique according to their coordinates) where we know personnel were stationed.
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of these locations across England and Wales. The
size of the rectangle represents the frequency at which a location is mentioned in the
station lists, which we later call the number of ‘unit-months’ and use as our measure
of overall military presence in a location. The shade of the rectangles indicates the
share of units stationed at a location which ‘were black’; a completely black rectangle
indicates that all mentions of a location in the station lists are for black units, a com-
pletely white square that black units were never posted in the location. It is clear that
there is considerable geographic variation across locations in the share of black units
stationed; it is this variation that our identification strategy exploits.
There are two obvious geographic patterns in Figure 4.3. Firstly, the absence of
units in the South East of the England. This was a consequence of the plan for the
invasion of occupied France: US vessels left from the west of the England, UK troops
from the east, and landed in France on French beaches in the same formation. The
second obvious feature is the large concentration of white units in East Anglia. This
was the area used to launch bombing raids by the Army Air Forces, which had a
lower proportion of black soldiers than the army overall (Army Air Force, 1945, p.
22). Figure 4.3 also shows a grid that we will later use to control for geographical
fixed-effects to account for such geographical idiosyncrasies.
4.3 General Estimation Framework
We use two independent data sets with high geographical resolution to test the hypoth-
esis that racial attitudes were affected by contact with black GIs. The first of these
provides data on BNP party membership across all of England and Wales’ 180,000 cen-
sus output areas (‘neighbourhoods’), the lowest level geography on which the national
statistics agency collects data. The second is an extract from the data generated by
‘Project Implicit’, a website on which individuals can carry out a test for their implicit
racial attitudes. As well as carrying out the test, individuals are prompted to provide
self-reported racial attitudes and demographic information including their postcode.
We describe the datasets in more detail in sections 4.4 and 4.5, but first lay down the
shared estimation strategy that we apply to both datasets.
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Figure 4.3: Troop Locations across England and Wales
This map shows locations of US Army troops during World War II. The size of the rectangle
repesents the frequency at which a location is mentioned in the station lists. The shade of the
rectangle indicates the share of black units at this location.
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4.3.1 Population of interest
Our population of interest consists of contemporary populations living in locations
which were close enough to US military bases that contact with troops was relatively
likely. We know the precise locations of US military bases and all our potential outcome
variables are observed at ultra fine geographical resolutions (census output areas or
postcode). We must therefore define what it is for an area to be ‘close’ to a base.
Rather than simple geodesic distance, our preferred specification uses a definition of
closeness which takes into account variations in population density. We argue that the
probability of contact with troops stationed at a distance of k kilometers was lower in
more densely populated areas: consider units posted in a rural area with a pub serving
a wide geographic area compared to a city with pubs serving a hyper-local clientele. In
order to capture this logic, we define a neighbourhood and base as being close if they
lie within a common postcode district (N = 2,261). Postcode districts are more-or-less
arbitrary districts defined by Royal Mail for mail sorting and delivery purposes; they
are ideal for our purposes as they cover very small areas in cities but somewhat larger
areas in urban areas (65% of the variance in log-area is explained by log-density), with
a median size of 27 square kilometers. Using this definition of close, our population of
interest consists of individuals living in postcode districts where one or more bases were
located. Our treatment measure will also be defined on the postcode district level. We
explore alternative methods of matching military bases to observations of outcomes in
the appendix.
4.3.2 Treatment Definition
With random interactions, the probability of individuals coming into contact with
troops increases in the number of troops stationed nearby and the length of time they
were stationed for, something that our treatment measure should reflect. To achieve
this we sum up the number of units stationed in each postcode district, both across
locations and through time.9. When we sum only black units we generate our main
treatment variable, ‘black unit-months’, and when we sum over all units we generate
a control variable ‘unit-months’, which reflects the overall intensity of presence of US
military forces. Formally,
Unit-months in postcode districtj =
∑
t
∑
b
Unitsb,t
9According to personal conversations with staff at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland,
information on the number of soldiers in each unit was destroyed at the end of the war. We are therefore
unable to weight units by the number of personnel they contained.
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and
Black unit-months in postcode districtj =
∑
t
∑
b
BlackUnitsb,t
where j is a postcode district, t ranges over time periods, b ranges all over bases
in postcode district j and Unitsb,t (BlackUnitsb,t) is the number of units (black units)
stationed at base b at time t.
‘Unit-months’ therefore measures measures the overall strength military presence
in a postcode district, which we shall always control for, and ‘black unit-months’ the
probability of contact with black GIs.
4.3.3 Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy requires that the number of ‘black unit-months’ be exoge-
nous to anything else correlated with contemporary racial attitudes, controlling for the
overall number of ‘unit-months’. In other words, given a certain size of base, it was
as good as random how many units stationed there were black and how many were
white.
Our estimation results would be biased if black units were strategically stationed
in areas with particular racial attitudes. There is no evidence for this being the case.
Black soldiers served almost exclusively in segregated units with support (non-combat)
roles: quartermaster units, laundry units, transport units etc10. For these units to
carry out their roles effectively, they needed to be posted close to combat (i.e. white)
units. Strategic behaviour would have required both precise knowledge of the variation
in racist attitudes across geography and the willingness to accomodate these prefer-
ences when solving the optimal allocation of troops problem. Such an exercise would
have been costly, without any obvious payoff, and would surely have left documentary
evidence if carried out. As discussed in the introduction, there were some early sugges-
tions to limit black troops to port areas (where Britain’s tiny existing black population
was concentrated), but these were rapidly dismissed, as indicated by a 1942 internal
memo from the Services of Supply Headquarters, “The policy has been defined to place
them [black units] where needed.”
10The prevailing attitude among senior military figures at the time is summed up in a letter General
Patton wrote to his wife: “A colored soldier cannot think fast enough to fight in armor.” (Sasser,
2014, p. 104).
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4.4 BNP Membership
We begin by proxying racial attitudes using data from Biggs and Knauss (2011), who
geolocate members of the far-right British National Party (BNP) using a membership
list published online in 200811. The list was confirmed to be genuine and is understood
to provide a complete listing of members of the party in November/December 2007,
although the BNP has claimed that the list contains a number of ex- and prospective
members too.
The British National Party was founded in 1982 as a splinter group from the Na-
tional Front, an openly racist organization with links to European neo-Nazis. The
party’s founder was jailed for conspiracy to incite to racial hatred in 1986, and a senior
official described the party as “100 per cent racist” in 1995 (BBC, 2001). Police officers
and prison officials are banned by their employers from joining the party, and in 2009 a
government minister attempted to introduce a similar ban for teachers, citing a desire
to “keep racism . . . out of our schools” (The Guardian, 2009).
Attempting to increase its electoral relevance, the party began to outwardly reject
claims of racism in 1999, but its ideology is still widely considered to be just that (The
Spectator, 2009). Most tellingly, non-white members were banned from the party until
this was deemed illegal by a court in 2010. Even whilst espousing a ‘modernization’
agenda, the party’s leader from 1999 (who had been convicted for distributing material
likely to incite racial hatred) continued to call for the “repatriation” of non-white
Britons, who a party manual referred to as “racial foreigners”.
We argue that party membership provides an excellent indication of racist attitudes.
Members provide financial support to the party through yearly fees, they receive a
membership card, regular party communiques and are invited to attend party meetings
and events. So although there is no survey evidence on individual motivations for
joining the party, membership likely indicates a high degree of ideological compatibility
with the party. Membership is not contingent on the presence of a local branch; at the
time the membership list was publicised, individuals could join the party by completing
a paper or online form. Doing so, we argue, provides evidence of willingness to pay to
support a party with extreme views on race.
The membership list comprises 13,009 individuals; 12,563 (97%) of the entries con-
tain a home address with a valid UK postcode. There are over one million unique
postcodes throughout the UK, so this allows BNP members to be geolocated extremely
accurately. Using an official lookup table, Biggs and Knauss aggregate the data to
11Due to legal constraints in Germany, we are not able to process this information directly from the
original, leaked membership list.
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the 2001 ‘Output Area’ level, the lowest level geography on which the UK statistical
agency aggregates demographic and social data, and report the number of members
within each area. The authors kindly shared their dataset. With the help of another
lookup table, we match the data to the most recent output area definitions, giving data
on the universe of the 181,408 ‘2011 Output Areas’ across England and Wales, which
we refer to as neighbourhoods. This provides a significantly finer level of geographic
observation than would be the case using voting data, which is available only for ten
regions (European Elections) or 573 constituencies (general elections). Of the 184,109
neighbourhoods in England andWales (median population: 303), 12,513 (6.7%) include
at least one BNP member. The maximum number of members per neighbourhood is
eleven, an output area in Barnsley.
4.4.1 Results
In this section, we show the results of regressions with BNP members per 10,000 white
residents as the dependent variable. The denominator arises since only whites were
permitted to join the party at the time the membership list was published.
Our outcome is measured at neighbourhood level (N = 181,408), so we run our
main regression at the neighbourhood level too, without further aggregation. Using
neighbourhoods as the unit of observation allows us to accurately match each unit to
larger historical geographies in order to generate control variables: neighbourhoods
almost always fit completely inside historic boundaries, something which would not be
the case for larger geographic units. In order to account for correlation in the error
term between observations, we cluster standard errors at the modern local authority
level, which divides England and Wales into 348 regions. Aggregating neighbourhoods
to higher geographies or changing the clustering level does little to change the pattern
of results (tables not reported).
As described in section 4.3.2, we consider a neighbourhood as potentially ‘treated‘
if it lies within a postcode district where troops were posted. Table 4.1 shows some
summary statistics. There were bases within the same postcode district as around a
third of England and Wales’ 181,408 neighbourhoods: these are the 60,028 neighbour-
hoods which will enter our sample. Around a third again (25,321) had some potential
for contact with black troops. We observe troop locations in sixteen months between
1943 and 1945; on average troops were close to the effected neighbourhoods for seven
of these. There are a mean of 2.58 BNP members per 10,000 white residents across all
neighbourhoods in England Wales, and a mean of 2.31 close to US bases. It is apparent
from the table that there are fewer BNP members in locations where black troops were
once present, but also that black troops were more likely to have been present in areas
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics, BNP Membership
Mean if black
Mean Mean if base troops ever
(absolute) in postcode district in postcode district
Population 309 305 302
Area (hectares) 83 126 153
In neighbourhood’s postcode district:
US military base 33%
Black troops ever present 14% 41%
Months with units stationed (max 16) 2.6 7.7 10.7
Months with black units stationed (max 16) 0.45 1.35 3.3
‘Unit-months’ 31 93 160
‘Black unit-months’ 1.26 3.8 9.15
BNP Members 0.067 0.062 0.053
BNP Members per 10,000 white inhabitants 2.58 2.31 1.9
N 181,408 60,028 25,321
Summary statistics for several measures, unconditional, conditional on ever having troops present
and conditional on ever having black troops present. ‘Unit-months’ and ‘Black unit-months’ are the
possible extent of contact with any troops and black troops, respectively.
with a larger military presence. This is entirely consistent with it being as good as
random if any single unit posted was black or white. In order to control for this we
turn to a regression framework, where we are also able to control for other variables
that might plausibly have affected the allocation of black troops.
Our main results are shown in Table 4.2. Each column represents a simple OLS
regression of the form:
BNP members per 10,000 whitesij = β0+β1UnitMonthsj+β2BlackUnitMonthsj+Xi+ ui
where i represents a neighbourhood, j that neighbourhood’s postcode district,
UnitMonthsj and BlackUnitMonthsj are constructed as per section 4.3.2, Xi is a vector
of neighbourhood level-controls and ui is the error term. Regressions employ standard
errors clustered on modern local authority level in order to account for the spatial
correlation of the error term.
Column (1) includes no additional controls. We introduce further controls in a
piecewise fashion, starting with column (2). First we impose an arbitrary eight by ten
grid on the map of England and Wales and generate a dummy variable for each of
these grid cells. The inclusion of these geographic fixed effects means only variation
within each grid cell is used to estimate our effect, comparing neighbourhoods which
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Table 4.2: Baseline Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Within postcode district:
Black unit-months -0.0199∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗
(-4.49) (-3.99) (-3.69) (-3.80) (-3.88)
Unit-months (100s) -0.108∗ -0.0597 -0.0553 -0.0468 -0.0454
(-1.82) (-0.94) (-0.87) (-0.79) (-0.76)
F-stat joint significance tests on:
Grid cells 2624.8 26.99 14.11 13.91
Industrial Sectors (1931) 0.128 0.618 0.577
Population Density (1931) 0.121 0.305 0.139
Urban Rural status (1931) 0.263 0.0378 0.0324
Distances 0.748 0.816 0.754
Qualifications (2011) 2.304 2.390
Unemployment (2011) 0.0250 0.0597
Housing Tenure (2011) 1.996 1.899
Ethnic Backgrounds (2011) 0.180
Clusters 278 278 278 278 278
Observations 60028 60028 59994 59994 59994
Coefficients from OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the neighbourhood (2011
census output area). Outcome is BNP members per 10,000 white inhabitants. Independent
variables are our measure for contact with black troops ‘Black unit-months’ and any troops
‘unit-months’ (divided by one hundred) respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
local authority district level. T statistics in brackets. One, two and three stars indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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are relatively close to one another but vary in terms of the number of black units posted
nearby. This is a more flexible way to capture variables with regional variation than
latitude/longitude controls.
In column (3), we match neighbourhoods to two historic geographies: 1931 local
government districts (N = 1,800) and 1931 parishes (N = 14,267), using boundary
data provided by the Vision of Britain Project. In most cases, neighbourhoods are
completely contained within these geographies; if not, they are matched to the ge-
ography which contains the neighbourhood’s population weighted centroid. Having
matched neighbourhoods to these historic geographies, we generate control variables
using data from the UK’s 1931 census; population density (parish level), urban/rural
status (local government district level) and working age population by occupational
sector (agriculture, light industry, staple industry, professional, all at local government
district level). We calculate the geodesic distance from each neighbourhood’s popu-
lation weighted centroid to the nearest historic local government district with urban
status, to the nearest town/city with a 1939 population over 100,000 (N = 55), to the
nearest city with a 1939 population over 300,000 (N = 8) and to the coast. None of
these controls enter significantly into the regression.
In column (4), we include an extensive range of neighbourhood level socio-economic
status variables from the 2011 UK census. Although these are ‘bad controls’ (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008, p. 64), in the sense that they are measured after treatment and
are thus potential outcomes, they should serve to pick up local characteristics which
have persisted through time. We include variables which have been shown by Biggs
and Knauss (2011) to correlate with BNP membership, calculating the proportion of
individuals in each of the following categories: aged 30-65, without qualifications, with
a university degree, in each of seven social classes, living in a home they own, living
in a house rented from the council, living in an overcrowded house, unemployed. We
calculate the non-white proportion on both the neighbourhood level and the higher local
authority level. In column (5), we also add variables designed to capture contemporary
ethnic compositions to the regression. Again following Biggs and Knauss (2011), we
calculate the ‘minority’ population share (defined as non-white). We do the same
at the higher local authority level (N = 348), where we also calculate a measure of
segregation:
1
2
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ wi∑wi − mi∑mi
∣∣∣∣
where i ranges over the n neighbourhoods in a local authority, wi and mi refer
respectively to the white and non-white proportion of neighbourhood i. The measure,
bounded between 0 and 1, can be interpreted as the portion of minorities that would
Chapter 4. Shocking Racial Attitudes 97
need to move neighbourhoods in order for the non-white/white distribution to be geo-
graphically even through the local authority. The point estimate remains stable across
all specifications and of similar magnitude.
In Table 4.3, we examine robustness to alternative treatment indicators. We pro-
gressively add controls in the same fashion as in table 4.2. In the top panel, we use
a binary variable as our main regressor of interest; this is one if black units were ever
posted in a neighbourhood’s postcode district and zero otherwise. In the middle panel,
we count the number of months (maximum sixteen) which black units were present
for. The third panel reports the results of a ‘horse race’, including all indicators. Our
preferred measure, ‘black unit-months’ stays highly statistically significant when using
historical controls. It stays significant in all specifications, unlike our alternative treat-
ment indicators. While the number of months in which black units were stationed is
never significant, the binary indicator of black troops ever being present loses signif-
icance as we add further controls. Taken together, the table suggests that both the
number of black troops and their duration of stay matter for contemporary outcomes,
and that our outcome measure does a good job of picking up both of these factors.
To ensure that our results are not driven by regional idiosyncrasies, table 4.4 reports
results on selected samples. In all cases, we use the same set of controls as in column (3)
of Table 4.2: including geographic and pre-treatment variables, but no contemporary
controls. First, we split the sample according to the East-West coordinate of the
neighbourhood. Encouragingly, our coefficient of interest, that on ‘Black unit-months’,
is very similar in the west (column 1) and the east of Britain (column 2). In column (3)
we drop from the sample any neighbourhoods within twenty kilometers of the coast.
This excludes all locations in which the small pre-war black population of England
and Wales was concentrated. Results remain highly significant. Finally, we exclude
London from the sample, column (4). Across all our specifications, ‘Black unit-months’
remains highly significant. We interpret this as evidence for the effect not being driven
by regional outliers, but that the effect is consistently present throughout England and
Wales.
All regressions up to this point have used a linear probability model. In Table
4.5, we show that our results are independent of alternative model specifications. In
column (1), we transform our key variables by taking the natural logarithm (plus one,
to deal with zeros). The presence of troops is skewed across locations, and a loga-
rithmic specification will take this into consideration. In column (2), we dichotomise
BNP membership and run a probit regression on that dependent variable. Spillovers
(i.e. peer effects) within areas might cause BNP membership to be inflated. Consider
neighbours where both are racist and one is a member of the BNP. Then, the non-
member might feel that it is socially more acceptable to become a BNP member as
Chapter 4. Shocking Racial Attitudes 98
Table 4.3: Alternative Treatment Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Within postcode district:
Black-units ever stationed -0.593∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗
(-4.24) (-2.68) (-2.65) (-2.79) (-2.73)
Unit-months (100s) -0.0994∗ -0.0792 -0.0739 -0.0683 -0.0675
(-1.83) (-1.33) (-1.25) (-1.23) (-1.21)
Within postcode district:
Months with black units -0.108∗∗∗ -0.0736∗∗∗ -0.0694∗∗∗ -0.0804∗∗∗ -0.0801∗∗∗
(-4.58) (-3.31) (-3.04) (-3.65) (-3.69)
Unit-months (100s) -0.0895 -0.0617 -0.0571 -0.0447 -0.0433
(-1.49) (-0.95) (-0.87) (-0.73) (-0.71)
Within postcode district:
Black units ever stationed -0.529∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗ -0.316∗∗ -0.265∗ -0.256
(-3.14) (-2.00) (-2.05) (-1.72) (-1.64)
Black unit-months -0.0124∗ -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗ -0.0174∗∗
(-1.80) (-2.72) (-2.83) (-2.08) (-2.07)
Months with black units 0.00716 0.0397 0.0450 0.0162 0.0157
(0.18) (0.95) (1.10) (0.37) (0.35)
Unit-months (100s) -0.0762 -0.0485 -0.0456 -0.0351 -0.0343
(-1.34) (-0.78) (-0.73) (-0.60) (-0.59)
Controls:
Grid cells N Y Y Y Y
Industrial Sectors (1931) N N Y Y Y
Population Density (1931) N N Y Y Y
Urban Rural status (1931) N N Y Y Y
Distances N N Y Y Y
Qualifications (2011) N N N Y Y
Unemployment (2011) N N N Y Y
Housing Tenure (2011) N N N Y Y
Ethnic Backgrounds (2011) N N N N Y
Clusters 278 278 278 278 278
Observations 60028 60028 59994 59994 59994
Coefficients from OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the neighbourhood (2011
census output area). Outcome is BNP members per 10,000 white inhabitants. Independent
variables are a dummy for whether black units ever being present (panel I), the number of
months black units were present (panel II) and our measure for contact with black troops
‘Black unit-months’ (panel III). The measure for contact with any troops ‘unit-months’ is
used throughout (military units are measured in hundreds). Standard errors are clustered
at the local authority district level. T statistics in brackets. One, two and three stars
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 4.4: Subsample Analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East West Inland Not London
Within postcode district:
Black unit-months -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0156∗∗∗
(-2.63) (-2.41) (-4.63) (-3.50)
Unit Months (100s) 0.0369 -0.138∗∗ 0.00917 -0.0730
(0.51) (-2.16) (0.12) (-1.14)
F-stat joint significance tests on:
Grid cells 61.68 3.252 108.5 28.73
Industrial Sectors (1931) 0.424 0.463 0.544 0.136
Population Density (1931) 0.817 1.363 2.519 0.216
Urban Rural status (1931) 0.000149 0.0415 0.0428 0.0314
Distances 3.266 1.356 0.646 1.204
Clusters 104 186 208 264
Observations 27491 32503 34141 58551
Coefficients from OLS regressions. Column (1) and (2) only use the west and
east of England, column (3) restricts the sample to inland locations and column
(4) excludes London. The unit of observation is the neighbourhood (2011 census
output area). Outcome is BNP members per 10,000 white inhabitants. Indepen-
dent variables are our measure for contact with black troops ‘Black unit-months’
and any troops ‘unit-months’ (divided by one hundred) respectively. Standard
errors are clustered at the local authority district level. T statistics in brack-
ets. One, two and three stars indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
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Table 4.5: Alternate Models
(1) (2) (3)
Log specification Probit Negative Binomial
Within postcode district:
Black unit-months -0.141∗∗ -0.00462∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗
(-2.36) (-3.82) (-3.80)
Unit Months (100s) -0.0811 -0.00729 -0.0266
(-1.34) (-0.53) (-0.79)
F-stat joint significance tests on:
Grid cells 28.71 1384.4 2358.3
Industrial Sectors (1931) 0.130 0.951 0.753
Population Density (1931) 0.0287 4.615 0.134
Urban Rural status (1931) 0.129 0.389 0.527
Distances 0.752 3.910 2.388
Clusters 278 278 278
Observations 59994 59992 59994
Coefficients from several regressions. The unit of observation is the neighbourhood
(2011 census output area). Outcome is BNP members per 10,000 white inhabitants,
except for column (2) where it is a dummy whether the neighbourhood conatins
any BNP members. Independent variables are our measure for contact with black
troops ‘Black unit-months’ and any troops ‘unit-months’ (divided by one hundred)
respectively, apart from column one, where the logarithm (plus one) of the measures
has been applied. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority district level.
T statistics in brackets. One, two and three stars indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels respectively.
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well than in an environment where no neighbours are BNP members. The probit ap-
proach takes care of these spillovers by reducing the variance in the outcome measure.
In column (3), we run a negative binomial regression on the absolute number of BNP
members per neighbourhood, constraining the log number of white residents to one in
the regression. This model is appropriate for a count outcome containing many zeros,
such as membership data for a small party. The coefficients are not comparable across
specifications, but all coefficients on ‘Black unit-months’ are in the expected direction
and statistically significant.
4.5 Implicit and Explicit Attitudes
In this section, we repeat the analysis on two different potential outcome measures from
an entirely different sample, warmness of feelings towards black people (‘thermology’)
and implicit racial biases. We make use of demographic data provided by respondents
to examine mechanisms of persistence.
The data comes from Project Implicit, an American non-profit organization which
hosts several country-specific websites allowing users to test their implicit attitudes
using various Implicit Association Tests (‘IATs’). IATs are provided on a range of
subjects (e.g. gender, sexuality, weight), but by far the most popular test is that
for race. After completing the test, subjects are asked to answer several questions
regarding their attitudes towards religion, minorities, politics and supply their postcode
and general demographics. About half of UK residents taking the IAT test do so on
the US website. Following IRB approval, we received a dataset containing all data
collected by the UK and US IAT websites between 2004 and 201312.
The dataset from the UK website contains around 240,000 started sessions, 90,000
of which were seen through to completion. Of these, valid postcode data is provided
in 25,826 sessions. We combine these with 19,582 observations from the US website to
complete our sample of 45,408 sessions. We make no claims about the representative-
ness of the sample: the median age is 29 years, compared to 40 for the population, and
roughly two thirds of the participants are male. Subjects are also better educated than
the population as a whole. Nonetheless, the sample contains individuals from through-
out the UK (all 348 of England and Wales’ local government districts are represented)
and of a wide range of ages (13 to 89).
Curiosity seems to be the main driver for participation in the test. The most
common stated reasons for coming to the website are the recommendation of a friend
12A public version of the US dataset, without zip codes, is available via the Open Science Framework
at https://osf.io/y9hiq/
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and mention in news articles. Around 20% of tests in the dataset were conducted in
the days after the BBC publicised the test on its news website in April 2005 under the
headline “Are you racist? The test that claims to know” (BBC, 2005).
4.5.1 Results: Thermology
We follow the same basic empirical strategy as in section 4.4, but now run individual-
level regressions on responses to the question “Please rate how warm or cold you
feel toward the following groups (0 = coldest feelings, 5 = neutral, 10 = warmest
feelings)”, the target group being black people (or, if the test is being taken on the US
website, ‘African Americans’). As per section 4.4, treatment intensity is measured by
the number of ‘black unit-months’ in the respondent’s postcode district. Throughout
this section, we use the same set of controls as in our preferred section 4.4 specification,
including a full set of pre-treatment controls and geographic fixed effects but no post-
treatment controls. We control for basic demographic information provided by subjects
(age, age squared and a gender dummy) in all regressions.
In line with the findings on BNP membership in the previous section, we find
that individuals living in areas with more black soldiers report warmer feelings (a
higher number) towards black people, even if the magnitude of the effect is somewhat
small. Interestingly, the treatment effect is no stronger on whites than on the entire
population, column (2). As per the regressions on BNP membership, controlling for
contemporary ethnic compositions does not do much to change the point estimate
(column 3); it is therefore not the case that persistence is driven by selective non-white
migration to treated areas. In column (4), we exclude individuals born prior to 1947
from the sample and again the estimate is hardly changed. Individuals born after this
date could not have come into direct contact with black troops, so any treatment effect
must be the result of the transmission of values. In column (5), we use responses to the
question ‘what is the postcode in which you have spent most of your life’ to limit the
subsample to individuals who are now living in treated areas, despite having spent most
of their life in areas where no troops were posted. The coefficient remains statistically
significant, and is (insignificantly) larger in magnitude. Although not a perfect test, this
provides evidence that the transmission mechanism driving persistence is not vertical
(from parents to children), but horizontal (from the neighbourhood).
4.5.2 Results: Implicit Attitudes
Greenwald et al. (1998) developed the Implicit Association Test (IAT) as a way of
measuring implicit attitudes. The test, which is computer administered, can be ap-
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Table 4.6: Thermology Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Whites All DoB > 1947 Movers
Within postcode district:
Black Unit Months 0.00353∗∗ 0.00322∗ 0.00341∗∗ 0.00304∗∗ 0.00441∗∗
(2.44) (1.91) (2.24) (2.12) (2.40)
Unit Months (100s) -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0181∗∗∗ -0.0224∗∗∗
(-4.34) (-3.22) (-3.89) (-4.33) (-3.34)
F-stat joint significance tests on:
Demographics 80.50 73.49 79.34 77.25 36.90
Grid cells 23.57 72.00 20.05 24.46 34.11
Industrial Sectors (1931) 0.124 0.415 0.131 0.172 1.110
Population Density (1931) 1.795 0.0828 0.650 2.487 3.185
Urban Rural status (1931) 2.740 0.845 1.797 2.433 0.762
Distances 1.493 1.648 1.644 1.749 1.163
Ethnic Backgrounds (2011) 1.832
Clusters 273 273 273 273 268
Observations 12866 11611 12866 12486 8617
Coefficients from OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the individual. Dependent
variable is the self-reported measure of attitudes towards black people. Independent variables
are our measure for contact with black troops ‘Black unit-months’ and any troops ‘unit-months’
(divided by one hundred) respectively. All regressions control for age, age squared and gender
of subjects. Column (2) restricts the sample to white people only, column (4) restricts the
sample to those born after 1947 and (5) restricts the sample to people who have spent most
of their life time at a different postcode. T statistics in brackets. One, two and three stars
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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plied to measure implicit associations on any topic, but the most common application
has been to race. A consistent finding (at least in the US) is of a strong automatic
preference towards white people, although there is considerable variation in race IAT
scores between individuals.
The race IAT consists of five steps. In each step subjects have to assign a ‘stimulus’
(a word or a picture of a face) to one of two groups by pressing keys on their keyboard.
In step one, subjects sort pictures of black and white faces into the categories ‘black’
and ‘white’. In step two, subject sort words into two categories, ‘positive’ or ‘negative’.
The words are all easy to categorise (e.g. “terrible”, “joy”, “hurt” and “peace”). In
step three, the tasks are combined – for example asking participants to assign black
faces and positive words to one category, white faces and negative words to the other.
In step four participants again assign faces to categories. Step five is akin to step three,
in that participants have to sort both faces and words, but this time the groupings are
reversed. So the participant might now have to assign black faces and negative words
to one category, white faces and positive words to the other. If individuals require
more cognitive effort to pair a) black faces and positive words and b) white faces and
negative words than a) black faces and negative words and b) white faces and positive
words, their response times will vary between blocks three and five. This is measured
by the “D” score, calculated by comparing response times between step three and step
five, normalised by the standard deviation of response times in all steps. Higher scores
indicate a stronger automatic association of positive words with white faces, a score
over zero indicates implicit racial bias toward whites (Greenwald et al., 1998). In our
dataset, 98% of observations lie in the range -0.73 to +0.977. The mean score for those
self-reporting as white is 0.37, and for those self-reporting as black as 0.15.
In table 4.7 we test whether contact with black GIs has had persistent impact on IAT
scores. Controls are introduced piecewise, as in Table 4.2. We find significant effects
in none of the specifications. The point estimates are close to zero, with relatively
small confidence intervals. We can therefore reject the hypothesis that contact had
meaningfuly sized persistent effects on implicit attitudes.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we used a unique episode in British history to carry out a rigorous
test of the intergroup contact hypothesis, a psychological theory that dates back to
the 1950s and predicts that prejudices about other groups can be reduced by contact
among groups. While many research articles in the psychology literature have carried
out experiments and survey studies to validate the theory, we are the first to tackle this
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Table 4.7: IAT Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Within postcode district:
Black Unit Months 0.000236 0.0000515 0.0000273 0.0000862 0.0000389
(0.67) (0.14) (0.07) (0.22) (0.10)
Unit Months (100s) -0.0000637 0.000119 0.000567 0.000374 0.000128
(-0.06) (0.10) (0.45) (0.28) (0.09)
F-stat joint significance tests on:
Grid cells 6846.0 166.3 93.87 86.52
Industrial Sectors (1931) 1.505 1.504 1.421
Population Density (1931) 0.847 1.635 0.183
Urban Rural status (1931) 3.896 1.526 1.541
Distances 2.122 1.387 1.262
Qualifications (2011) 0.403 0.814
Unemployment (2011) 0.366 0.779
Housing Tenure (2011) 2.414 1.387
Ethnic Backgrounds (2011) 5.861
Clusters 273 273 273 273 273
Observations 13295 13295 13284 13284 13284
Coefficients from OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the individual. Dependent
variable is the measure of implicit racist attitudes from the IAT. Independent variables are
our measure for contact with black troops ‘Black unit-months’ and any troops ‘unit-months’
(divided by one hundred) respectively. All regressions control for age, age squared and gender
of subjects. T statistics in brackets. One, two and three stars indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels respectively.
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test from an economist’s perspective. Our identification is unique in providing quasi-
experimental evidence from a large-scale historical episode. Furthermore, we do not
solely rely on survey measures but analyze changes in preferences also by changes in
observed choices. In addition, we show that the effect of intergroup contact is persistent
even after several decades.
When the US Army arrived in England in the early 1940s to prepare for the invasion
of occupied Europe, troops contained around 150,000 African American soldiers. Those
black soldiers served almost exclusively in segregated black-only units with mainly
supportive functions. Deployment of troops was made according according to military
needs and hence orthogonal to existing racial attitudes.
Based on the geographical variation in the probability of encountering black soldiers,
we can estimate the effect of intergroup contact on contemporary racial attitudes.
We use membership data from the British National Party, a far-right party, widely
considered to be extremist, as our main outcome variable. We find a persistent effect,
in that BNP membership is lower in areas where black soldiers were stationed in the
1940s. Using several controls and robustness checks we show that the effect is not driven
by outliers, geographical factors and does not hinge on the model specification.
We also contribute to the literature on the formation and persistence on preferences
in economics. Using data from a large online survey (and hence a different sample)
we show that self-reported attitudes also vary in the same fashion. These attitudes, as
our results cautiously suggest, are not passed down vertically across generations, but
are rather transmitted horizontally via the living environment.
The same dataset allows us to draw conclusions about implicit attitudes. We do
not find an effect of intergroup contact on contemporary implicit attitudes. Our inter-
pretation for this finding is that implicit attitudes presumably do not follow the same
pattern of transmission as explicit attitudes.
This is especially striking as there exist geographical patterns in implicit attitudes
that seem to be persistent across time. Further research is needed in determining the
transmission mechanism of implicit attitudes.
Chapter 5
Dynamics in Gun Ownership and Crime
– Evidence from the Aftermath of
Sandy Hook*
5.1 Introduction
Gun control has been a polarizing topic in United States politics over the past decades.
The debate between gun rights and gun control advocates is fiercely fought, often re-
lying on only a small set of arguments. Supporters of the right to possess firearms,
as well as some conservative politicians often argue that arming citizens and abolish-
ing gun-free zones will lead to decreases in violent crime. In 2012, a few days after
the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, NRA CEO
Wayne LaPierre used the phrase “The only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun,
is a good guy with a gun.” (New York Times, 2012), to emphasize the importance
of arming civilians to deter crime. To back up their argument, gun rights proponents
usually argue that while gun ownership has risen over the last decades, violent crimes
have dipped. On the other hand, gun control activists, including many liberal politi-
cians, point to the high numbers of violent crimes in the United States, in particular
homicides committed with guns, and argue that the significantly lower levels observed
in virtually all similarly developed countries that have stricter gun laws must reflect a
causal relationship of gun prevalence on crime rates (Brady Campaign, 2016). Addi-
tionally, they often assert that widespread availability of guns creates substantial risks
to society if terrorists, convicted felons or domestic abusers obtain firearms easily and
subsequently use them for criminal activities.
*This chapter is based on joint work with Christoph Koenig.
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Because the political debate tends to be based on isolated observations and po-
tentially spurious correlations, providing objective, scientific evidence is imperative.
More than 30,000 US residents every year die of suicide, homicide or an accident in-
volving a firearm. If a reduction or increase in gun ownership would effectively reduce
these numbers, substantial welfare gains could be realized. This study therefore pro-
vides quasi-experimental evidence on the relationship between firearm purchases and
crime rates. In contrast to the existing literature of similar scope from the fields of
economics, public health and criminology that largely relies on correlational evidence,
we use arguably exogenous variation in the demand for firearms from a subset of the
population that can reasonably be expected to buy guns for lawful purposes, such as
self-defense.
In particular, we use a country-wide exogenous shift in firearm demand in the United
States following the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Fear of tougher gun
legislation and an increase in perceived need of self-defense capabilities drove up gun
sales across the entire United States (Vox, 2016; CNBC, 2012). In most US states,
citizens have instant access to firearms, i.e. they can take their gun home immediately
after purchase. Some states, however, have implemented legislation intended to delay
purchases, either by imposing mandatory waiting periods between purchase and receipt
of a gun or by introducing other time-consuming bureaucratic hurdles such as making
government issued gun purchasing permits mandatory. These delays led to differential
firearm purchases following the shooting at Sandy Hook, a feature that we exploit to
estimate changes in crime rates in a standard differences-in-differences setup.
In a first step, we show that handgun purchases in states with instantaneous access
to guns increased more strongly following the tragic events at Sandy Hook. We com-
pare the change in the number of handgun purchase background checks per 100,000
population induced by the shooting between states that impose delays and those that
do not. In the two year window around the shooting, states without delays saw signif-
icantly higher post-shooting handgun purchases. This finding is robust to increases of
the time window and the addition of controls that are allowed to have a varying effect
over time. While graphical inspection of the time series data does not show any dif-
ferential pre-trends, adding state-specific time trends makes the results even stronger,
and performing a synthetic control exercise (Abadie et al., 2012) also confirms the
robustness of our findings.
Using Google search data, we then analyze if the expression of interest in buying
a gun differed depending on whether the state imposed purchasing delays or not. We
compare the difference in shooting-induced changes of daily searches for the term ‘gun
store’ between both groups of states, a search expression that has been shown to be
the best predictor of gun purchasing intentions (Scott and Varian, 2014). Using the
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same set of covariates as before, and stepwise varying the time window around the
shooting at Sandy Hook from seven days up to 730 days does not reveal any differences
in search patterns. In other words, consumers in all states did not show strongly
different intentions to purchasing a firearm after the shock, but when it came to actually
purchasing the gun, legislative delays led some consumers not to buy. This finding can
be rationalized by the presence of procrastinating naïve present-biased consumers, but
not by arguments from standard economic theory such as transaction costs alone. A
present-biased consumer would show interest in purchasing a firearm, but then due to
the delayed reward of receiving the gun postpone the purchase, while still intending
to buy the gun in the future. Publicly known transaction costs however would cause
consumers to not wanting to buy guns in the first place. Our findings suggest that
insights from behavioral economics are important factors to consider in these kinds of
public policy questions.
We then rule out that differences in primary market firearms purchases were coun-
teracted by shifts to secondary markets (i.e. gun shows instead of licensed gun dealers),
as the demand for gun shows did not tilt towards states with purchase delays. We
again employ Google search data, using searches for the expression ‘gun show’. When
varying the time window around the shooting, we initially detect a higher demand in
states without purchase delays. With a long enough time horizon, this effect vanishes
such that both groups of states become statistically indistinguishable. This shows that
states implementing delays do not experience stronger demand shifts towards secondary
markets. If anything, we underestimate the true total effect of the shooting on gun
purchases.
The second part of our empirical analysis looks at the impact of the differential
firearm purchases on different types of crimes. Using monthly FBI data on several
categories of crime, we estimate changes in the crime rate between states with and
without delays after the shooting at Sandy Hook. To ensure an adequate treatment of
possibly diverging pre-trends, we allow for control variables to have a differential impact
at different dates and include county-specific time trends. We find that states granting
instant access to firearms see significantly more murders after Sandy Hook. This effect
is strongest and significant when including at least five and up to 14 months before and
after the shooting, and is fading for longer time horizons, suggesting that the effect
wears off quickly. After twelve months, allowing instant access to guns is associated
with an estimated 14.47% increase in murder rates, which implies that approximately
98 lives could have been saved from murder in each month of 2013 if mechanisms to
delay purchases had been in place in all US states. While murder rates increase, we
also find that all other crime categories remain unaffected, and the share of assaults or
robberies committed with guns does not change significantly. This provides tentative
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evidence against the claim of guns leading to a credible deterrence effect, in which
criminals avoid certain types of crimes, fearing backlash from armed victims.
Additional analyses investigate the robustness of the effect on murders. To rule out
that the result is purely seasonal, we conduct a placebo regression around the same
date, but in 2010 instead of 2012, and find no effect. We also provide evidence on how
the effect changes when varying the time horizon of our sample. As mentioned earlier,
the effect only exists for medium time horizons (five to 14 months), as including only
a few months of data leads to very imprecise estimates, and including more than 14
months before and after the shooting shows that the effect eventually washes out as we
would have expected from a temporary shock. Furthermore, excluding states one-at-
a-time yields similar coefficient estimates, and all estimates remain highly significant,
no matter which state is removed, effectively showing that the effect is not caused by
a single outlier state.
There might also be concern that the relationship between increases in gun own-
ership and increases in murder rates is not causal. This would be a problem if the
shooting at Sandy Hook changed attitudes towards murder differentially in states with
and without delays, while at the same time changing gun ownership. After all, a mass
shooting itself constitutes an act of violent crime that through extensive media cov-
erage might influence preferences towards violence for some individuals. To address
this concern, we complement the analysis by looking at an additional event unrelated
to violent crime but responsible for positive gun demand shifts: The 2012 Presiden-
tial election. While we cannot separate the election and the shooting at Sandy Hook,
because the former happened in November 2012, and the latter in December 2012, we
can however show that the coefficient for murders is much stronger if we pre-date the
treatment event by one month. This is consistent with President Obama’s re-election
contributing to the effect in the same direction as the shooting. It is also reassuring
that the effect becomes immediately insignificant if pre-dated or post-dated by more
than one month.
We then repeat our estimations using an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, in
which we estimate the relationship of gun purchases and murder rates by instrumenting
gun purchases with our differences-in-differences treatment indicator from our earlier
analyses. Our results confirm the previous findings: Increases in gun ownership are
significantly positively related with murder rates, but no such effect exists for other
types of crimes. The IV estimates predict that every 2049 additional guns cause one
additional murder, or that 97 lives could have been saved from murder in each month
of 2013. This finding is remarkably close to the effect size of 98 lives that our earlier
estimates predicted. The results from the IV approach therefore suggest that our set of
control variables performs well in predicting the reaction to the demand shock in terms
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of compliance, such that intent-to-treat and treatment effect on the treated almost
coincide.
Finally, we use supplementary homicide data to identify the circumstances of the
additional murders. When analyzing murders separately by whether a firearm was
used as the murder weapon or not, we are able to show that the entire effect can be
attributed to murders by firearm and that murders, where the weapon of choice was
not a gun, remain unaffected. We then investigate which gender was more likely to
become a murder victim. Our estimates suggest that murders of both men and women
increase, but that the relative increase is more than twice as large for women. This is
primarily driven by men that murder women.
This study is related to several streams of research. Scholars from the disciplines
of economics, criminology and public health have previously tried to find empirical
support for the relationship of firearm ownership and violent crime rates, with mixed
results. Several studies find that more guns lead to more crime (e.g. Cook, 1978; Cook
and Ludwig, 2006; Duggan, 2001; Hemenway and Miller, 2000; Kaplan and Geling,
1998; Miller et al., 2002, 2007; Siegel et al., 2013; Sorenson and Berk, 2001), using either
time series data on an aggregated level, cross-sectional or panel data.1 Other studies
tackle the issue more indirectly by estimating the effect of gun legislation (Fleegler
et al., 2013) or gun shows (Duggan et al., 2011) on crime rates, based on the idea
that those in turn might influence gun prevalence. The most prominent study to
find a negative effect is the book by Lott (2013). He argues that the enactment of
concealed carry laws has created a credible deterrent, such that criminals abstained
from committing crimes, and that availability of firearms through this channel decreases
violent crimes. His findings are supported by the results in Lott and Mustard (1997)
and Moody (2001). Additional research suggests that there is no statistical relationship
between gun prevalence and crime (Kates and Polsby, 2000; Kleck and Patterson, 1993;
Lang, 2016; Moody and Marvell, 2005). All of these studies however rely on correlations
for inference and thus give rise for omitted variables bias. No clear effect is reported in
Kovandzic et al. (2013), in which the authors use an instrumental variables approach,
but their suggested instruments for gun ownership seem unlikely to satisfy the exclusion
restriction (voter share for the Republican party, share of veterans and subscriptions
to gun-related outdoor magazines). We contribute to this literature by providing well-
identified evidence from an exogenously timed gun demand shock.
This chapter is also closely related to literature exploring the role of legislative re-
strictions for gun sales such as waiting periods. Fleegler et al. (2013), for example, looks
at the link between the strength of firearm legislation and firearm-related fatalities. It
1An excellent survey discussing in particular the early contributions is provided by Hepburn and
Hemenway (2004), newer contributions are discussed by Kleck (2015).
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finds that stronger firearm legislation is associated with fewer gun-related deaths, but
is not able to determine if this relationship is causal. Kleck and Patterson (1993) stud-
ies a similar question but does not find any effect of gun control laws on violence, but
rather that violent crimes lead to higher gun prevalence. In contrast to these studies,
this chapter is not interested in a general measure of gun control, but more specifically
in the induced delays by waiting periods and time-consuming permit processes that can
eventually discourage some consumers. Closely related is the contribution by Ludwig
and Cook (2000) that is interested in the effects of introducing waiting periods through
the Brady Act. The paper does not present clear-cut evidence that waiting periods
contribute to changes in violent crimes, but the approach is notably different to ours.
We are primarily interested in differential firearm take-up and therefore study an ex-
ogenous event that influences behavior given an existing set of constraints. Ludwig and
Cook (2000) instead analyzes the changes resulting from legislative advances assuming
constant firearm demand. This might be a problematic approach if consumers can
anticipate legislative changes and adjust the timing of firearm purchases. In the case
of the Brady Act, almost three years passed between the introduction of the bill and
when it went into effect. Our approach is also not just restricted to waiting periods, but
includes mandatory purchasing permits that also delay the receipt of a firearm.2
Given the small number of studies on the effects of gun legislation, the Center for
Disease Control in 2003 concluded that more evidence is needed to ultimately judge the
effect of waiting periods on violent crimes (Hahn et al., 2003). Recent contributions to
the literature concerned with the effects of legislative restrictions put stronger emphasis
on providing credible identification to allow for causal inference, such as Dube et al.
(2013) and (Chicoine, 2016) that look at the expiration of the Federal Assault Weapons
Ban and subsequent violence in Mexican municipalities. They find that the availability
of assault rifles following the expiration significantly increased violent crimes. While
assault rifles seem of relative importance to organized crime such as cartels and gang
violence, our study in contrast is concerned with a demand shift in legally acquired
handguns. This distinction is important, because judging the relationship of gun preva-
lence and crime rates may yield very different results if the type of gun is primarily
used by professional criminals instead of citizens for lawful purposes.
By offering an explanation for why gun purchasing delays may lead to fewer rel-
ative purchases that is based on findings from behavioral economics, we additionally
contribute to the recent literature in public economics that analyzes the effect of be-
2Rudolph et al. (2015) analyzes the effect of the introduction of Connecticut’s mandatory pistol
purchasing permit in 1995 and finds a strong decrease in homicides. Because the passage of this
legislation did not come unannounced, the same caveats apply as in the case of Ludwig and Cook
(2000).
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havioral biases for public policies (e.g. Chetty et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2011).3 We also
relate to studies in economics that link behavioral shortcomings with criminal activity,
violent behavior and policing. Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) investigates the effect of
movie violence on violent crimes and finds that attendance of movies serves as a sub-
stitute for violent behavior. Card and Dahl (2011) finds that unexpected losses of the
home football team increase instances of domestic violence, and Mas (2006) observes a
decline in policing quality after a lost salary arbitration by the respective police union
in New Jersey.
Our results have important implications for other researchers and policy makers.
First, we complement the literature on the relationship of gun ownership and crime
by providing well-identified estimates of the effect of an exogenously timed change in
firearm ownership rates. Since, according to anecdotal evidence, our sample of inter-
est purchased firearms for lawful purposes and not for criminal activity, the significant
increase in murder rates seems even more striking, especially since Fabio et al. (2016) re-
port that only a small fraction of crimes are committed using legally acquired firearms.
Second, our findings do not detect a deterrence effect, suggesting that criminals either
do not anticipate changes in firearm ownership correctly, or that they have a negligible
impact on their choices. Therefore, arming citizens to prevent crimes does not seem
to be a very promising approach. Third, legislators deciding about gun control mea-
sures should take our findings into account, as designing smart regulations can have
non-negligible welfare effects, and save a substantial number of lives. Waiting periods
and bureaucratic hurdles appear very promising to at least somewhat reduce impulsive
acts of violence, especially against women. Fourth, our contribution suggests that cog-
nitive biases and limitations established by the growing field of behavioral economics
can meaningfully be applied in a context of political economy and research on crime,
and should thus be taken into account when modeling individual behavior.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides details about gun laws in
the United States, describes the tragic events at Sandy Hook Elementary School and
the subsequent firearm demand shock. It furthermore delivers theoretical explanations
for the differential firearm take-up of prospective gun owners. Section 5.3 in turn
describes our data in detail and explains our estimation strategy. Results can be found
in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 concludes.
3Excellent summaries on the application of behavioral biases in public policy are provided by
DellaVigna (2009) and Chetty (2015).
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5.2 Background
5.2.1 Gun Laws in the United States
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution together with nine other
amendments, collectively called the Bill of Rights, was passed by the 1st United States
Congress on September 25, 1789 and then adopted on December 15, 1791 through
ratification by 75% of the states. It protects the right of citizens to keep and bear
arms at the federal, and through the Fourteenth Amendment also at the state and
local government level. While the official text of the Second Amendment says that
“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”, the United States Supreme
Court clarified in its decision of District of Columbia et al. v. Heller (554 U.S. 570)
that this right also refers to individuals (outside of militias) for traditionally lawful
purposes such as self-defense.
The federal government, as well as state and local governments have in the past
however enacted laws that make it harder or require more effort from citizens to acquire
firearms. On the federal level, the most important pieces of legislation for this study
are the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.
The Gun Control Act requires that all professional gun dealers must have a Federal
Firearms License (FFL). Only they can engage in inter-state trade of handguns, are
granted access to firearm wholesalers and can receive firearms by mail. The Brady
Act was enacted on November 30, 1993, and mandated background checks for all gun
purchases through FFL dealers. Initially, the bill also imposed a five-day waiting period
on handgun purchases, which upon successful lobbying of the NRA, was set to expire
when the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) took effect in
1998, a system operated by the FBI that handles all background checks related to the
sales of firearms.
While there is little regulation regarding firearm ownership on the federal level
compared to other similarly developed countries, there is substantial heterogeneity in
restrictions imposed by the states. For example, many states invoke restrictions on
the prerequisites and responsibilities of gun dealers, such as whether they require an
additional state license to operate their business or whether they are supposed to keep
centrally stored electronic records of transactions. Other legal restrictions concern buy-
ers, as states can for example decide if they want buyers to be able to purchase guns
in bulk, if buyers need a permit prior to purchase, if they have to undergo background
checks (for transactions exempted from federal background check requirements), or if
buyers are required to wait a certain amount of time between purchasing and receiv-
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ing their gun. Finally, there exists legislation concerned with restrictions on carrying
firearms in public places, including schools and the workplace.4
Most of the constraints on private firearm ownership at the state level attempt to
either prohibit convicted felons or otherwise potentially dangerous people from acquir-
ing guns for non-lawful purposes, or restrict the usefulness of firearms for non-lawful
purposes independent of the buyer. One restriction that is of substantial interest to
our study is the imposition of mandatory waiting periods. While the establishment of
waiting periods with the Brady Act aimed to give law enforcement agencies sufficient
time to conduct background checks, they also provide a “cooling-off” period and can
therefore help to prevent impulsive acts of violence (Cook, 1978; Andrés and Hemp-
stead, 2011). These impulsive acts of violence might be directed towards other persons
(such as homicides and assaults), but they could also be directed towards the gun
holder itself (e.g. suicides).
As of 2016, nine states and the District of Columbia have imposed mandatory
waiting periods. California and D.C. require ten days, Hawaii 14 days, Rhode Island
seven days and Illinois between 24 hours (long guns) to 72 hours (handguns) on all
firearm purchases. Minnesota is the only state to require seven days wait between
purchase and pickup of handguns and assault rifles only. Maryland and New Jersey
impose seven days for handguns, while Florida and Iowa impose a three day waiting
period for handguns. Wisconsin has repealed its 48 hour waiting time on handguns in
2015.
Additionally, some states require a license to possess or buy a firearm prior to
the actual purchase, which due to bureaucratic hurdles can also impose a waiting
time. In Connecticut, a handgun eligibility certificate may take up to 90 days before
being issued. Before buying a gun in Hawaii, prospective gun owners have to obtain
a permit to purchase which can take up to 20 days to be issued. Buyers in Illinois
have to obtain a Firearm Owner’s Identification card (FOID) before being allowed
to purchase an unlimited number of firearms in the following ten years. Obtaining an
FOID can take up to 30 days. The state of Maryland requires buyers to hold a Handgun
Qualification License which will be issued or denied within 30 days of application. In
Massachusetts, authorities may take up to 30 days to process a request for a license
to carry or a Firearm Identification Card (FID), where the former allows unlimited
purchases of any firearms without additional paperwork and the latter is restricted to
rifles and shotguns. Citizens in New Jersey in turn must obtain a permit to purchase
a handgun for each purchase separately, while they can purchase unlimited shotguns
and rifles with a Firearms Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC). Authorities may take
4An excellent overview of all restrictions in the respective states can be found in The Brady
Campaign (2013), NRA (2016) and Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence (2016).
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up to 30 days to issue such a permit. In New York, a license to possess or carry a
handgun is necessary for each gun and obtaining one can take up to six months. In
North Carolina, a license to purchase a handgun can take up to 14 days to be issued,
and it is valid for one gun only. Citizens of Rhode Island need to wait up to 14 days
to receive their pistol safety certificate (blue card). Table 5.1 summarizes the waiting
periods and license requirements for handguns across states.5
Table 5.1: Handgun waiting periods and handgun purchasing license delay by state
State AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE FL
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 3
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 0 0
State GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 14 0 3 0 3 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 20 0 30 0 0 0 0 0
State ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0
State NV NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 30 0 180 14 0 0 0
State OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VT
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
State VA WA WV WI WY DC
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 0 2∗∗ 0 10
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mandatory Waiting Period refers to the amount of time in days to pass between the purchase
and the receipt of a firearm. If a state has different waiting periods for different types of firearms,
the number refers to the purchase of handguns. Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay refers to the
maximum time in days that can pass before a permit that will allow the holder to purchase one
or more handguns will be issued or denied. 0 means that no permit is needed or will be issued
instantaneously. ∗ Repealed in 2015. Source: http://smartgunlaws.org
5.2.2 The Shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School
On the morning of December 14, 2012, then 20-year-old Adam Lanza, a resident of
Newtown, Connecticut, first shot and killed his mother at their home before driving to
Sandy Hook Elementary School, where he shot and killed six adult school employees
and 20 students, who were between six and seven years old. Although the carnage
only lasted about five to ten minutes, Lanza was able to discharge his firearms (a semi-
automatic AR-15 type assault rifle and a pistol) 156 times, averaging approximately
one shot fired every two to four seconds. He committed suicide shortly after the first
law enforcement officers arrived at the scene. Eyewitness and police reports describe
5Michigan and Nebraska also require a permit, but only if the gun is purchased from an unlicensed
seller. Since we are interested in gun sales from licensed sellers only, we treat these states as not
imposing delays. Iowa’s permit is issued instantly and can be used after the aforementioned three day
waiting period.
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that Lanza was acting calmly throughout and killed his victims with targeted shots to
the head. Even after several years, his motives are still not fully understood. Lanza did
not leave any documents that could explain his thoughts, but it has been suggested that
he had a history of mental illness. His father reported to have observed strange and
erratic behavior in Lanza that he might have falsely attributed to his son’s Asperger
syndrome, rather than a developing schizophrenia (New Yorker, 2014).
The shooting being the deadliest shooting at a US high or grade school and the third
deadliest mass shooting in US history at the time, combined with the fact that most of
the victims were defenseless children, sparked a renewed debate about gun control in
the United States. A few days after the shooting, President Barack Obama announced
that he would make gun control a central issue of his second term. A gun violence task
force under the leadership of Vice President Joe Biden was quickly assembled with the
purpose of collecting ideas how to curb gun violence and prevent mass shootings. The
task force presented their ideas to President Obama in January 2013, who announced to
proceed with 23 executive actions, aimed at improving background checks, addressing
mental health issues and insurance coverage of treatment thereof, as well as enhancing
safety measures for schools and law enforcement officers responding to active shooter
situations. Additionally, the task force proposed twelve congressional actions, including
renewing the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, expanding criminal background checks
to all transactions, banning high capacity magazines, and increase funding to law
enforcement agencies. The proposals were met by fierce opposition from the NRA and
some Republican legislators. At the end of January 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein
introduced a bill aimed at reinstating the Federal Assault Weapons Ban. While the
bill passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2013, it eventually was struck
down on the Senate floor 40-60 with all but one Republicans and some Democrats
opposing the bill. A bipartisan bill to be voted on at that same day, introduced by
Senators Joe Manchin and Pat Toomey, aimed at introducing universal background
checks, also failed to find a majority with 54-46, leaving federal legislation eventually
unaffected.6
While no new federal regulations eventually followed the events at Sandy Hook Ele-
mentary School, gun sales soared in the months after the shooting. Fear of tougher gun
legislation and a higher perceived need of self-protection drove up sales for both, hand-
guns and rifles (Vox, 2016). While gun sales had surged after every prior mass shooting
during the Obama administration, the increase in sales was unprecedented after the
6Three states tightened their gun laws in the wake of the Sandy Hook Shooting: Connecticut,
Maryland and New York. Connecticut and New York tightened their existing assault weapons ban,
required universal background checks and outlawed high capacity magazines. Maryland outlawed
assault rifles and high capacity magazines, and now requires handgun licensing and fingerprinting for
new gun owners.
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Monthly federal NICS gun sale background checks plotted over time between 2009 and 2015 in absolute
numbers. The blue vertical line marks the date of the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School.
The red line shows background check for handguns, the green line for long guns, and the black line
displays the sum of the two.
Figure 5.1: NICS background checks before and after Sandy Hook
shooting at Sandy Hook. The extreme demand shift even created supply problems for
some dealers, who were hoping to see sales increases of a magnitude of up to 400%
(CNBC, 2012; Huffington Post, 2013). Several executives in the gun industry have
openly admitted that they view mass shootings as a boon to their business, attracting
especially first-time gun owners. Tommy Millner, CEO of Cabela’s in response to the
Sandy Hook shooting said “the business went vertical ... I meant it just went crazy [...
We] got a lot of new customers.” and James Debney of Smith & Wesson explained that
“the tragedy in Newtown and the legislative landscape [...] drove many new people to
buy firearms for the first time.” (The Intercept, 2015). But the increased interest in
firearms was not just restricted to brick-and-mortar stores. In a recent paper, Popov
(2016) shows that prices for gun parts in an online market sharply increased by 20%
after Obama’s announcement for tougher gun legislation. Figure 5.1 shows the spike
in gun sales – it displays the evolution of firearm background checks over time, before
and after the Sandy Hook shooting. While gun sales generally increase at the end
of the year, the spike following the Sandy Hook shooting is much more pronounced
than in the years immediately before and after. It is these new customers and their
differential propensity to acquire firearms in some states that we seek to exploit for our
data analysis.
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5.2.3 A Behavioral Motivation for Firearm Purchase Delays
There exist several theoretical approaches that could explain why a purchasing delay
would result in some individuals not buying guns at all. In the following, we therefore
provide insights from standard economic theory, as well as behavioral economics that
predict differential purchasing decisions depending on whether delays exist or not. We
also establish more precise conditions under which these theories hold, such that our
data analysis can deliver supporting or opposing evidence for the theories in question.
Note that the purpose of this exercise is not to support our empirical findings, since our
results hold independent of any theory. We rather aim to provide a theoretical founda-
tion to shed light on possible reasons behind the observed facts, and as a by-product
are able to test which theory best explains the patterns evident in the data.
In standard economic theory, the primary reason for differential purchasing reac-
tions given identical preferences root in differing transaction costs. Without delays,
purchasing a gun requires the prospective buyer to travel to the gun store, file the nec-
essary paperwork, and take home their gun which creates costs. Delays however require
substantially more effort. In the case of waiting periods, the prospective buyer not only
has to to travel to the gun store and file the necessary paperwork, they would also have
to come back after a few days to pick up their gun. The additional costs associated
with a second visit to their gun dealer can outweigh the net benefit of purchasing,
and therefore prevent some marginal customers to buy a firearm. If for example each
trip to a gun dealer generates utility losses of c, and a gun provides utility gains of
v, the assumption 2c > v > c is sufficient to observe a differential reaction depending
on whether the state implemented waiting periods or not. Implementing mandatory
handgun permits that are only issued after a delay creates a similar effect. Before
prospective buyers can undertake their trip to the gun store, file the paperwork and
take home their gun, they have to travel to their closest public authority commissioned
with issuing these types of permits, file the necessary paperwork there and wait for the
permit to be issued. If the costs associated with getting a permit are k, k + c > v > c
will lead to states with delayed permits experiencing lower rates of gun purchases. Im-
portantly, transaction costs in a full information setup with perfectly rational agents
require that there already exists a differential interest in buying a firearm between the
onset of the demand shock and the act of buying the gun.7 This is due to the fact that
buyers incorporate transaction costs in their decisions and then either buy a gun or
not.
7We will discuss the appropriateness of the assumption of full information about delay legislation
when we present our results regarding the intention to buy a firearm.
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Another reason why we would observe a differential reaction depending on the
implementation of delays is due to naïve present-biased consumers (Laibson, 1997).
Present-biased decision makers prefer consuming today over tomorrow, but not nec-
essarily tomorrow over in two days, i.e. they change their assessment of preferred
options at different points in time, depending on when they are being asked about it.
For example, when being asked whether to have fruit salad or cake tomorrow, a time-
inconsistent decision maker deciding for fruit salad today, could revise the decision to
cake when being asked again tomorrow. Naïvete refers to the decision makers’ inability
to know about their tendency to behave time-inconsistently.
Present-bias affects several dimensions of inter-temporal choice and has been fre-
quently observed in decision-making contexts: Meier and Sprenger (2010) report that
people who hold credit card debt are more likely to be present-biased, Augenblick et al.
(2015) find evidence of present-bias in effort allocation decisions among workers, Choi
et al. (2011) observe dominated investment behavior in retirement decisions due to
time-inconsistency, and Duflo et al. (2011) build a model of present-bias in fertilizer
use that predicts actual fertilizer purchases in rural Kenia quite well.8
Following the approach by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), where future utility
streams are uniformly discounted by β ≤ 1, we argue that delaying the reward from
owning a gun can lead some consumers to not buy a firearm. Assume that the costs
of purchasing a firearm are c and the utility of having a firearm is v. In the absence
of delays, prospective buyers will decide to buy if v > c. When delays are present
however, this condition becomes stricter βv > c, because the utility from owning the
gun has been shifted to the future and is therefore discounted by the prospective buyer.
Depending on the ratio of v and c, and their relationship with β, some present-biased
consumers will therefore not buy a gun when facing delays.
The difference between this theory and simply assuming transaction costs is however
that with naïve present-bias, the ex ante interest of buying a gun should be identical
between states that impose delays and states that do not (given identical preferences).
This can easily be seen in a two-period model, in which a gun can be purchased in
either period 1 or period 2. While a naïve present-biased prospective buyer will not
buy in period 1 because βv − c < β(v − c) when β < 1, they still believe in period 1
that they will buy eventually in period 2, because βv − βc > 0. This behavior arises
because the prospective buyer underestimates how heavy the costs of buying the gun
will weigh in the future. He therefore might make plans to purchase a gun in the next
period, but never follows through.
8More examples are discussed in Sprenger (2015) and Frederick et al. (2002).
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We can test whether transaction costs or present-biased consumers are primarily
responsible for causing a divergence in purchasing behavior. If we find evidence that
prospective buyers exhibit strong differences when it comes to their intention to buy a
gun after the shock, this can be reconciled with transaction costs but not with present-
bias. In contrast, if we observe differential purchasing behavior while the interest in
buying a gun is independent of whether the state implemented a delay, this is evidence
for present-biased consumers.
Also note that several other theories cannot account for differential purchasing
behavior. Projection bias (Loewenstein et al., 2003) predicts that consumers’ current
taste is projected to the future, where it may not be accurate anymore. As a policy
implication, offering return periods allows these consumers to make better decisions, as
the purchase can be reversed when the realization of tastes is substantially different to
the anticipated taste. Waiting periods for firearm purchases however will not interact
with projection bias. Consumers interested in buying a gun (based on their projected
utility) will do so, no matter whether they have to wait for their gun or not. Since
the purchasing decision is made when conducting the background check and filing
the paperwork, and not when picking up the firearm, there is no scope for projection
bias influencing the decision. Similarly, transient emotional reactions can hardly be
expected to drive the difference, as the purchasing decision is made when filing the
paperwork. This should lead to differential pick-up rates of purchased guns, but not
necessarily to differences in purchases per se.9
5.3 Data & Estimation Strategy
5.3.1 Estimation Strategy & Identification
Following the shooting at Sandy Hook, firearm demand in the United States increased
strongly, both for fear of tougher legislation, as well as a higher perceived need of
self-protection. As some states allow their citizens to instantly purchase the guns of
their choosing, the higher demand in those states could immediately translate into
increased sales. States that were imposing mandatory waiting periods or that had a
time-consuming application process for purchasing permits, however, were able to delay
transactions, possibly discouraging buyers from eventually buying any guns.
We therefore define all states that had a positive waiting period for handguns or that
require a time-consuming permit to be issued prior to purchase as “delayed states”, as
9Section E.3.1 in the appendix discusses the assumptions under which competing theories could
offer an explanation and argues why we believe these assumptions to be unrealistic.
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listed in Table 5.1: California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Wisconsin and the
District of Columbia. All other states we subsume under “instant states”, and we
remove Connecticut from all samples, because the state might have been affected dif-
ferently by the shooting at Sandy Hook, as Newtown lies in Connecticut.10 We first
show that delayed states have a smaller increase in gun sales than instant states, and
that this increase is not driven by pre-existing trends. Then, we continue with inves-
tigating the effect of differential firearm purchases on crime rates. There exist several
potential outcomes for such an analysis. First, crime rates could increase as new gun
owners might turn criminal. For example, a domestic dispute otherwise gone unnoticed
to law enforcement might suddenly turn violent with one spouse shooting and killing
the other. It is also conceivable that if new gun owners are marginally law-abiding in
the sense that their low income is weakly preferred to being criminals, any income shock
might turn them criminal, a profession potentially more lucrative for someone armed.
Second, crime rates could decrease, because armed citizens serve as a credible deter-
rent to criminals. Robbing someone on the street or burglarizing someone’s apartment
becomes more dangerous if the likelihood of the victim being armed is higher, therefore
decreasing the relative profitability of being a criminal. Additionally, engaging in bar
fights or similar altercations suddenly becomes more risky if the opponent has a gun
at their disposal. Third, crime rates could overall stay unchanged, but there could
be a shift from less severe to more severe crimes. Speaking in the examples above,
the domestic dispute or the bar fight due to the availability of lethal force could turn
from assault to murder, effectively reducing crimes in one category and raising it in
the other.
Our data analysis uses a classical differences-in-differences (DiD) approach, in that
we compare crime changes due to the Sandy Hook shooting between delayed and instant
states. Our estimation equation reads
yit = α + γi + λt + β(POSTt × INSTANTi) + δXit + ti + it (5.1)
where yit is our measure of gun purchases in the first step of the analysis, and our
measure of crime rates in the second step, γi denotes location and λt time fixed effects.
Our coefficient of interest is β, capturing the joint influence of dummy POSTt (time
periods after the shooting at Sandy Hook) and dummy INSTANTi (locations that
belong to instant states). Xit denotes a vector of control variables with time-varying
10None of our results depend on this decision. Appendix Section E.2 contains the results when
including Connecticut for the two most important tables from our results section. All other tables are
available from the authors.
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influence and ti is a time trend, allowed to vary within each location unit. it is the
error term.
To assure proper identification and validity of our DiD estimator, we need two
assumptions to be fulfilled: First, we must not have differential pre-trends in our out-
come measures to ensure that divergence between instant and delayed states is indeed
driven by the treatment and not just the continuation of a pre-existing divergence.
We will address this concern by graphical visualization, synthetic control exercises and
allowing for location-specific time trends. Second, there must not have been other
events responsible for the divergence that occur at approximately the same time as
the treatment. Placebo regressions and shifting the onset of the treatment will deliver
evidence that the effect is particular to a very small time window that coincides with
the shooting. We furthermore argue that the timing of the shooting at Sandy Hook
is entirely exogenous to any relevant outcome variables: The perpetrator Adam Lanza
apparently had prepared the crime for years, investigators believe he downloaded videos
and other materials related to the shootings at West Nickel Mines School (2006) and
Columbine High School (1999) on his computer. The shooting came as a surprise to
law enforcement and Lanza’s social environment and apparently were not triggered by
any other public events. Therefore, we assume strict exogeneity of the event to our
outcome variables.
Additionally, in order to establish a causal link between the demand shock and crime
rates, proper identification requires that the shock only affected firearm demand and
not crime rates directly other than through the changes in gun prevalence. Given that
a mass shooting itself is a crime and might therefore differentially influence attitudes
towards violence, we will address this potential issue by extending our analysis to
include the date of the 2012 Presidential election, to see if the re-election of President
Obama contributes to our estimated coefficient from the shooting at Sandy Hook.
5.3.2 Datasets
Gun Ownership
Unfortunately, no reliable information about gun ownership and inflow of new guns
exists at a sufficiently fine geographic (e.g. county) level. Researchers therefore have
relied on proxies for gun ownership levels, including subscription to a gun magazine
(Duggan, 2001), fraction of suicides committed with a firearm (Cook and Ludwig, 2006;
Azrael et al., 2004; Kleck, 2004), and gun ownership questions from the General Social
Survey (GSS) (Glaeser and Glendon, 1998).
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Since we are interested in the increase in gun ownership rather than the stock
of guns, we use applications from the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS), which is available from the FBI for each state and month since 1998
and has been used for this purpose before (Lang, 2016).11 Each purchase of a new
firearm at a federally licensed firearm dealer triggers an application for a background
check.12 In total, we obtain monthly data for background checks of firearm purchases
in all 50 states (and the District of Columbia) between November 1998 and December
2014.
While the NICS data gives us a good idea of actual firearm purchases, we would
also like to measure the ex ante interest in buying a firearm. If the assumption of
present-biased consumers abstaining from buying firearms in delayed states were true,
they should still be affected by the demand shock in the sense that, ceteris paribus,
their desire to own a firearm increased by just as much as for consumers in instant
states. We therefore extract daily search data from Google Trends (http://google.
com/trends) for the expression ‘gun store’ for each state between 2009 and 2014.
Google Trends is a data service that reports the relative frequency of specific Google
search expressions across time and geography. The search term ‘gun store’ has been
shown to be highly predictive of the willingness to purchase a firearm (Scott and Varian,
2014). Unfortunately, Google Trends data is always rescaled and sometimes censored,
such that some manual conversions are needed to make meaningful comparisons. First,
for each query, Google rescales data to be between 0 and 100, where 100 is assigned to
the largest value in the entire time window of the query. Thus, we only obtain data on
the relative occurrence of the expression in one particular state on each date within a 3
month time window. To correctly adjust the results in the time dimension, we designed
the queries such that months were overlapping, for example the first query downloaded
January to March data, the second March to May, the third May to July and so on.
We then rescaled the data based on the overlaps using January of 2009 as a baseline. In
order to also make the cross-section comparable, we designed a query for January 2009
for each state to obtain initial relative weights for each state. Second, Google Trends
data is censored to zero if the number of searches falls below a certain, not publicly
known threshold. Since we have no reason to believe that censoring affects states across
our treatment groups differently, we do not employ corrective action. Due to censoring,
we only obtain daily data for in total 34 states and the District of Columbia.13
11The data can be downloaded at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/nics_firearm_
checks_-_month_year_by_state_type.pdf.
12State permit holders to purchase a gun are exempt from the background check, if the process
of obtaining their permit involved passing a background check (since November 30, 1998 only NICS
background checks qualify).
13We are missing data for the states Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana,
North Dakota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia and
Wyoming, representing both instant and delayed states. Connecticut is also removed from the sample.
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Note that our NICS measure of changes in gun ownership potentially misses some
trades on secondary markets (e.g. through gun shows). 2016 Democratic nominee
for President Hillary Clinton’s campaign has suggested multiple times that up to 40%
of guns are purchased at gun shows, a number that has however been criticized to
be misleading (Washington Post, 2015). Duggan et al. (2011) instead reports that
in 1993/1994, transactions at gun shows only accounted for about 4% of all firearms
transactions. A study by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (1999) further-
more estimates that 50-75% of dealers at gun shows are federally licensed, therefore
being required to perform background checks on all transactions, even at gun shows.
Additionally, eighteen states and DC have passed laws that require federal background
checks in most or all private transactions. Therefore, the majority of transactions
at gun shows should be reflected in the NICS background checks. Since most of the
states that employ some form of purchase delay are also those states that require back-
ground checks for private transactions, we would at most underestimate the difference
in firearm acquisitions between instant and delayed states.
Instant states
Delayed states
Excluded
Map of the United States showing the distribution of gun shows in 2012 and 2013. Red states denote
instant states. Blue states denote delayed states. Connecticut is shown in gray as we exclude the
state from the sample. Each location with a gun show is represented by a green circle, the size of the
green circle indicates the number of gun shows held at this location.
Figure 5.2: Locations of gun shows
To alleviate remaining concerns, we collect daily data from Google Trends for the
search expression ‘gun show’ for each state between 2009 and 2014. We employ the
same scaling procedure as explained above and thus obtain a measure that allows us
to investigate the temporal development of demand for gun shows across states with
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or without waiting periods or delays. In total we obtain data from 40 states and
the District of Columbia.14 Addtionally, we collect data on the location and timing
of gun shows. The website http://www.gunshowmonster.com/ provides a database
of future and past gun shows across the United States. The website allows users
to make submissions, which after editorial approval will be published and therefore
provides decent coverage: our sample contains 8764 gun shows between July 2009 and
December 2014 in almost all US states. We aggregate gun shows on the county level
for each month. Note that the sample is surely incomplete and possibly even skewed
towards certain states with easier access to guns. We therefore only use this data in
some supplementary estimations to show that the effects regarding the supply and
demand for gun shows go in similar directions. Figure 5.2 shows the locations of gun
shows in 2012 and 2013 using green circles, where the circle size increases in the number
of gun shows at a certain location.
Crime
As our outcome measure in the second step where we investigate the effects of gun
ownership on crime rates, we use the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR): Offenses
Known and Clearances by Arrest (USDOJ: FBI, 2014a; USDOJ: FBI, 2015a).15 Ap-
proximately 18,000 federal, state, tribal, county and local law enforcement agencies
voluntarily submit detailed monthly crime data, either through their state’s UCR pro-
gram or directly to the FBI, about offenses known to these agencies. Variables include
the monthly count of different types of crime for each law enforcement agency, such as
murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft. The
data also comprises variables that distinguish the type of weapon used (e.g. firearm,
knife, strong arm) for example in robberies and assaults, and they allow to distinguish
between severity for some crimes, such as simple assault versus aggravated assault, or
forcible and non-forcible rape.
Unfortunately, some agencies in the data set are not reporting consistently. Com-
mon reporting mistakes include large negative absolute values for crimes, or contin-
uously reporting zero crimes. We address this issue by following the guidelines for
properly cleaning UCR data from Targonski (2011): First, we determine truly missing
data points. An entry of zero could either mean that no crimes occurred, or that the
agency was not reporting any crimes. An additional reporting variable however indi-
14Censoring removes Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Car-
olina, Rhode Island, Wyoming, again comprising instant and delayed states. Connecticut is also taken
out of the sample.
15For a placebo regression using different years later in the main text we use (USDOJ: FBI, 2012;
USDOJ: FBI, 2013).
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rectly indicates, whether data was submitted. If no data was submitted, this reporting
variable will have missing values for that specific date. We thus exclude all observations
showing zero crimes, where the additional reporting variable contains missing values.
Second, there are some obvious cases of data bunching, as there exist agencies that
report their data only quarterly or (semi)annually, but no data in the months between.
We identify those observations using an algorithm designed by Targonski and we also
exclude them from the analysis.16 Third, some smaller agencies choose to not report
crimes themselves, but through another agency. In that case, they show up as report-
ing zeroes, although their counts are reflected in the data of the reporting agency. We
drop those observations. Fourth, we apply the rule of 20 to identify wrongly reported
zero crimes. Whenever an agency reports on average 20 or more crimes per month, it
seems unlikely they experienced zero crime in any given month. Such data points are
also excluded from our analysis. Fifth, we delete all observations with outlier values
999, 9999 and 99999 from the sample. Sixth, we remove all data containing negative
values smaller than -3.17
Instant states
Delayed states
No data
Map of the United States showing our UCR sample. Red counties are located in instant states. Blue
counties are located in delayed states. Grey counties are not present in the sample.
Figure 5.3: Counties represented in the UCR sample
16The algorithm is not part of Targonski (2011) but we received instructions and rules for the algo-
rithm from Joe Targonski in a personal email exchange. The algorithm basically identifies any county
(with absolute annual crime reports above 10) that report crimes only in March, June, September and
December (or a subset of those for (semi-)annually reporters), and zero crimes in all other months.
The email exchange is available from the authors upon request.
17In line with Targonski (2011) we ignore small negative values of at least -3. Those are usually
corrections for misreporting in previous months.
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In addition to the approach by Targonski (2011), we drop data from all counties
that do not report for the full time period of our study, and all counties that always
report zero crimes. If all reporting agencies in any county cover less than 50% of
the county’s population, we also remove these data points to make sure that control
variables reflect the characteristics of the sample.18 We then aggregate the crime data
for all cases of murder, manslaughter, total rapes, forcible rapes, attempted rapes,
total robberies (independent of type of weapon used), robberies with firearms, total
assaults (independent of type of weapon used), aggravated assaults, simple assaults,
assaults with firearms, total burglaries (including forced and non-forced entry), and
total larceny cases, for each US county that we have data for, for each month of the
years 2012 and 2013. This generates a data set of 13 types of crimes in 2,084 counties
and approximately 50,000 observations. Figure 5.3 shows all counties that remain in
our sample.
Crime: Supplementary Data Set
The UCR data only contains murder counts, but does not distinguish between the
type of weapon used and does not provide additional information with respect to the
circumstances of the crime. In order to determine who is most likely to be murdered
as a result of the demand shock, we utilize the UCR Supplementary Homicide reports
for 2012 and 2013 (USDOJ: FBI, 2014b; USDOJ: FBI, 2015b). These reports are
compiled from information that law enforcement agencies voluntarily submit to the
FBI and they contain detailed information about each homicide, such as gender of
victim and offender and weapon used.
In addition to offering more detailed information on each homicide, they might also
lead to a different count of murders than the UCR data due to the reporting issues
mentioned above. Replicating the effect found in the UCR data with this additional
data set would therefore be reassuring in the sense that our results are not driven by
an inappropriate data cleaning procedure.
We aggregate the data for murder from the report to monthly counts on the county
level. In addition, we generate counts for each of these crimes committed with any type
of firearm, versus those committed without the use of a gun. We also build a count of
murders for each gender separately and we count the number of murders in which the
offender is male and the victim is female.
18The decision to set the cutoff at 50% was made arbitrarily, but even keeping all counties does not
qualitatively change our results. Details will be given in the results section.
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Controls
To control for potential confounds and account for differences in counties, we obtain
several covariates. In selecting variables, we follow the choice of controls from the
many correlational studies that investigate the relationship of firearm prevalence and
crime (e.g. Cook and Ludwig, 2006; Kovandzic et al., 2012, 2013). From the 2010
US Decennial Census, we use (log) population, area, % rural, % African Americans,
% Hispanics, and % below the poverty line, all on the county (and when necessary
aggregated to the state) level.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 The Firearm Demand Shock After Sandy Hook
Since we predict some people to abstain from firearm purchases in delayed states, as
a first step to our analysis, we investigate the effect of the shooting at Sandy Hook
on NICS background checks for handguns. Higher demand after the shooting should
translate into more purchases in both groups of states, but the increase should be more
pronounced in instant states. Figure 5.4 shows a massive spike in background checks
for instant states right after the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School.19 There
also seems to be a stronger than usual spike for the delayed states, but it is clearly
smaller.
Employing our DiD estimation strategy, we estimate the differential effect of the
shooting in instant and delayed states using regression analysis. Table 5.2 reports the
results of a linear regression of the number of monthly background checks per 100,000
population on being in instant states after the shooting at Sandy Hook, as explained
in section 5.3.1 above. Columns 1 through 3 estimate the effect for handguns, while
columns 4 through 6 show the results for long guns. In all specifications, we include
the years 2012 and 2013, i.e. approximately one year post and prior to the shooting at
Sandy Hook. We chose this time frame to reduce the risk of picking up trend breaks
that the linear trends cannot account for (for example due to other events).20
19Section E.1 in the appendix shows the respective figures for long gun purchases and total gun
purchases.
20The results for handguns (our primary weapon of interest) do not depend on the choice of the
time frame. Table E.3 in the appendix reports results for all available years of the Obama adminis-
tration. Clearly, the effect decreases in the inclusion of additional time periods, but stays significant
throughout. The results for long guns are less clear, but remember that our classification of instant
and delayed states depends on delayed purchases of handguns which does not necessarily coincide with
delays for long guns.
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Monthly NICS background checks per 100,000 inhabitants for handguns in delayed states (black) and
instant states (red) between 2009 and 2014. The blue vertical line marks the date of the shooting at
Sandy Hook Elementary School.
Figure 5.4: Background checks for handguns in delayed vs instant states
Columns 1 and 4 contain a baseline specification without any controls or time
trends, and just include month and state fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the
state level to account for serial correlation in outcomes, and regressions are weighted
by the state population to not give less densely populated states more explanatory
power than high density states. The effect for handguns and long guns is positive
and significant, showing that purchases increased as a result of the shooting at Sandy
Hook by more in instant states than in delayed states. In columns 2 and 5, we add
our set of controls to take potential confounds into account. Included variables are the
logarithm of population, area, % rural, % African American, % Hispanics, % below
the poverty line (all interacted with month fixed effects to allow for a potentially
different impact each month). In doing so, we account for the fact that gun ownership
dynamics might be different in more rural versus more urban states, and might differ
along dimensions such as income and education levels, for reasons not present in our
estimation equation. The choice of these controls is not arbitrary, but follows the
approach of (Cook and Ludwig, 2006; Kovandzic et al., 2012, 2013) addressing the
critique of (Kleck, 2015) that most prior studies have either used irrelevant covariates
or too few if any. Adding controls does not affect our results for handguns by much, but
the coefficient for long guns drops while the standard error increases slightly, leading to
an insignificant estimate. Columns 3 and 6 then also add a linear time trend for each
state to account for potentially different pre-trends in the states. This strongly raises
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Table 5.2: Handgun background checks
Monthly handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Handgun Long gun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 26.281∗∗∗ 25.525∗∗∗ 102.850∗∗∗ 20.997∗∗ 14.727 45.215∗∗
(8.116) (9.358) (28.486) (8.539) (10.127) (21.180)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
State FE×t N N Y N N Y
States 50 50 50 50 50 50
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
Mean DV 162.61 162.61 162.61 189.48 189.48 189.48
R2 0.882 0.905 0.919 0.890 0.924 0.937
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of monthly handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants on our treat-
ment indicator and controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook.
The level of observation is the state level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean
of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls:
Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are
weighted by state population.
coefficients for both types of guns, and both are highly significant, effectively showing
that diverging pre-trends are not a concern in our setting. Note that each column
indicates the weighted mean of the dependent variable to allow for a judgment of the
treatment magnitude. In the case of our specification in column 3, our estimated effect
implies a 63% stronger increase in handgun sales in instant over delayed states.
While all three specifications show a significant effect that led to more handgun
purchases in instant over delayed states following the shooting at Sandy Hook, the
specifications in columns 3 and 6 are our preferred estimates. Including location-specific
time trends ensures that differential pre-trends do not bias the results, and allowing
controls to vary over time provides a very flexible approach to dealing with regional
idiosyncrasies that may amplify seasonal patterns. Therefore, we continue using this
specification throughout the rest of the chapter, and provide robustness checks relative
to this estimation strategy.
Although including state-specific trends should effectively deal with potential non-
parallel trends, we provide an additional robustness check: Figure 5.5 provides a com-
parison of delayed states with a synthetic control of instant states. The method of
synthetic control studies has first been used by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to
model the impacts of terrorism in the Basque country, and subsequently been formal-
ized by Abadie et al. (2012). Since its inception, it has become a popular method for
comparative case studies in many fields, where only some geographical region or object
has received treatment, including but not limited to public finance (Kleven et al., 2013),
financial economics (Acemoglu et al., 2016), and macroeconomics (Cavallo et al., 2013).
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The method is a powerful tool to control for pre-treatment violations of the common
trends assumption, as it constructs a synthetic control from the set of all control re-
gions matching the pre-treatment outcomes of the treated regions. Because we have
more instant than delayed states, and in contrast to our earlier regression analysis, we
redefine delayed states to be the treated group and create a synthetic control from the
set of instant states. Since our data comprises more than one treated state, we first av-
erage handgun sales over all delayed states, weighted with their respective population.
Then, we construct a synthetic control from all instant states to match the handgun
sales from the single delayed state. While we obtain a good match of pre-treatment
outcomes using this method, Figure 5.5 shows that handgun sales in the synthetic con-
trol of instant states rise strongly and remain above delayed states for the full course of
a year after the shooting at Sandy Hook.21 We consider this more reassuring evidence
that pre-trends are not biasing our results.
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Handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants in delayed states and a synthetic control of
instant states in the months before and after the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The
vertical line indicates the date of the shooting.
Figure 5.5: Handgun sales in delayed states and synthetic control states
To test whether present-bias or transaction costs are more likely to explain our
findings, we analyze if the ex ante willingness to purchase a gun was affected similarly
by the demand shock. We test this assumption using daily Google Trends data on
searches for the word ‘gun store’, which has been shown to be a good predictor of
firearm purchasing intentions (Scott and Varian, 2014). Table 5.3 uses our preferred
21Figure E.3 in the appendix shows that this does not necessarily hold for long guns.
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regression specification from Table 5.2, but now utilizes a varying time window around
the shooting at Sandy Hook for our Google search expression of interest. Column 1
inspects the variation in Google searches for the first seven days before and after the
shooting, which we expand to 30 days in column 2, 90 days in column 3, 365 days
in column 4 and finally 730 days (= 2 years) in column 5. None of the specifications
show a difference in firearm purchasing interest that would reject our notion that
instant and delayed states were equally affected from the demand shock.22 In fact,
the coefficients across all specifications are very similar and small compared to the
mean of the dependent variable. We therefore feel confident arguing that although
gun purchases differed substantially, the intent to buy a gun was largely similar across
delayed and instant states.
As we explained earlier, this similar intent to buy a firearm cannot be reconciled
by publicly known transaction costs alone, but rather needs naïve present-biased gun
buyers who credibly believe to purchase a gun in future periods. The important as-
sumption under which this finding holds however is that prospective buyers are well-
informed about their state’s gun laws, especially about waiting periods and delayed
purchasing permits. We argue that this assumption is reasonable for several reasons.
First, searches for ‘gun store’ do not capture interest in learning about gun laws, but
rather intend to locate the closest gun store. Since most people presumably know that
there exist differing gun laws in their respective states, they will in most cases research
the process of obtaining a gun before finding a local dealer. Second, since a transac-
tion cost argument requires prospective buyers to be marginal after the shock, they
will potentially at other points in time have thought about owning a gun already and
should therefore be more likely to be familiar with gun laws. This is especially true if
the shock did not extremely shift preferences for firearms. Third, since the estimated
effect is not significant in any of our specifications, and also very small compared to
baseline levels, the share of users not knowing about gun laws would need to be sub-
stantial. We conducted a short survey on surveymonkey.com in which we asked 119
participants about the gun laws in their state. Of the 113 respondents that completed
all questions, 88 (= 78%) correctly identified whether their state implemented waiting
periods or required purchasing permits. Excluding all participants that are sure that
they will not buy a gun in the next two years increases the share of respondents to
correctly identify their state’s gun laws only slightly to 82% (46 of 56). We therefore
deem the assumption of knowledge about gun laws at the time of search for gun store
locations as viable and argue that transaction costs alone are therefore not responsible
for the divergence, but rather time-inconsistent plans by prospective buyers due to
procrastination.
22Figure E.4 in the appendix shows the development of Google searches between November 2011
and January 2013 graphically.
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Table 5.3: Google searches for ‘gun store’
Daily normalized Google searches for ‘gun store’
7 days 30 days 90 days 365 days 730 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instant × Post 0.600 1.715 1.073 −0.629 0.068
(2.011) (2.069) (0.886) (0.545) (0.474)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
State FE×t Y Y Y Y Y
States 35 35 35 35 35
Observations 525 2,135 6,335 25,553 51,103
Mean DV 9.36 10.19 9.47 10.17 10.07
R2 0.865 0.780 0.754 0.709 0.690
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of daily Google searches for the expression ‘gun store’ on our treatment indicator
and controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes days after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of
observation is the state level. Each column indicates how many days prior and post to the shooting at Sandy Hook we use. Mean
DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted
with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by state population.
We have already argued that transactions at gun shows should be largely reflected
in our background check data or should bias the effect downwards. To ensure that
the demand for gun shows had not changed more strongly in delayed states, we use
the regression specification from Table 5.3 using Google Trends data on the search
term ‘gun show’. Table 5.4 reports the findings of stepwise expanding the time window
around the shooting. In the first 90 days (columns 1 through 3) we pick up a positive
effect that is significant mostly at the 10% level, suggesting that if anything, shifts to
the secondary market were stronger in instant than in delayed states.23 Expanding the
time frame further makes the effect insignificant, suggesting that demand did not shift
to secondary markets more strongly in delayed states. Section E.3.2 in the appendix
additionally provides some tentative evidence that the supply of gun shows did not tilt
towards delayed states either and the results qualitatively match the findings for gun
show demand.
Overall, while citizens in instant and delayed states were similarly interested in
acquiring firearms, we find that purchases were affected more strongly in instant states,
as some buyers in delayed states postponed their purchases, leading to differential
ownership dynamics. These results are not driven by differences in pre-existing trends
or by diversion to secondary markets. In the following, we use this differential firearm
take-up to investigate changes in crime rates.
23Figure E.5 in the appendix depicts the evolution of Google searches graphically. It also shows
that there are some gaps in searches between the states already before and also after the shooting
event that appear to be non-systematic.
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Table 5.4: Google searches for ‘gun show’
Daily normalized Google searches for ‘gun show’
7 days 30 days 90 days 365 days 730 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instant × Post 4.417∗ 4.091∗∗ 2.912∗ 0.984 0.687
(2.605) (1.965) (1.642) (1.077) (0.897)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
State FE×t Y Y Y Y Y
States 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 615 2,501 7,421 29,971 59,901
Mean DV 8.82 12.05 11.73 12.12 12.53
R2 0.844 0.775 0.748 0.715 0.704
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of daily Google searches for the expression ‘gun show’ on our treatment indicator
and controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes days after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of
observation is the state level. Each column indicates how many days prior and post to the shooting at Sandy Hook we use. Mean
DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted
with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by state population.
5.4.2 The Effect of Firearm Availability on Crime
Since following the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary, there were more new guns
owned in instant than in delayed states, we would like to know how this subsequently
affected crime rates. Table 5.5 reports results from linear regressions, using our pre-
ferred specification from our first step analysis regarding changes in gun ownership.
The regressions include the years 2012 and 2013, i.e. the years prior and after the
shooting at Sandy Hook.24 In column 1 we regress the sum of all crimes per 100,000
inhabitants in each county on our treatment indicator (being in an instant state after
the shooting at Sandy Hook). We include county and month fixed effects, and report
robust standard errors clustered at the state level and to not give less densely popu-
lated counties more explanatory power, we weigh the regressions by population. The
effect on overall crime is positive, but far from statistical significance. In column 2,
we add our set of control variables to account for potential confounds. The coefficient
now turns negative, but is still not significant. We include a linear time trend for each
county in column 3. This approach insures us against simply picking up diverging
pre-trends, and the effect stays insignificant. Column 4 and 5 of Table 5.5 split up the
results from column 3 in the most common violent and non-violent crimes according to
the UCR definition: A violent crime is defined as either being murder, non-negligent
24This choice of time frame is motivated by two arguments: First, the previous section established
that the effect of the shooting on differences in gun purchases is strongest for this shorter time frame,
suggesting that the effects eventually wash out; and second, a shorter time frame reduces the risk of
picking up trend breaks that the linear trends cannot account for. Robustness checks below will vary
this time frame.
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manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault. Non-violent crimes are all
remaining crimes. Even now, our regressions do not pick up significant effects. Impor-
tantly, the estimated coefficients in all specifications seem extremely small compared
to the baseline value of the dependent variable.
Table 5.5: Baseline: All crimes
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
Total Violent Nonviolent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instant × Post 1.012 −7.376 3.937 1.057 2.880
(4.534) (13.826) (7.242) (0.811) (6.577)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N Y Y Y
County FE×t N Y Y Y Y
Counties 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016
Mean DV 331.03 331.03 331.03 30.16 300.87
R2 0.941 0.951 0.956 0.917 0.952
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls.
Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of observation is
the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable.
Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; %
Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by county population.
To investigate the issue further, we break up violent crimes into their components.
Table 5.6 shows the regressions in our preferred specification for each type of violent
crime.25 The first column is just a repetition of column 4 in the previous table. Column
2 reports the results on murder and shows that instant states experience significantly
higher murder rates after the shock in gun demand following the shooting at Sandy
Hook. The estimated effect size of 0.055 additional murders per 100,000 population
constitutes a 14.47% increase in murders over delayed states. Since the population
of instant states comprises approximately 178 million people, this implies that gun
purchasing delays prevented approximately 98 murders in each month of 2013, and up
to 1180 lives could have been saved from murder in instant states in only one year had
such legislation been in place. Our other specifications in columns 3 through 6 show
no significant effect on manslaughter, rape, robberies, or assaults and the estimated
coefficients are much smaller compared to their baseline value than for murder. We
thus find no evidence of a deterrence effect: None of the violent crimes experiences a
significant downshift to counteract the uptick in murder rates.
25Table E.4 in the appendix shows for murder, manslaughter and aggravated assault that the results
remain qualitatively unchanged if we use state time trends instead of county time trends in our
regressions. In fact, the coefficients and standard errors remain almost unchanged. Using time trends
for large geographical regions however strongly decreases the coefficients for all crimes and makes the
Chapter 5. Dynamics in Gun Ownership and Crime 137
Table 5.6: Violent crimes
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
All Murder Mansl’ter Rape Robbery Agg. Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 1.057 0.055∗∗∗ 0.003 0.106 0.458 0.438
(0.811) (0.021) (0.005) (0.139) (0.534) (0.414)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016
Mean DV 30.16 0.38 0.01 2.34 9.05 18.39
R2 0.917 0.363 0.095 0.478 0.945 0.859
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls.
Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of observation is
the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable.
Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; %
Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by county population.
Table 5.7 reports our findings for the most common non-violent crimes. Column 1
repeats the last column from Table 5.5. Column 2 reports results on burglary, column
3 on larceny and column 4 on vehicle theft. None of these crimes see a significant in-
or decrease in instant states following the shooting at Sandy Hook and the estimated
effects are small. We find the non-results on larceny and vehicle theft particularly
reassuring, since changes in these crimes could easily be spurious correlations—finding
an ex ante reason for why they should be affected by changes in gun ownership seems
challenging (Lott, 2013, p. 29).
A non-effect in assaults or robberies could however still mean that a higher share
of these crimes were now committed using a firearm. In Table 5.8, we therefore split
up assaults and robberies in those committed with a gun and those without. Column
1 reports the overall effect on robberies and column 2 reports the effect on robberies at
gunpoint. Column 3 and 4 report the same specification for assaults. All four models
lack statistical significance and exhibit coefficients close to zero, suggesting that the
increased gun ownership did not lead to a significantly higher or lower share of assaults
or robberies being committed with a firearm. It therefore seems that the only criminal
activity these newly acquired guns were used for were homicides, a finding consistent
with impulsive acts of violence, which gun purchasing delays aim to prevent.
Our results show that murder rates strongly increased in instant states as compared
to delayed states after the gun demand shock following the shooting at Sandy Hook
results for murder insignificant. Combining these findings suggests that relevant convergence processes
happen at the state level.
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Table 5.7: Non-violent crimes
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
All Burglary Larceny Veh.Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instant × Post 2.880 0.951 5.145 −0.429
(6.577) (2.170) (4.227) (0.588)
County FE Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y
Counties 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016
Mean DV 300.87 53.07 155.92 19.34
R2 0.952 0.870 0.924 0.925
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls.
Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of observation is
the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable.
Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; %
Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by county population.
Elementary School.26 The estimated effect size suggests that a substantial number of
lives could have been saved had access to guns been delayed in all states. To ensure
that our effect on murder rates is not driven by confounding factors, the following
section provides detailed robustness checks to our regressions from this section.
5.4.3 Robustness Checks
To address concerns that our regressions are merely picking up seasonal effects that
are different in delayed and instant states respectively, we repeat our regression from
Table 5.6, but now instead of December 14, 2012 use December 14, 2010 as the event,
and include only the years 2010 and 2011 in our estimation to mimic the data range
used previously.27 This placebo regression should only be picking up an effect if there is
something particular about December and adjacent months that causes our estimates to
be invalid. Table 5.9 reports the estimates for changes in violent crimes after December
14, 2010. None of the crimes seems to be significantly affected, and importantly, so is
murder. The coefficient in fact is much closer to zero, suggesting that the previously
uncovered effect can be attributed to the treatment rather than seasonal variation
across groups of states.
26Table E.5 in the appendix presents the results for murder, manslaughter and aggravated assault
if all reporting agencies (even if they cover less than 50% of the population of their respective county)
are included. The results are qualitatively similar.
27We chose 2010, because 2010 and 2011 were the latest years that were free of large mass shootings
with more than 20 victims.
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Table 5.8: Crimes by type of weapon
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
Robbery Assault
All Gun All Gun
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instant × Post 0.458 −0.120 0.438 0.012
(0.534) (0.170) (0.414) (0.171)
County FE Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y
Counties 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016
Mean DV 9.05 3.39 18.39 3.92
R2 0.945 0.914 0.859 0.799
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls.
Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of observation is
the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable.
Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; %
Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by county population.
Even if the effect is not purely seasonal, it could also be caused by unrelated events
taking place in our period of observation. Additionally one could be concerned that
the effect is a construct of the choice of the time window around the event. Therefore,
Figure 5.6 shows how the coefficient estimate on murder changes if we include data
further away from the shooting. Initially, with only up to four months post and prior
to the shooting, the effect is insignificant, but adding more data moves the coefficient
in the right direction and drastically decreases standard errors. Increasing the time
window around the shooting far enough leads to a positive estimate, starting at five
months post and prior the shooting. The effect stays largely the same and significant
throughout the first nine months, but then eventually diminishes until it is not signifi-
cant anymore if more than 14 months post and prior the shooting are being used. We
are therefore confident that our result is not simply an outlier driven by a favorable
choice of the time window. Additionally, it seems unlikely that events further than six
months before or after the shooting initiated the observed effect, effectively excluding
the 2013 US Federal Government shutdown, the 2013 DC Navy Yard shooting, but
not ruling out the November 2012 re-election of President Obama and the July 2012
shooting in a movie theater near Denver, Colorado, which constitute the most notable
events in the United States in 2012 and 2013.
Both of the these events however would presumably contribute directionally simi-
larly to the effect. As pointed out earlier, mass shootings during the Obama presidency
have throughout increased gun sales. This would mean that our findings constitute the
lower bounds of the effects, as the 2012 Denver shooting would have differentially
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Table 5.9: Placebo regressions of violent crimes
Placebo: Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
All Murder Mansl’ter Rape Robbery Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 0.995 0.002 0.001 0.074 0.670 0.249
(1.130) (0.045) (0.006) (0.072) (0.608) (0.640)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086
Observations 50,064 50,064 50,064 50,064 50,064 50,064
Mean DV 31.32 0.38 0.01 2.2 9.48 19.27
R2 0.923 0.376 0.094 0.445 0.945 0.869
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls.
Since this is a placebo regression, Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the placebo date of
December 14, 2010. The level of observation is the county level. We include data from the years 2010 and 2011. Mean DV shows
the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month
FE); Regressions are weighted by county population.
affected gun sales already, making the effects due to the Sandy Hook shooting look
smaller than they actually are. Similarly, the November 2012 election increased gun
sales as citizens feared tougher gun legislation from a Democratic president (CNN
Money, 2012).
There could also be the concern that the shooting at Sandy Hook not only influenced
firearm demand, but also had a direct impact on crime rates. When comparing the
differences in crime rates across delayed and instant states, we implicitly assume that
they were driven by the different gun ownership dynamics and not directly changed by
the event. It could however be conceivable that a violent act such as a mass shooting
influenced attitudes towards violence differently in instant and delayed states, as the
states differ across many dimensions. One way to address this concern is to find a
non-violence related shock to firearm demand. One example is the 2012 Presidential
election. Former Governor Mitt Romney took a more a liberal position on gun rights
than President Obama, which earned him the endorsement of the NRA. After the
election, gun sales increased strongly (CNN Money, 2012).
Unfortunately, the 2012 Presidential election happened shortly before the shoot-
ing at Sandy Hook Elementary School in November 2012. Separating the two events
therefore seems impossible, such that we can only determine if the election contributed
to the overall observed effect. Figure 5.7 reports the coefficients and corresponding
90% confidence intervals of the murder regression from Table 5.6 when the treatment
date is shifted to an earlier or later month. Clearly, the effect is strongly positive and
significant at date 0, i.e. right after the shooting at Sandy Hook took place. Shifting
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Figure 5.6: Time window on murder coefficient
the date to the future makes the effect less strong and it becomes insignificant if post-
dated by more than one month. Reassuringly, the coefficient also falls monotonically
for the first four months. Post-dating the event even further then makes the coefficient
jumpy, as we probably pick up other events. Predating the treatment event by one
period (to include the election in November 2012) however strongly increases the effect
and it becomes more significant. This suggests that the 2012 election indeed positively
contributed to the effect. Pre-dating the treatment even further than one month also
delivers insignificant effects which is reassuring as the effect does not result from other
events than the shooting and the election. We are therefore confident that our esti-
mated effect on murder rates resulting from the shooting at Sandy Hook is indeed due
to differences in firearm ownership rates across instant and delayed states.28
Finally, we would like to know how robust our estimation is to the exclusion of
states. If the coefficients become very unstable upon exclusion of single states, we
should be very cautious with interpreting the effect of delays to be a general finding
across the United States. Figure 5.8 reports the results from our murder regression
with 90% confidence intervals, removing one state at a time for all states in our sample.
The first bar shows the estimated effect for the full sample, the second bar does not
28Section E.3.3 in the appendix provides directionally similar, yet insignificant results for the 2008
election.
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Figure 5.7: Timing of treatment onset
include Alaska, the third bar shows the full sample minus Arkansas, and so forth.
Across all specifications, the coefficient is of similar magnitude. In fact, it never falls
below .04 and rarely exceeds .06 and overall seems to exhibit relatively little variance.
The confidence bands show that the effect is significant across all specifications.
5.4.4 Instrumental Variables Approach
One valid criticism towards our estimation strategy so far could be that our effect is
more of an intention-to-treat rather than a true treatment effect on the treated. We
have shown that “offering treatment” (being in an instant state after Sandy Hook) leads
to “treatment” (experiencing higher gun sales) and that “offering treatment” leads to
the effect (experiencing higher murder rates). This however disregards the variation in
gun sales (“(non)-compliance”) that can possible dilute our treatment effect.
For this reason, we provide results from a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation.
We first divide handgun sales by 1,000 to ease the interpretation of our estimated
coefficients. Our first stage regresses these gun sales on the dummy of being in an
instant state after Sandy Hook and our usual set of covariates, fixed effects and time
trends. The predicted values we then use to estimate our second stage: How gun
ownership affected crime rates. We do this separately for murder, manslaughter and
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Figure 5.8: Coefficients on murder leaving out states
aggravated assault using two stage least squares (2SLS) and as a comparison estimate
the structural equation with OLS to visualize the size of the problem that endogeneity
would have caused when estimating the relationship of gun purchases and crime rates
directly.
Table 5.10 presents the results. Column 1 shows the first stage and not surprisingly
delivers a coefficient highly significant and of similar magnitude as earlier.29 The F-
statistic of 21.01 reported at the bottom of the column suggests that we do not face
a weak instrument. Column 2 presents the OLS results of the structural equation for
murder, while column 3 takes the first stage into account by using the 2SLS estimator.
The coefficient implies that every 2049 additional guns lead to one additional murder.30
Note that we would not have found an effect for murders had we not dealt with the
endogeneity of gun sales (even after including control variables). Columns 4 and 5
repeat the exercise for manslaughter. A simple OLS estimation would have shown an
effect, but the 2SLS estimator clarifies that this effect only arises due to endogeneity.
29Note that the sample is slightly different than in Table 5.2, because we have no data for Alabama
and Florida in the second stage.
30Note that in the second stage both variables, gun sales and crimes, are expressed per 100,000
population, and gun sales are additionally expressed in thousands. This changes the interpretation of
the coefficient compared to our earlier regressions. The coefficient now tells you by how much murders
(in absolute numbers) increased for every 1,000 additional handguns sold.
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Columns 6 and 7 provide results for aggravated assaults and neither column reports a
significant effect.
Table 5.10: Instrumental variables regression
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
First Stage Murder Mansl’ter Agg. Assault
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Instant × Post 0.112∗∗∗
(0.024)
Handgun sales per 1,000 0.058 0.488∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.030 −2.829 3.901
(0.067) (0.186) (0.018) (0.045) (2.195) (3.684)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016
R2 0.118 0.363 0.363 0.095 0.095 0.859 0.859
IV F-stat. 21.01
Notes: Coefficients from Instrumental Variables and OLS regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on gun sales per
100,000 inhabitants in thousands, where gun sales is instrumented by our treatment indicator. The first stage is reported in column
1. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. OLS regressions estimate
the structural equation only. The level of observation is the county level in the second stage and the state level in the first stage.
We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month
FE); Regressions are weighted by county/state population.
The results from our Instrumental Variables approach clearly show that stronger
increases in gun ownership lead to more murders, supporting our earlier findings. Fur-
thermore, the Instrumental Variables approach shows a similar magnitude of the effect.
While the first stage implies that instant states saw gun sales that were elevated by
approximately 200,00031 in the months after the shooting at Sandy Hook, the effect
from the second stage predicts that roughly 97 murders could have been prevented in
each month of 2013, which is almost the 98 murders that our reduced form regressions
predicted. This suggests that non-compliance does not play a large role in our setting,
presumably due to a sensible choice of controls, and that therefore intent-to-treat and
treatment effect on the treated almost coincide. Our results also emphasize the im-
portance of credible identification in this setup, as the OLS results of the structural
equation vary significantly from the 2SLS estimates and can therefore lead to wrong
conclusions about the actual causal relationship between gun ownership and crime
rates.
31The calculation involves a population estimate of 178 million for instant states.
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5.4.5 Identifying Murder Circumstances
Our previous analyses have only predicted that instant states see additional murders,
but we haven’t learned much about the characteristics of those murders. The crime
data employed so far was not detailed enough to distinguish between murders with
guns and murders with other types of weapons. This section therefore provides results
from regressions using the UCR Supplementary Homicide reports.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.11 compare the results using our original UCR crime
data set (UCR) with the UCR Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR). Clearly, the
coefficients are significant, positive and of similar magnitude in both cases. Note how-
ever that the R2 is somewhat different and coefficients and standard errors are not
identical, suggesting that there are some differences between the SHR and the UCR
data. Although we performed extensive data cleaning on the UCR data, these dif-
ferences could arise if the cleaning procedure did not eliminate all irregularities. We
find it reassuring that the results are so similar, suggesting that there are only few
misreports left in the remaining UCR sample.
Table 5.11: Results from Supplementary Homicide reports
Monthly murders per 100,000 inhabitants
UCR: All SHR: All with
Gun
w/o Gun Victim
Female
Victim
Male
Men
killing
Women
All
Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instant × Post 0.055∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ −0.010 0.018∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.007) (0.018) (0.005) (0.018)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016
Mean DV 0.38 0.42 0.3 0.12 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.26
R2 0.363 0.631 0.644 0.188 0.146 0.687 0.130 0.679
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of murders per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls. Column
1 uses UCR data, all other columns are based on SHR data. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after
the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of observation is the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean
DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted
with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by county population.
We have yet to provide evidence that the observed increase in murder rates stems
from the use of guns. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.11 split the SHR results by murder
weapon, column 3 performs the regression for all murders in which any type of firearm
was involved, while column 4 shows the results for all murders with all other weapons.
The results propose that the entire effect can be attributed to murders with guns, as
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the coefficient in column 3 is positive and highly significant, while the coefficient in
column 4 is comparably small and far from significance.
Columns 5 and 6 break up murder victims (where the weapon of choice was a
firearm) by gender. The additional victims seem to be drawn from both genders, but
when comparing the effect size to the mean of the dependent variable, it becomes
apparent that women are relatively more affected than men: Murder rates for men
increase by only 20.8%, while the increase for women is more than twice as high with
45%. This suggests that women face a (relatively) higher risk to be murdered from
the additional guns that purchasing delays keep out of the hands of citizens. Columns
7 and 8 complement these findings by providing evidence from a somewhat different
angle. Column 7 reports results for all gun murders in which the offender was male
and the victim was female, while column 8 depicts the results for all other murders
(female offenders and male offenders killing men). The results are very similar: The
rate of men murdering women increases by 50%, while the rate of all other murders
rises by only 21%, less than half as much.
While not providing definitive evidence, the results are suggestive of an increase in
deadly domestic violence. While the typical murder victim and offender are both male,
the fact that women are disproportionately affected indicates that relationship through
blood or marriage between victim and offender could play a role. This would also align
with the general observation that self-control capabilities are correlated across domains
(Tangney et al., 2004). If this applied to both the time-inconsistency that keeps some
citizens from buying guns and the lack of self-control that leads to the commission of
impulsive acts of violence, it would deliver an explanation for our observations. This
is of course highly speculative, but we think that the importance of this issue warrants
further investigation of this mechanism which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
5.5 Conclusion
With the political debate on gun control gaining traction amid several recent mass
shootings, understanding the consequences of legislation that limits access to firearms
is imperative. The existing literature has delivered contradicting results and there ex-
ists reasonable doubt about identification in many previous contributions. This chap-
ter contributes to this important topic by presenting well-identified effects on crime
rates of an exogenous country-wide gun demand shock that led to differential gun pur-
chases depending on whether states had implemented mechanisms to delay purchases
or not.
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Our results show that in states without any firearms purchasing delays, gun sales
rose stronger following a country-wide gun demand shock as a result from the shooting
at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. The strong effect is
robust to a variety of controls and alternative specifications and does not seem to
be caused by pre-existing time trends. Additional evidence suggests that the effect
might be driven by time-inconsistent consumers postponing their gun purchases rather
than simply transaction costs, as results show that the intention to acquire firearms
right after the shooting was not significantly different across groups of states, but
large differences appear in actual gun sales. Our analysis also addresses transactions
on secondary markets and provides evidence that sales at gun shows are unlikely to
confound our results.
We then use these findings to explore how crime rates changed. While all but
one crime categories remain unaffected, murder rates increase significantly in states
where gun purchases reacted more strongly. Several additional regressions and analyses
address possible robustness and endogeneity issues. Our findings suggest that in each
month of 2013 alone, approximately 98 murders could have been prevented if all states
had implemented delays for gun purchases. The null finding regarding other crime
categories suggests that armed citizens might not provide a strong deterrent effect.
Including the 2012 United States Presidential election as an additional event that
drove up gun sales makes the effect stronger, suggesting that our results are not due to
a direct effect of mass shootings on crime rates, but rather through increased firearm
ownership rates. We also look more closely at the additional murder victims and find
that women are relatively more likely to being murdered. This is primarily driven by
male offenders.
At this point we would like to emphasize that the aim of this chapter is not to speak
in favor of the abolition of Second Amendment rights. The topic of allowing citizens
to own guns is obviously very complex and has many dimensions that need to be taken
into consideration, such as whether armed citizens can provide protection against ex-
ploitation by the government, or whether stripping legal gun owners from their rights
will in the short run lead to more crime as potential victims become defenseless. Addi-
tionally, our results do not address the issue of widespread firearm access of criminals
or structures of organized crime that are so pervasive in some larger US cities and that
have their own roots and causes. Our study merely provides evidence on two aspects of
the gun control debate, i.e. that more widespread gun ownership positively contributes
to murder rates and that delaying gun purchases can help to prevent murders, espe-
cially of women. These findings should therefore be taken into account when deciding
about the extent and the means of gun control legislation.
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Finally, we see our study as a good starting point to investigate additional, re-
lated issues. First, additional direct evidence on the circumstances under which gun
ownership leads to increased violent crime is needed. While we conclude that time-
inconsistency is consistent with our findings, it would be interesting to see if differences
in present-bias can actually be seen in individual gun buyers. Second, it would be in-
teresting to determine the exact relationship of victims and offenders. While we can
only speculate why women are more at risk of being murdered after such a shock, we
would expect to see immediate family members and spouses to be more heavily affected
if the murders result from impulsive acts of violence. Third, the effect of the Sandy
Hook shooting on suicides remains completely unknown. Given the large evidence on
the relationship of gun prevalence and suicides, knowing whether guns not particularly
bought for the purpose of killing oneself actually impact suicide rates. We leave these
issues for future research as they constitute different research questions or cannot yet
be answered given the available data.
Appendix A
Risk, Time Pressure & Selection
Effects
A.1 List of Binary Risky Choices
Table A.1: Lotteries Used in Risky Choice Tasks
#Set/# Lottery Lottery A Lottery BPayoff 1 Prob. 1 Payoff 2 Prob. 2 EV Payoff 1 Prob. 1 Payoff 2 Prob. 2 EV
S1 / G1 - 19.00 27.14 % - 5.00 72.86 % - 8.80 4.50 21.50 % - 15.50 78.50 % - 11.20
S1 / G2 - 8.00 15.00 % - 4.00 85.00 % - 4.60 3.00 15.00 % - 7.00 85.00 % - 5.50
S1 / G3 - 16.00 23.34 % - 10.00 76.66 % - 11.40 8.50 13.00 % - 16.50 87.00 % - 13.25
S1 / G4 - 9.00 40.00 % - 2.00 60.00 % - 4.80 7.00 40.00 % - 15.00 60.00 % - 6.20
S1 / G5 - 15.50 30.00 % - 12.50 70.00 % - 13.40 5.50 12.08 % - 18.50 87.92 % - 15.60
S1 / G6 - 15.00 12.00 % - 7.50 88.00 % - 8.40 5.00 27.50 % - 15.00 72.50 % - 9.50
S1 / G7 - 7.50 14.55 % - 2.00 85.45 % - 2.80 3.00 33.33 % - 7.50 66.67 % - 4.00
S1 / G8 - 16.00 40.00 % - 8.00 60.00 % - 11.20 4.00 10.00 % - 14.00 90.00 % - 12.20
S1 / G9 - 15.00 28.89 % - 6.00 71.11 % - 8.60 3.50 24.86 % - 15.00 75.14 % - 10.40
S1 / G10 - 16.00 10.00 % - 12.00 90.00 % - 12.40 6.00 10.00 % - 16.00 90.00 % - 13.80
S1 / G11 - 15.00 15.00 % - 11.00 85.00 % - 11.60 12.00 15.00 % - 17.00 85.00 % - 12.65
S1 / G12 - 11.00 30.00 % - 6.00 70.00 % - 7.50 5.00 30.00 % - 15.00 70.00 % - 9.00
S1 / L1 6.50 80.62 % 14.50 19.38 % 8.05 13.50 79.00 % - 6.50 21.00 % 9.30
S1 / L2 5.00 80.00 % 15.00 20.00 % 7.00 15.00 75.00 % - 5.00 25.00 % 10.00
S1 / L3 3.00 76.66 % 6.00 23.34 % 3.70 10.00 72.06 % - 7.00 27.94 % 5.25
S1 / L4 6.00 75.00 % 14.00 25.00 % 8.00 14.00 80.00 % - 12.00 20.00 % 8.80
S1 / L5 4.50 60.00 % 7.50 40.00 % 5.70 12.50 71.25 % - 7.50 28.75 % 6.75
S1 / L6 7.50 70.00 % 12.50 30.00 % 9.00 14.50 80.44 % - 8.50 19.56 % 10.00
S1 / L7 9.50 81.66 % 15.50 18.34 % 10.60 14.50 87.65 % - 2.50 12.35 % 12.40
S1 / L8 4.00 75.00 % 9.00 25.00 % 5.25 14.00 70.00 % - 11.00 30.00 % 6.50
S1 / L9 6.00 70.00 % 10.00 30.00 % 7.20 12.50 84.00 % - 15.00 16.00 % 8.10
S1 / L10 2.00 65.00 % 7.00 35.00 % 3.75 7.00 85.00 % - 7.00 15.00 % 4.90
S1 / L11 2.00 65.00 % 5.00 35.00 % 3.05 10.00 70.00 % - 5.00 30.00 % 5.50
S1 / L12 5.00 75.00 % 15.00 25.00 % 7.50 10.00 90.00 % - 4.00 10.00 % 8.60
S2 / G1 - 20.00 30.00 % - 4.00 70.00 % - 8.80 4.00 20.00 % - 15.00 80.00 % - 11.20
S2 / G2 - 8.00 32.00 % - 3.00 68.00 % - 4.60 4.00 13.64 % - 7.00 86.36 % - 5.50
S2 / G3 - 15.00 10.00 % - 11.00 90.00 % - 11.40 8.00 15.00 % - 17.00 85.00 % - 13.25
S2 / G4 - 10.00 30.67 % - 2.50 69.33 % - 4.80 7.00 41.33 % - 15.50 58.67 % - 6.20
S2 / G5 - 15.00 20.00 % - 13.00 80.00 % - 13.40 6.00 10.00 % - 18.00 90.00 % - 15.60
S2 / G6 - 14.00 20.00 % - 7.00 80.00 % - 8.40 4.00 25.00 % - 14.00 75.00 % - 9.50
S2 / G7 - 6.00 20.00 % - 2.00 80.00 % - 2.80 3.00 30.00 % - 7.00 70.00 % - 4.00
S2 / G8 - 17.00 31.76 % - 8.50 68.24 % - 11.20 4.50 12.11 % - 14.50 87.89 % - 12.20
S2 / G9 - 14.00 40.00 % - 5.00 60.00 % - 8.60 4.00 20.00 % - 14.00 80.00 % - 10.40
S2 / G10 - 16.00 20.00 % - 11.50 80.00 % - 12.40 6.50 9.78 % - 16.00 90.22 % - 13.80
S2 / G11 - 15.50 29.10 % - 10.00 70.90 % - 11.60 11.00 14.00 % - 16.50 86.00 % - 12.65
S2 / G12 - 12.00 30.77 % - 5.50 69.23 % - 7.50 5.00 26.31 % - 14.00 73.69 % - 9.00
S2 / L1 7.00 85.00 % 14.00 15.00 % 8.05 12.00 85.00 % - 6.00 15.00 % 9.30
S2 / L2 4.50 72.22 % 13.50 27.78 % 7.00 13.50 80.56 % - 4.50 19.44 % 10.00
S2 / L3 3.00 65.00 % 5.00 35.00 % 3.70 9.00 75.00 % - 6.00 25.00 % 5.25
S2 / L4 6.50 82.35 % 15.00 17.65 % 8.00 15.00 77.86 % - 13.00 22.14 % 8.80
S2 / L5 5.00 65.00 % 7.00 35.00 % 5.70 12.00 75.00 % - 9.00 25.00 % 6.75
S2 / L6 8.00 80.00 % 13.00 20.00 % 9.00 15.00 80.00 % - 10.00 20.00 % 10.00
S2 / L7 10.00 85.00 % 14.00 15.00 % 10.60 14.00 90.00 % - 2.00 10.00 % 12.40
S2 / L8 3.50 70.83 % 9.50 29.17 % 5.25 14.00 70.59 % - 11.50 29.41 % 6.50
S2 / L9 6.00 60.00 % 9.00 40.00 % 7.20 12.00 85.00 % - 14.00 15.00 % 8.10
S2 / L10 3.00 85.00 % 8.00 15.00 % 3.75 8.00 80.63 % - 8.00 19.37 % 4.90
S2 / L11 2.50 78.00 % 5.00 22.00 % 3.05 11.50 64.71 % - 5.50 35.29 % 5.50
S2 / L12 4.50 66.66 % 13.50 33.34 % 7.50 11.00 82.86 % - 3.00 17.14 % 8.60
Notes: Payoffs and expected values in e ; S=set; G=prominent gain; L=prominent loss
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A.2 Graphical Presentation of Risky Choices
A.3 Incentivization of Cognitive Ability Tasks
The IQ and IE tasks were incentivized in the following way. In each task we count
the number of correct items. This number then determines the probability to win a
fixed prize of e 10 in the IQ and of e 20 in the IE task. The probability is calcu-
lated as P (win e 10) = (Number of correct items + 1)/(12 + 1) in the IQ task; and as
P (win e 20) = (Number of correct items+1)/(34+1) in the IE task. That is, subjects
have a clear incentive to solve as many items as possible, since their expected payoff
is monotonically increasing in the number of correct items. At the same time, they
always have a positive probability of winning the prize. The procedure was chosen to
make sure that participants could never draw clear conclusions regarding their score
or regarding the correct answer of single items. We wanted to avoid such inference
because we did not want subjects to draw strong inference regarding their cognitive
ability from our experiment. Note that subjects learned about the outcome of the
random payment draw only at the end of the experiment if either Part 1 or Part 4 were
randomly selected for real payment.
Appendix B
Unleashing Animal Spirits –
Self-Control and Overpricing in
Experimental Asset Markets
B.1 Period-specific Price Comparisons
Looking at single periods, it is possible to get a more precise picture of when the
price differences between conditions arise. Table B.1 reports the per-period differences
of volume-adjusted mean prices, trade-adjusted mean prices, RAD and RD between
LOWSC and HIGHSC. The z-values from Mann-Whitney tests testing the equality of
the respective measures across the two conditions are displayed in parentheses with
significance levels indicated by asterisks. While in the first periods we see almost
no price differences, starting from period five, markets in LOWSC exhibit significantly
higher mean prices, mispricing, and overpricing, with the peak in period 8. There are no
significant differences between the two conditions in the ultimate period. By definition,
this implies a more pronounced bubble and burst pattern in LOWSC markets than in
HIGHSC markets.
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Table B.1: Period-specific Effects
Period
∆volume-adjusted ∆trade-adjusted
∆RAD ∆RD
mean price mean price
1
-0.67 -0.85 0.0143 -0.0245
(0.84) (0.735) (-0.63) (0.84)
2
0.73 2.87 -0.0749 0.0266
(0.105) (-0.21) (0.21) (0.105)
3
4.53 3.38 0.0006 0.1646
(-0.84) (-0.525) (-0.105) (-0.84)
4
7.18 7.64 * 0.1720 0.2612
(-1.47) (-1.89) (-1.26) (-1.47)
5
9.24 * 9.03 * 0.2523 0.3359 *
(-1.785) (-1.785) (-1.47) (-1.785)
6
12.27 ** 12.01 ** 0.4186 ** 0.4461 **
(-2.205) (-2.31) (-2.205) (-2.205)
7
15.90 ** 15.84 ** 0.5703 ** 0.5781 **
(-2.521) (-2.415) (-2.521) (-2.521)
8
18.40 ** 19.00 ** 0.6573 ** 0.6693 **
(-2.521) (-2.521) (-2.521) (-2.521)
9
11.69 ** 11.78 ** 0.4249 ** 0.4249 **
(-2.1) (-1.995) (-2.1) (-2.1)
10
6.13 6.48 0.2007 0.2228
(-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.05) (-1.26)
Differences between LOWSC and HIGHSC and z-values (in parentheses)
for Mann-Whitney tests. Volume-adjusted mean prices denote the average
price per asset, while trade-adjusted mean prices denote average price per
trade.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.2 Additional Regression Results
Table B.2: Determinants of Trading Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average quantity traded
LOWSC -0.120 -0.0503 -2.915 -3.038
(2.079) (2.032) (4.235) (4.562)
CRT -0.0287 -1.310* -1.328*
(0.842) (0.700) (0.716)
CE 0.685 0.558 0.542
(0.802) (0.820) (0.868)
CRT × LOWSC 2.881* 2.874*
(1.525) (1.537)
CE × LOWSC 0.278 0.335
(1.700) (1.922)
Female -0.295
(1.942)
Constant 12.52*** 11.06*** 12.42*** 12.69***
(1.025) (2.173) (2.280) (3.313)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.000 0.006 0.035 0.036
OLS regression, dependent variable is individual average number
of trades. LOWSC is a dummy where 1 stands for LOWSC and
0 for HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent. CRT
denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects who
indicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions before were
excluded. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at
market level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.3: Determinants of Trading Activity (MIXED)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average quantity traded
MIXLO -0.424 -0.828 -0.573 -0.586
(2.252) (2.157) (5.110) (5.143)
CRT -1.309 0.579 0.541
(0.807) (1.429) (1.462)
CE 1.653 1.217 1.161
(0.973) (1.191) (1.289)
CRT × MIXLO -3.984* -3.950*
(1.903) (1.885)
CE × MIXLO 1.211 1.205
(2.265) (2.258)
Female -0.422
(1.602)
Constant 12.09*** 9.805*** 9.266*** 9.691***
(1.155) (1.517) (2.189) (3.124)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R2 0.001 0.040 0.084 0.085
OLS regression, dependent variable is individual average number
of trades. MIXLO is a dummy where 1 stands for MIXLO and
0 for MIXHI. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent. CRT
denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects who
indicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions before were
excluded. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at
market level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.4: Ratings of Emotions in MIXED Markets
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
Excitement1 4.200 4.500 0.400
Fear1 2.100 2.175 0.395
Surprise1 3.600 4.050 0.103
Anger1 1.800 2.025 0.440
Relief1 2.825 3.250 0.161
Sadness1 1.525 1.725 0.324
Joy1 3.625 4.375 0.058*
Excitement2 3.425 4.200 0.042**
Fear2 1.900 2.575 0.014**
Surprise2 2.450 3.400 0.030**
Anger2 2.025 2.000 0.723
Relief2 3.275 4.150 0.233
Sadness2 1.950 1.725 0.622
Joy2 3.375 4.125 0.207
Emotion intensity 2.720 3.163 0.025**
Emotion valence 1.464 1.969 0.208
Emotion intensity1 2.811 3.157 0.123
Emotion valence1 1.754 2.069 0.123
Emotion intensity2 2.629 3.168 0.025**
Emotion valence2 1.604 1.944 0.400
Note: p-values from Wilcoxon-Signed Rank tests collapsing
data on the market level byMIXLO andMIXHI respectively;
emotion intensity is the average score over all emotion ques-
tions, emotion valence is the average score over all positive
emotions minus the score over all negative emotions; variables
ending in 1 or 2 relate to questions at the beginning (1) or
the end (2) of the asset market, respectively; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.5: Changes of Ex-post Emotion Ratings in MIXED Markets
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
Diff excitement -0.775 -0.300 0.232
Diff fear -0.200 0.400 0.029**
Diff surprise -1.150 -0.650 0.288
Diff anger 0.225 -0.025 0.575
Diff relief 0.450 0.900 0.441
Diff sadness 0.425 0.000 0.290
Diff joy -0.250 -0.250 1.000
Note: p-values from Wilcoxon-Signed Rank tests collapsing
data on the market level byMIXLO andMIXHI respectively;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix B. Unleashing Animal Spirits – Self-Control and Overpricing 157
Table B.6: Determinants of Individual RD Based on Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndRDsales
LOWSC 0.355** 0.350** 0.605** 0.648**
(0.146) (0.143) (0.243) (0.221)
CRT -0.0488 -0.0774 -0.0712
(0.0395) (0.0613) (0.0608)
CE 0.00173 0.0584 0.0639
(0.0551) (0.0617) (0.0634)
CRT × LOWSC 0.0684 0.0709
(0.0800) (0.0782)
CE × LOWSC -0.146 -0.167
(0.109) (0.106)
Female 0.103
(0.0655)
Constant 0.172 0.210 0.111 0.0164
(0.106) (0.147) (0.104) (0.110)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.227 0.241 0.269 0.283
OLS regression, dependent variable is Individual Relative De-
viation (IndRD) for sales, an individual equivalent to mar-
ket level Relative Deviation (RD) restricted to sales only.
LOWSC is a dummy where 1 stands for LOWSC and 0 for
HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent. CRT
denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects
who indicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions
before were excluded. Heteroskedasticity robust standard er-
rors clustered at market level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.7: Determinants of Individual Miscpricing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndRD
LOWSC 0.383** 0.375** 0.723*** 0.760***
(0.138) (0.134) (0.160) (0.147)
CRT -0.0593 -0.0775 -0.0722
(0.0349) (0.0574) (0.0568)
CE -0.0155 0.0553 0.0600
(0.0457) (0.0461) (0.0475)
CRT × LOWSC 0.0461 0.0483
(0.0722) (0.0728)
CE × LOWSC -0.182** -0.200**
(0.0784) (0.0774)
Female 0.0884
(0.0584)
Constant 0.119 0.203 0.0648 -0.0159
(0.0979) (0.125) (0.0713) (0.0774)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.299 0.326 0.370 0.382
OLS regression, dependent variable is Individual Relative Devi-
ation (IndRD), an individual equivalent to market level Relative
Deviation (RD). LOWSC is a dummy where 1 stands for LOWSC
and 0 for HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent.
CRT denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT. Sub-
jects who indicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions
before were excluded. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at market level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table B.8: Second-Period Differences in Trading Behavior
Group Mean
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
pbid 29.400 31.803 0.510
pask 50.383 55.751 0.039**
qbid 15.441 15.407 0.659
qask 13.291 11.687 0.796
timebid 54.392 49.446 0.470
timeask 48.067 45.576 0.587
firsttimebid 42.484 40.912 0.683
firsttimeask 28.344 28.591 0.717
Variables starting with a p denote prices, q quantities
and time variables refer to the time passed in the cur-
rent period, thus lower values indicate behavior earlier
on. bid and ask refer to posted bids and asks, p-values
from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with data collapsed on
market and treatment level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table B.9: Determinants of Trading Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trading Profits
MIXLO 1.036 1.040 4.342* 4.301*
(0.770) (0.795) (2.222) (2.215)
CRT 1.084** 1.882*** 1.757**
(0.497) (0.621) (0.691)
CE 0.473 0.867 0.685
(0.550) (0.768) (0.753)
CRT × MIXLO -1.660** -1.547**
(0.642) (0.690)
CE × MIXLO -1.031 -1.051
(1.125) (1.098)
Female -1.381
(0.888)
Constant 7.035*** 5.302*** 3.936*** 5.326***
(0.441) (1.097) (1.323) (1.638)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R2 0.016 0.079 0.120 0.145
OLS regression, dependent variable is average trading profit from
asset market in e ˙ CRT denotes the number of correct answers
in the CRT. Subjects who indicated they knew one or more of
the CRT questions before were excluded. CE is the individual
certainty equivalent, robust standard errors clustered on market
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.3 Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task
0
.1
.2
.3
0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300
HIGHSC LOWSC
F
ra
ct
io
n
Stroop Task: Number of Correct Answers
Figure B.1: Correct Stroop responses in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Figure B.2: Stroop Trials in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Figure B.3: Errors in the Stroop Task in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
Table B.10: Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task
Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task
HIGHSC Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 192.65 22.6146
Trials 194.55 23.55973
Errors 1.9 1.879941
LOWSC Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 171.3125 20.68363
Trials 174.45 20.96948
Errors 3.14 2.971356
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Figure B.4: Correct Stroop Responses in Treatment MIXED by Condition
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Figure B.5: Stroop Trials in Treatment MIXED by Condition
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Figure B.6: Errors in the Stroop Task in Treatment MIXED by condition1
Table B.11: Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task (MIXED)
Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task (MIXED)
HIGHSC Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 179.225 24.1135
Trials 182.65 24.59784
Errors 2.425 1.448031
LOWSC Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 164.05 39.93838
Trials 178.3 25.47518
Errors 13.25 36.44367
1Two outliers were dropped from this display in the MIXLO group, both of whom apparently did
not fully understand the task. One had 123 errors and the other had 205 errors.
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B.4 Distribution of Subjective Measures
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Figure B.7: Strain in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Figure B.8: Tiredness in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Table B.12: Distribution of Subjective Measures
Distribution of Subjective Measures
HIGHSC Mean Standard deviation
Strain 2.6375 0.9839696
Tiredness 2.8 1.162712
LOWSC Mean Standard deviation
Strain 3.175 0.9907803
Tiredness 2.9875 1.206457
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Figure B.9: Strain in Treatment MIXED by Condition
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Figure B.10: Tiredness in Treatment MIXED by Condition
Table B.13: Distribution of Subjective Measures (MIXED)
Distribution of Subjective Measures (MIXED)
MIXHI Mean Standard deviation
Strain 2.375 1.14774
Tiredness 3.15 1.075365
MIXLO Mean Standard deviation
Strain 3.275 1.154423
Tiredness 3.35 1.188621
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B.5 Distribution of Answers in the Cognitive Reflection
Test
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Figure B.11: Correct CRT Answers in HIGHSC vs LOWSC
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Figure B.12: Correct CRT Answers in MIXED by condition
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Table B.14: Distribution of Answers in the Cognitive Reflection Test
Distribution of Answers in the Cognitive Reflection Test
Mean Standard deviation
HIGHSC 1.05 .9665284
LOWSC 1.1375 1.087836
MIXED Mean Standard deviation
MIXHI 1 .9607689
MIXLO .975 .9996794
B.6 Distribution of Certainty Equivalents
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Figure B.13: Individual Certainty Equivalents in HIGHSC vs LOWSC
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Figure B.14: Individual Certainty Equivalents in MIXED by Condition
Table B.15: Distribution of Individual Certainty Equivalents
Distribution of Individual Certainty Equivalents
Mean Standard deviation
HIGHSC 2.2 .8467361
LOWSC 2.145 .6964467
MIXED Mean Standard deviation
MIXHI 2.16 .6766433
MIXLO 2.24 .5494986
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B.7 Instructions
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on
General information on the procedure
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate economic decision making. You can
earn money during the experiment, which will be paid to you individually and in cash
after the experiment has ended.
The whole experiment takes about 1.5 hours and consists of 3 parts. At the beginning
you will receive detailed instructions for all parts of the experiment. If you have any
questions after reading the instructions or at any time during the experiment please
raise your hand. One of the experimenters will then come to you and answer your
question in private.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked to make decisions.
In some parts, you will interact with other participants. Thus both your own decisions
and the decisions of other participants can determine your payoffs. Your payoffs are
determined according to the rules which are explained in the following. As long as you
can make your decisions, a countdown will be displayed in the upper right corner of the
screen which is intended to give you an orientation for how much time you should use
to make your choices. In most parts you can exceed the time limit if needed; in some
parts, however, you can only act within the time limit (You will be informed about
this beforehand). Information screens not requiring any decisions will disappear after
the time-out.
Payment
In some parts of the experiment we will not refer points instead of Euros. Points will
be converted to Euros at the end of the experiment. You will be informed about the
exchange rate at the beginning of the respective part.
For your timely arrival you will receive 4 e additionally to the income earned during
the experiment.
Anonymity
We evaluate the data from the experiment only in aggregate and never connect personal
information to data from the experiment. At the end of the experiment you have to
Appendix B. Unleashing Animal Spirits – Self-Control and Overpricing 172
sign a receipt, which we need for our sponsor. The sponsor does not receive any further
data from the experiment.
Aid
On your desk you will find a pen. Please leave it on there after the experiment.
Part I
Task
The first part of the experiment consists of a task that will last 5 minutes. You will
see a black screen on which words in different colors will appear. Here you can see an
example:
You will be asked to click one of the buttons at the bottom of the screen. You will be
asked to choose the button corresponding to the color the word is written in (not the
word itself). In the example you should click on “yellow”.
After clicked a button, the screen disappears and another word in another color ap-
pears. Please try to solve as many word/color combinations as possible within 5
minutes.
After 5 minutes the first part ends automatically and the second part begins.
Payment
You receive 3 e for part I.
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Part II
Task
In the second part you first have to answer three questions. For each question answered
correctly you receive 0.5 e = 50 Cents.
Afterwards, you will be shown 10 decision problems. In each of these problems you
can choose between a lottery and a safe amount of money. The lottery remains
unchanged within a period, whereas the safe amount of money increases with every
additional decision problem. As the safe amount of money is strictly increasing from
row to row, you should stay with the safe amount of money after you have switched to
it once.
Your decision is only valid after you have made a choice for each problem and then
confirmed it by clicking the OK-button on the bottom right of the screen. Take enough
time for your decisions, as your choice – as described in the following – will determine
your payoff from this part.
Here you can see what your screen will look like:
Your profit will be determined according to the following rules: First, the computer
chooses randomly and with equal probability one of the ten decision problems for
payment. If you selected the lottery in the relevant problem, the computer will simulate
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the outcome and you will receive it as payment. If you selected the safe amount in the
relevant problem, you will receive it for sure.
For example: Assume the computer randomly chooses the first decision problem and
you chose the lottery. Then the computer will simulate the outcomes of this lottery
and you either receive 0.2 e (50% probability) or 4.2 e (50% probability).
Payment
The sum of your payoffs from the questions answered correctly at the beginning and
your payoff from the decision problem chosen by the computer are your payment for
part II of the experiment.
Please note: The computer will directly calculate the result. However, you will only
learn about this at the end of the experiments, i.e. how many questions you answered
correctly and which decision problem with which outcome the computer selected for
you. That information will be presented to you on a separate screen at the end of the
experiment.
After the end of part II, part III begins automatically.
Part III
Payment
In the third part of the experiment we refer to points rather than Euros. Points are
converted to Euros at the end of the experiment according to the following exchange
rate
500 points = 1 Euro (1 point = 0.002 Euros = 0.2 Cents)
Short Description
The third part of the experiment consists of a simulated stock market. The stock
market lasts for 10 consecutive periods. Within these periods you can buy or sell
shares of a single firm.
At the end of each period for every share that you own you receive either a dividend
of 10 points (probability 50%) or 0 points (probability 50%).
During the 2 minutes trading period you can either offer to sell or buy shares or accept
existing buying or selling offers by other participants.
Appendix B. Unleashing Animal Spirits – Self-Control and Overpricing 175
Detailed description: Trading Period
At the beginning of the first trading period you will receive an endowment of shares
and points. Every participant receives either 20 shares and 3000 points or 60 shares
and 1000 points. The distribution of endowments is random with a 50% probability of
receiving each endowment.
Each period lasts exactly 120 seconds (= 2 minutes) and all screens disappear after
the time out. You cannot make any trades or offers until he next trading period starts.
During a trading period neither your amount of shares nor your amount of points can
fall below zero.
During a trading period your screen will look like the following.
In the upper box you see the current period and how much time you have left in the
current period. Below it to the left the box displays how many shares you currently
own and how large your current wealth is expressed in points. Additionally the current
share price and the amount of available shares and points are displayed.
Available shares are those of your shares that you have not offered for sale yet. If you
offer to sell shares, you still own them, but they will be subtracted from your account
as soon as someone else accepts your offer. Hence, you can only make sale offers that
do not exceed your current amount of available shares.
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Available points are those of your points that you have not used for buying offers yet.
If you make an offer to buy shares, you still own the points, but they will be subtracted
from your account as soon as someone else accepts your offer. Hence, you can only
make buying offers that do not exceed your current amount of available points.
On the bottom left you can see a graph that shows the evolution of share prices in the
current period. On the horizontal axis (the x-axis) you can see the time in seconds at
which a trade was made. On the vertical axis (the y-axis) you can see the corresponding
price.
In the upper part of the screen you see two lists that have the headlines “Previous Sales”
and “Previous Purchases”. Here, every trade that you made is listed. For each trade
where you bought shares, price and quantity will be listed in “Previous Purchases”.
For each trade where you sold shares, price and quantity will be listed in “Previous
Sales”.
Below you find two lists with the headlines “Current Selling Offers” and “Current
Buying Offers”.
Accepting Selling Offers
In the list “Current Selling Offers” you find price and quantity of each offer, in which
a participant offers to sell shares. Your own selling offers will also appear in this list.
You can accept every offer in this list (except for your own offers) by marking the
corresponding entry in the list, entering the quantity you want to buy into the field
“quantity”, and then confirming by clicking on the button “Buy”. If you accept a selling
offer, you will receive the number of shares that you have entered from the seller and
the seller receives the corresponding price for each share he sold to you.
Please note: You can also buy less than the number of shares stated in the offer. In
that case the offer of the seller will remain on display in the list after the trade, but
the number of shares on offer will be reduced by your purchase. Example: A seller
makes an offer to sell 10 shares at the price of 60 points each. A buyer buys 6 of those
shares. Then an offer to buy 4 shares at the price of 60 points each will continue to be
available to all other participants.
Please note that the computer automatically marks the best selling offer (i.e. the one
with the lowest price) with a blue bar. You can recognize your own offers, as they are
not displayed in black but in blue font.
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Accepting offers to buy
In the list “Current Buying Offers” you find price and quantity of each offer, in which
a participant offers to buy shares. Your own buying offers will also appear in this
list. You can accept every offer in this list (except for you own offers) by marking
the corresponding entry in the list, entering the quantity you want to sell into the
field “quantity”, and then confirming by clicking on the button “Sell”. If you accept a
buying offer, the other participant will receive the number of shares that you entered
and you receive the corresponding price for each share you sold.
Please note: You can also sell less than the number of shares the buyer offers to buy.
In that case the offer of the buyer will remain on display in the list after the trade, but
the number of shares demanded will be reduced by your sale.
Please note that the computer automatically marks the best buying offer (i.e. the one
with the highest price) with a blue bar. You can recognize your own offers according
to their blue font.
Creating Selling or Buying Offers
In the bottom part of the screen you have the possibility to create your own selling
or buying offers. If you want to create an offer to sell, enter the quantity of shares
that you want to sell and the price per share which you demand for each unit in the
field below “You Want to Sell” . After clicking the button “Create Selling Offer”, your
selling offer will show up in the list “Current offers to sell”. Example: You want to sell
10 shares at a price of 55 points per share. Then you enter 10 into the field “Quantity”
and 55 into the field “Price”.
If you want to create a buying offer, enter the quantity that you want to buy in the
field below “You Want to Buy” and the price per share for which you are willing to
buy that quantity. After clicking the button “Make Buying Offer” your offer will show
up in the list “Current Buying Offers”. Example: You want to buy 20 shares at a price
of 45 points per share. Then you enter 20 into the field “amount” and 45 into the field
“price”.
Please note: An offer to buy or to sell that has been made cannot be cancelled. Only
if no one accepts an offer during the course of a trading period, it will not be displayed
in the next period of trade.
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Dividends
After the end of a trading period the following screen displays a summary of the
previous period showing you how many shares and points you own, whether a dividend
has been paid and if so, how large your overall dividend payments were.
In each period the dividend per share either amount to 10 points (with a probability
of 50%) or to 0 points (with a probability of 50%) and is the same for all shares. After
the end of period 10, all shares are worthless. All participants learn the realization
of the dividend simultaneously on a separate screen at the end of the corresponding
period.
The following table displays the value pattern of a share, i.e. the expected value of
the remaining dividends. The first column indicates the current period, in the second
column you find the number of remaining dividend payments. The third column shows
the average expected dividend per share and period. The last column shows the average
of remaining dividends per share in the corresponding period.
Current Remaining dividend x Average dividend = Average remaining
period payments value per period dividends per share
(0 or 10 with equal probability) that you own
1 10 5 50
2 9 5 45
3 8 5 40
4 7 5 35
5 6 5 30
6 5 5 25
7 4 5 20
8 3 5 15
9 2 5 10
10 1 5 5
Assume for example that four trading periods remain. As the dividend per share is
either 0 or 10 points with a probability of 50% each, this yields an expected dividend
of 5 points per share and period. Assume you only own one single share which you
intend to hold until the market closes. Then you can expect a total dividend payment
for the four remaining periods of ‘4 remaining periods’ x ‘5 points’ = ‘20 points’.
Payoff
At the end of part III the shares no remaining value. Only your amount of points will
be converted to Euros according to the exchange rate stated above of 1 point = 0.002
Euros = 0.2 Cents.
Afterwards, you will see a screen displaying your payoffs from the second part.
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In the following, we will ask you to completely and honestly answer some questions
concerning your person. On leaving the laboratory, we will pay you your profit privately
and in cash. Please remain seated until we call you up in a random order. Please leave
the instructions and the pen at your desk and take your numbered seat card with
you.
Practice Period
Before you start today’s experiment with part I, you will first play a practice period of
part III to become familiar with the stock market. The payoff from this practice period
will not influence your final payoff. Please note that the realization of the dividend
and your endowment are not necessarily identical to the first period of part III as the
realization is random and endowments will be randomly assigned.
After completion of the practicing period part I of the experiment begins.
Appendix C
High-Frequency Trading, Maker-Taker
Pricing and Behavioral Adjustments:
An Experimental Study of Pricing
Structures in Fast-Paced Markets
C.1 Instructions
This experiment is used for the investigation of economic decision-making. You can
thereby earn money. The money will be paid out privately and in cash after the
experiment.
The whole experiment approximately lasts 1 hour and consists of three independent
parts. At the beginning of each part you receive detailed instructions. Please raise your
hand if you have any questions after reading through the instructions or during the
experiment. One of the experimenters will then come to you and answer your questions
in private. For reasons of linguistic simplification we will only use male expressions in
the instructions, which also apply for female participants.
In the experiment you and other participants of the experiment are asked to make
decisions. In some cases you are going to interact with other participants. Your
decisions as well as the decisions of other participants determine your earnings from
the experiment according to the rules explained below.
While making your decisions, there is a clock counting down in the right upper corner
of your computer screen. This clock serves as a guide for how much time it should
take you. In most of the cases you may exceed this time frame in case you need
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additional time for making your decisions. However, in some parts you have to make
your decisions within this time limit. Screens, which do not require any input, will be
hidden after the time has expired.
Payment
In some parts of the experiment your earnings will not be counted in Euros but in
points. At the end of the experiment, these points are converted to Euros at a given
exchange rate. The corresponding exchange rate will be given at the beginning of the
respective part.
In addition to the money earned during the experiment, you receive 4 Euros for arriving
on time.
Anonymity
The data from the experiment are only evaluated on an aggregate level and names are
never related to data. At the end of the experiment you have to sign a receipt, which
only serves for billing with our sponsor. This sponsor does not receive any further
information from the experiment.
Tools
You can find a pen on your table. Please leave it there after the experiment.
Part I
Payment
In this part of the experiment your earnings will not be counted in Euros but in points.
At the end of the experiment, these points are converted to Euros at the exchange rate
of
1000 Points = e 1
(1 Point = e 0.001 = 0.1 Cent)
Short description
The first part of the experiment refers to the simulation of a stock market. The stock
market exists for 10 consecutive periods, in which you can buy and sell shares of a
single company.
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After the tenth period you receive the surrender value for each share in your possession.
The redemption value may change in every period and will be announced after each
trading period.
During the trading period of 120 seconds (2 minutes), you can create purchase or sales
offers for shares, as well as accept the offers of other participants.
Detailed description: Trading Period
At the beginning of the first period you receive you get a basic set of shares and
points. Each participant receives gets either 20 shares and 3000 points or 60 shares
and 1000 points. Which set you will receive is a random choice with equal probabilities
(50%).
Each period lasts for 120 seconds and all screens will be blanked out after this time
has expired. No trade is possible until the beginning of the next period. In none of the
trading periods your stock of shares and points can drop below zero.
During trading periods your screen looks like follows:
In the top row you can see in which period you are and how much time is left in the
current period. The left-sided block below displays your current amount of shares and
points. Additionally, the current stock price and the amount of available shares and
points are shown.
Available shares are shares, which you did not offer for sale. If you offer shares for sale,
you still own them, but as soon as somebody accepts your offer, they do not longer
belong to your account of shares. Therefore, you cannot offer more than your available
shares.
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Available points are points, which you did not use for purchase offers. If you make a
purchase offer, you still own the amount of points you need for the transaction, but
as soon as somebody accepts your offer, these are no longer yours. Therefore, you can
only create purchase offers that do not exceed your available points.
In the lower left part of the screen, you can see a graph, which displays the course of
the share price. On the horizontal axis (x-axis) you see the time at which a trade was
completed. On the vertical axis (y-axis) you see the corresponding price.
In the upper part of the screen you see two lists, which are labeled “Bisherige Verkaeufe”
(prior sales) and “Bisherige Kaeufe” (prior purchases). These lists display all your
completed trades. Each purchase will be listed with the corresponding price in the
“Bisherige Kaeufe” list and each sale will be listed with the corresponding price in the
“Bisherige Verkaeufe” list.
Below that, you can find two lists named “Aktuelle Verkaufsangebote” (current sales
offers) and “Aktuelle Kaufangebote” (current purchase offers).
Accepting Sales Offers
The list “Aktuelle Verkaufsangebote” (current sales offers) contains the prices of all
sale offers of all participants. Your own sales offers will also appear in this list. You
can accept an offer from that list (except your own offers) by clicking the “Kaufen”
(purchase) button. You then receive a share from the seller and the seller receives the
corresponding price from you.
Please note that the computer automatically marks the best offer (the offer with the
lowest corresponding price) with a blue bar. You can identify your own offers by the
blue font color (instead of black).
Accepting Purchase Offers
The list “Aktuelle Kaufangebote” (current purchase offers) contains the prices of all
purchase offers of all participants. Your own purchase offers will also appear in this
list. You can accept an offer from that list (except your own offers) by clicking the
“Verkaufen” (sale) button. The buyer then receives a share from you and you receive
the corresponding price from the buyer.
Please note that the computer here again automatically marks the best offer (the offer
with the highest corresponding price) with a blue bar. You can identify your own offers
by the blue font color (instead of black).
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Creating Sales and Purchase Offers
You have the option to create sales and purchase offers in the lower part of the
screen.
If you want to create a sales offer, enter the price per share into the box below the “Sie
moechten verkaufen” (you want to sale) section. After clicking the “Verkaufsangebot
erstellen” (creating a sales offer) button, your offer appears in the “Aktuelle Verkauf-
sangebote” (current sales offers) list. Example: You want to sell a share for the price
of 50. Then you have to enter 50 into the “Preis” (price) box.
If you want to create a purchase offer, enter the price per share into the box below the
“Sie moechten kaufen” (you want to purchase) section. After clicking the “Kaufange-
bot erstellen” (creating a purchase offer) button, your offer appears in the “Aktuelle
Kaufangebote” (current purchase offers) list. Example: You want to buy a share for
the price of 80. Then you have to enter 80 into the “Preis” (price) box.
Please note: If nobody accepts your offer during a trading period, this offer will not
be displayed in the next trading period.
Deleting Offers
You can withdraw an offer as long as nobody accepts it. Therefore, you have to mark
your offer (in the “Aktuelle Verkaufsangebote” (current sales offers) or the “Aktuelle
Kaufangebote” (current purchase offers) list) and click the “Angebot loeschen” (delete
the offer) button directly below the list.
Further characteristics of the stock market
It is possible, that your stock market possesses one (or both) of the following character-
istics. First of all, we describe these characteristics. At the end of the instructions you
are informed whether these characteristics apply to your stock market or not.
Computerized Traders
In some of the markets, a computer will have the role of an additional trader. The
computer will always create sales and purchase offers, but never accept any open offer.
The offers of the computer are not marked differently than those of other traders. The
computer is programmed as follows: at any time, it will have 3 purchase offers below
the current stock price and 3 sales offers above the current stock price in the offer lists.
In doing so, the computer will never offer more than 100 points or less than 0 points
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for a share. The computer is programmed to decide very quickly (within fractions
of a second). Possible discounts and fees (see below) also apply to the computerized
trader.
Discounts and Fees In some of the markets, there exists a discount and fee structure.
By conclusion of a trade, the trader who created the sales or purchase offer receives an
additional point per transaction, whereas the trader who accepted the offer has to pay
an additional point per transaction.
Example: Trader A creates a sales offer for 50 points. Trader B accepts the offer.
Therefore, trader A has to pay 49 points (50 points − 1 point discount), because he
created the offer, and trader B has to pay 51 points (50 points + 1 point fee), because
he accepted the open offer.
Estimation Questions After each trading period we will ask you to answer some estima-
tion questions. Please answer these questions as precisely as possible. At the end, the
computer randomly and with equal probabilities chooses one period and one question
of the corresponding period. Your payment is higher the closer your estimation is to
the real value. For a correct estimation you receive 2.00 Euros. The further away from
the real value, the lower is your payment. You cannot receive less than 0 Euro for the
estimation question.
Redemption Value
Initially, the redemption value is 50 points and is the same for all shares. After each
trading period, the redemption value changes. It either increases by 20 points (with a
probability of 50%) or decreases by 20 points (with a probability of 50%). However,
the stock value cannot drop below 0 points or rise above 100 points. The change of
the redemption value is the same for all participants. After the conclusion of the tenth
period, you are informed about the final redemption value of the share. You receive
this redemption value for each share you own at this point.
Earnings After repurchase, the shares do not have any further value. Your amount of
points (consisting of your points account and the points obtained by the repurchase
of shares) will be converted into Euros following the exchange rate of 1 Point = 0.001
Euros = 0.1 Cent as stated above. Additionally, you receive the amount from the
estimation questions.
Trial Periods Before we are starting with today’s experiment, you have to answer some
comprehension questions before you have to complete two trial periods to get to know
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the stock market. The income from the trial periods is not part of your earnings.
Please note that the basic set of the trial periods does not have to be identical to the
one of the first period of Part I because the realization is random and the initial sets
are randomly assigned. The trial periods are identical to Part I with respect to the
characteristics of the stock market.
After the conclusion of the trial periods, Part I of the experiment begins.
Characteristics of the stock market for all periods
There are [no] computerized traders in your stock market.
There are [no] discounts and fees in your stock market.
Part II
Exercise
The second part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making problems. For each
of these problems you can choose between a lottery (option A) and a certain amount
of money (option B). The lottery is the same for all 20 decision-making problems, but
the certain amount of money rises with each decision-making problem.
Specifically, your screen looks like follows:
Option A always pays you 1.50 Euros with a probability of 50% and 3.50 Euros with a
probability of 50%. The secured amount of money of option B starts with 1.60 Euros
and increases at intervals of 0.10 Euros (= 10 Cent) until it reaches 3.50 Euros for the
twentieth decision.
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Please choose your preferred option, either option A or option B, for each of the 20
decisions. Please note: since the fixed amount constantly increases, once you have
chosen the certain amount of money, you should remain at your decision.
Payment
Your earnings from Part II are determined as follows: first, the computer chooses
randomly and with equal probabilities one out of these 20 decision-making problems.
If you have chosen the lottery for the corresponding decision, the computer will simulate
this lottery and you will receive the result from the lottery. If you have chosen the
certain amount of money, you will receive this amount.
Example: Assume that the computer randomly chooses the first decision-making prob-
lem and you have chosen the lottery there. Then the computer simulates the lottery
and you receive either 1.50 Euros (with a probability of 50%) or 3.50 Euros (with a
probability of 50%).
Please note: the computer calculates your earnings from this part of the experiment
instantaneously, but you will not be informed about your earnings at this point. You
will receive this information on a separate screen at the end of the experiment.
Part III
Payment
In this part of the experiment your earnings will not be counted in Euros but in points.
At the end of the experiment, these points are converted to Euros at the exchange rate
of
20 Points =e 1
(1 Point = e 0.05 = 5 Cent)
Description
A framed matrix is displayed on your screen, which is a rectangular arrangement of
various symbols. The matrix consists of 3 columns and 3 rows. The symbol in the right
lower corners is missing. Below the matrix, there are 8 symbols available for selection,
where only one schematically fits into the lower right corner of the matrix. Enclosed
you will find an example:
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In this example, symbol 5 would be the correct answer.
Your task is to choose the correct symbol. As soon as you confirm your choice, a new
matrix appears including 8 new symbols, where again only one fits into the lower right
corner of the matrix.
You have to select a symbol for each matrix. Without making a choice you cannot move
on to the next matrix. Furthermore, there is no chance to get back to the previous
matrix and change your choice once you have confirmed your choice of a symbol.
Overall, you have 5 minutes (300 seconds) to solve as many matrices as possible. The
remaining time is presented in the upper right corner of your screen. In the lower left
corner of your screen, you can see how many matrices you have solved correctly and
wrongly, respectively, so far and whether your last choice was correct or wrong. The
matrices’ level of difficulty increases over time.
Earnings
You receive 5 points for each correctly solved matrix. For each wrongly solved matrix,
5 points are deducted. Therefore, your total score is:
Total score = 5 x (# correctly solved matrices − # wrongly solved matrices)
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If you have solved more matrices wrong than correct, you receive 0 points for this part.
Your amount of points will be converted to Euros following the exchange rate stated
above.
Following Part III, we ask you to completely and truthfully answer a few questions
about personal details. After that, you will be informed about your earnings, which
will be paid out in cash afterwards. Please remain seated until we call you for pay-
ment.
Appendix D
Shocking Racial Attitudes: The
Cultural Legacy of Black G.I.s in
Europe
D.1 Alternative Treatment Geography
As an alternative to our main specification, we define a military base as being close
to a neighbourhood if the base is within k kilometers of that neighbourhood’s popu-
lation weighted centroid. Using this definition of ‘close’, our main treatment measure
becomes:
Black Unit Monthsi =
∑
t
∑
b
1[dist(i, b) < k] · BlackUnitsb,t
where dist(i, b) is the euclidean distance (in meters) between the populated weighted
centroid of neighbourhood i and the given coordinates of base b. Table D.1 reports
regression results with k set to 2 kilometers. The columns follow those of Table 4.2.
The results are very similar to that specification. Figure D.1 shows the effect of varying
k on the estimate of the coefficient on BlackUnits. We run 100 regressions and plot
the estimated coefficient on BlackUnitMonths along with a 95% confidence interval.
The point estimate decreases with distance – individuals living in areas closer to bases
were more likely to have contact with them.
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Table D.1: Baseline Regressions using 2 km Radius
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Within 2km radius:
Black unit-months -0.0113∗ -0.0143∗∗ -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0153∗∗ -0.0146∗∗
(-1.95) (-2.31) (-2.63) (-2.28) (-2.14)
Unit-mnths (100s) -0.00363 0.0375∗ 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0707∗∗∗ 0.0694∗∗∗
(-0.14) (1.89) (2.68) (4.10) (3.91)
F-stat joint significance tests on:
Grid cells 1.81969e+10 76626.0 502.0 472.7
Industrial Sectors (1931) 0.998 2.006 1.669
Population Density (1931) 6.527 2.117 2.353
Urban Rural status (1931) 0.434 1.299 1.194
Distances 1.768 1.356 1.258
Qualifications (2011) 3.708 3.895
Unemployment (2011) 0.445 0.499
Housing Tenure (2011) 1.267 1.115
Ethnic Backgrounds (2011) 0.470
Clusters 271 271 271 271 271
Observations 42181 42181 42135 42135 42135
Coefficients from OLS regressions using troops within a 2 km radius of the neighbourhood
as dependent variable. The unit of observation is the neighbourhood (2011 census output
area). Outcome is BNP members per 10,000 white inhabitants. Independent variables are
our measure for contact with black troops ‘Black unit-months’ and any troops ‘unit-months’
(divided by one hundred) respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority
district level. T statistics in brackets. One, two and three stars indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Figure D.1: Varying Search Radius
This figure shows an estimate of our treatment effect varying the radius k in which troops are
considered to be close to a neighbourhood.
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Figure E.1: Background checks for long guns in delayed vs instant states
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Figure E.2: Background checks for total guns in delayed vs instant states
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Figure E.3: Long gun sales in delayed states and synthetic control states
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Figure E.4: Google searches for ‘gun store’ in delayed vs instant states
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Figure E.5: Google searches for ‘gun show’ in delayed vs instant states
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E.2 Tables
Table E.1: Handgun background checks (including CT)
Monthly handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Handgun Long gun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 26.199∗∗∗ 25.485∗∗∗ 101.699∗∗∗ 21.013∗∗ 14.515 44.114∗∗
(8.016) (9.283) (28.357) (8.467) (10.086) (21.056)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
State FE×t N N Y N N Y
States 51 51 51 51 51 51
Observations 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224
Mean DV 162.52 162.52 162.52 188.79 188.79 188.79
R2 0.882 0.904 0.919 0.890 0.924 0.937
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of monthly handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants on our
treatment indicator and controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at
Sandy Hook. The level of observation is the state level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the
(weighted) mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with
Month FE); Regressions are weighted by state population.
Table E.2: Violent crimes (including CT)
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
All Murder Mansl’ter Rape Robbery Agg.
Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 0.979 0.058∗∗∗ 0.004 0.024 0.461 0.436
(0.787) (0.020) (0.005) (0.169) (0.518) (0.406)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 2090 2090 2090 2090 2090 2090
Observations 50,160 50,160 50,160 50,160 50,160 50,160
Mean DV 30.05 0.37 0.01 2.33 9.04 18.3
R2 0.917 0.363 0.095 0.463 0.945 0.859
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and
controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of
observation is the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the
dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls:
Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions
are weighted by county population.
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Table E.3: Background checks with wider time window
Monthly gun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Handgun Long gun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 37.286∗∗∗ 38.433∗∗∗ 32.789∗∗∗ 32.707∗∗∗ 26.629∗∗∗ 9.703
(10.356) (12.700) (7.127) (7.758) (8.193) (9.183)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
State FE×t N N Y N N Y
States 50 50 50 50 50 50
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,000 3,000 3,000
Mean DV 134.34 134.34 134.34 158.47 158.47 158.47
R2 0.834 0.854 0.876 0.889 0.924 0.931
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of monthly gun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants on our
treatment indicator and controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at
Sandy Hook. The level of observation is the state level. We include data from the years 2009 to 2014. Mean DV shows the
(weighted) mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with
Month FE); Regressions are weighted by state population
Table E.4: Violent crimes (varying trend levels)
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
Murder Mansl’ter Agg. Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instant × Post 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.010 0.458 0.458 0.040 0.438 0.438 0.189
(0.021) (0.020) (0.014) (0.534) (0.522) (0.305) (0.414) (0.405) (0.234)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y N N Y N N Y N N
State FE×t N Y N N Y N N Y N
Region FE×t N N Y N N Y N N Y
Counties 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084 2084
Observations 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016 50,016
Mean DV 0.38 0.38 0.38 9.05 9.05 9.05 18.39 18.39 18.39
R2 0.363 0.332 0.331 0.945 0.938 0.937 0.859 0.843 0.843
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and
controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of
observation is the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the
dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls:
Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions
are weighted by county population.
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Table E.5: Violent crimes (include all agencies)
Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
Murder Mansl’ter Agg. Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 0.055∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.458 0.401 0.438 0.378
(0.021) (0.023) (0.534) (0.467) (0.414) (0.379)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y Y Y
50% coverage rule Y N Y N Y N
Counties 2084 2453 2084 2453 2084 2453
Observations 50,016 58,872 50,016 58,872 50,016 58,872
Mean DV 0.38 0.36 9.05 8.66 18.39 18.23
R2 0.363 0.303 0.945 0.903 0.859 0.796
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and
controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of
observation is the county level. We include data from the years 2012 and 2013. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the
dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls:
Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions
are weighted by county population.
E.3 Additional Analyses
E.3.1 Theoretical Motivation: Competing Theories
This section intends to deliver additional arguments for why only present-bias and
transaction costs potentially cause our findings. We will thus provide other theories
that under some assumptions can explain the effect and argue why these assumptions
seem too restrictive.
One candidate to explain our findings would be inattention to transaction costs. If
consumers do not pay attention to the transaction costs when making the Google
search for ‘gun store’, but only realize it when they actually buy the gun, we would
observe a similar effect. Note however that once consumers arrive at a gun store to
make a purchase, the transaction costs of the first trip are sunk and therefore those
that intend to buy a gun should also do so. Additionally, when consumers search for
‘gun store’ in order to buy a gun, they presumably have spent time to deliberate the
purchasing decision and therefore also thought about potential transaction costs. We
therefore discount inattention to transaction costs as a plausible reason.
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Other theoretical explanations from behavioral economics can also be ruled out to
cause our findings. As already stated in the main text, projection bias or different
emotional states will not cause the disparity between searches and actual sales, as long
as emotions or preferences don’t change between the search and the planned visit to
the gun store. The reason is that these behavioral biases do not interact with the
waiting periods. The decision to buy is made when the background check is conducted
at the first visit at the gun store, and not when the firearm is picked up (after the
waiting period expired). Our findings also indicate that preference changes between
the search and gun store visit should play no role. We expect the shock to affect
preferences immediately after the shock (and indeed the largest spike in gun sales can
be seen in the month immediately after the shooting). Since there is not much temporal
space between the Google searches and the purchases, there is little room for changes
in emotional states. We also do not see any differential effect further away from the
shooting, which could indicate more thoughtful and less impulsive decision making
about purchasing a gun.
E.3.2 Gun Shows: Extensive Margins
One could be concerned that lower demand for firearms in delayed states arises because
buyers flock to unregulated gun shows to circumvent the tedious and time-consuming
process of purchasing through a federally licensed dealer. As previously noted, the
majority of transactions at gun shows is presumably represented in our sample, since
many exhibitors are federally licensed (and therefore mandated to perform background
checks), many states have regulations for sales at gun shows and the number of guns
acquired at gun shows is estimated to be comparatively small. Additionally, we have
demonstrated that the demand for gun shows did not tilt towards delayed states.
To show that also the supply of gun shows did not increase stronger in delayed than
in instant states, Figure E.6 shows the evolution of gun shows in both types of states
graphically.
Table E.6 reports regression results of the number of monthly gun shows per 100,000
inhabitants on the joint effect of being in an instant state after the Sandy Hook shoot-
ing, again utilizing our set of controls from previous regressions interacted with month
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the state level, we employ month and
county fixed effects and a time trend that is allowed to be different in each county.
Column 1 reports the results for the years immediately before and after the shooting
at Sandy Hook. We expand the time dimension in column 2 by the years 2011 and 2014
respectively, and column 3 looks at all years of the Obama administration. Overall,
there does not seem to be an effect of the shooting on the number of gun shows in
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Figure E.6: Gun shows in delayed vs instant states
delayed vs instant states, as the coefficient is very close to zero and not statistically
significant at any conventional level. Only column 3 shows a significant effect, but it
suggests that the supply of gun shows increased stronger in instant states after the
shooting. Thus we can conclude that the supply of gun shows in delayed states very
likely did not increase over instant states.
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Table E.6: Regressions of gun shows before and after Sandy Hook
Monthly gun shows per 100,000 inhabitants
2012-2013 2011-2014 2009-2014
(1) (2) (3)
Instant × Post −0.009 0.008 0.014∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
County FE Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y
Counties 3134 3134 3134
Observations 75,216 150,432 225,648
Mean DV 0.04 0.04 0.03
R2 0.537 0.408 0.376
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of gun shows per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls.
Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the shooting at Sandy Hook. The level of observation is the
county level. Columns indicate the time frame for which we include data. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent
variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population);
Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by county
population.
E.3.3 The 2008 Presidential Election
As an additional robustness check, and because we cannot separate the 2012 Presiden-
tial election from the shooting at Sandy Hook, we can re-run our regression of murders
using the 2008 Presidential Election as the event that triggered another gun demand
shift, without being violent in nature. According to anecdotal evidence, the 2008 elec-
tion similarly drove up gun sales (CNN, 2008) and this is also confirmed by recent
research (Depetris-Chauvin, 2015). We therefore repeat our regression from table 5.2
to see if gun sales were also differentially affected by the 2008 election. The results can
be found in Table E.7.
Clearly, the results for both long- and handguns are significant across all our specifica-
tions and go in the same direction as in our main specification. Table E.8 then repeats
our regression of violent crimes from Table 5.6, but now looks at the years of 2008
and 2009, and takes the 2008 Presidential election as the event date.1 We observe an
effect on murder rates that goes in the same direction as in Table 5.6 and is of sim-
ilar magnitude, but that is not statistically significant due to larger standard errors.
A Z-test (Clogg et al., 1995) comparing our murder estimate in Table 5.6 with our
estimate in Table E.8 cannot find statistically significant differences between the two
estimates (p = .9101). We view this exercise as suggestive that the 2008 Presidential
election might have had a similar effect, but that we are unable to correctly identify
the effect.
1For these years, we use the data by (USDOJ: FBI, 2010; USDOJ: FBI, 2011).
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Table E.7: Handgun background checks (2008 election)
Monthly handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Handgun Long gun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 19.515∗∗∗ 18.651∗∗∗ 56.765∗∗∗ 29.780∗∗∗ 27.197∗∗∗ 52.925∗∗∗
(5.326) (6.418) (15.227) (5.611) (6.865) (16.979)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
State FE×t N N Y N N Y
States 50 50 50 50 50 50
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
Mean DV 94.55 94.55 94.55 133.88 133.88 133.88
R2 0.936 0.946 0.955 0.892 0.928 0.932
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of monthly handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants on our treat-
ment indicator and controls. Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the 2008 Presidential election.
The level of observation is the state level. We include data from the years 2008 and 2009. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean
of the dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls:
Log(population); Area; % Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are
weighted by state population.
Table E.8: Violent crimes after 2008 Presidential election
2008 election: Monthly incidents per 100,000 inhabitants
All Murder Mansl’ter Rape Robbery Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instant × Post 1.584 0.050 0.004 −0.188 0.883∗ 0.839
(1.457) (0.039) (0.004) (0.139) (0.529) (0.991)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
County FE×t Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 1975 1975 1975 1975 1975 1975
Observations 47,400 47,400 47,400 47,400 47,400 47,400
Mean DV 35.58 0.42 0.01 2.32 11.45 21.39
R2 0.931 0.382 0.092 0.456 0.953 0.878
Notes: Coefficients from linear panel regressions of crime incidents per 100,000 inhabitants on our treatment indicator and controls.
Instant denotes a dummy for instant states, Post denotes months after the 2008 Presidential election. The level of observation is
the county level. We include data from the years 2008 and 2009. Mean DV shows the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable.
Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Log(population); Area; %
Rural; % Blacks; % Hispanics; % Below poverty line (all interacted with Month FE); Regressions are weighted by county population.
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